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Abstract
Business processes in various sectors such as financial, healthcare and resources,
are constantly exposed to a wide range of risks. Failures in the management of
these risks can result in substantial financial and reputational consequences, po-
tentially threatening an organization’s existence. Legislative initiatives in the fi-
nance sector have highlighted the pressing need to better manage risks in business
processes. As a consequence of these mandates, organizations are now seeking new
ways to control risks that may influence business processes and are attempting to
incorporate risk management as a distinct view in their operational management.
However, whilst conceptually appealing, to date there is little guidance as to how
this can best be done.
The objective of this research is to develop a fully-operational approach for the
management of risks related to executable business processes in near real-time.
This approach consists of four main contributions: i) a language for defining risks
on top of a process model at design-time; ii) a technique to detect such risks at
run-time, i.e. during process execution; iii) a technique for making risk-informed
decisions at run-time, e.g. by suggesting the next process task to perform in
order to reduce a given risk; and iv) a technique to automatically mitigate the
identified risks at run-time, by performing minimal changes on a running process
instance. By incorporating elements of risk in all stages of the lifecycle of exe-
cutable business processes, this work contributes to create a more effective link
between the fields of Business Process Management and Risk Management. The
approach was implemented on top of the YAWL system and evaluated though
the use of artificial and real-life data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Area
In the era of information, the increasing development and adoption of Internet
technologies gave companies the opportunity to foster integration and networking.
This allowed the emergence of Process-Aware Information Systems, i.e. “software
systems that manage and execute operational processes involving people, appli-
cations, and/or information sources on the basis of process models” [DAH05].
Process-Aware Information Systems, drastically improved the way companies
execute their business processes, for example, by reducing execution time or en-
forcing standard execution of processes [Gar14, RA05] since process models are
executed via process engines. As result of the adoption of PAISs, companies
increased the control over the way business processes are executed.
On the one hand, cases like the recent incidents in the finance sector (the
e 4.9B fraud at Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale [Jac10]; the US$2.3B UBS rogue trading scandal
[FB13]), in the health sector (the Patel Inquiry [Tho10, Hig]) and in the aviation
industry (terrorist attacks [Woo08]) show how business processes are exposed to
risks. On the other hand, companies constantly invest money trying to prepare
themselves against possible risks for their business activities, since the increased
control over a business process, obtained through the adoption of PAISs, does
not make it safe.
According to the AS/NZS ISO 31000 standard, a business process risk is the
chance of something happening that will have a negative impact on the process
objectives, and is measured in terms of likelihood and consequence [Sta09]. Leg-
islative initiatives such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [10702] and Basel III [Bas11]
in the finance sector have highlighted the pressing need to better manage business
process risks. As a consequence of these mandates, organizations are now seeking
1
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new ways to control process-related risk and are attempting to incorporate it as
a distinct view in their operational management [WW11, RBGR06]. However,
whilst conceptually appealing, to date there is little guidance as to how this can
be done concretely. Currently, the disciplines of business process management
and risk management are largely disjoint and operate independently of one an-
other [SWW+14]. In industry they are usually handled by different organizational
units, where the disconnectedness of the risk control systems in place provides an
environment for potentially high risk exposure.
1.2 Terminology
Several definitions of “risk” [Int09, Sta04, Sta09, SGF01, Swa98] have been pro-
posed in the area of Risk Management. In the context of this research we deal
with risks related to business processes, also called process-related risks. The
definition of process-related risk that we use is inspired by the definition of risk
proposed by the AS/NZS ISO 4360 Standard [Sta04] where a risk is “the chance
of something happening that will have an impact upon organizational objectives.
It is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood”.
We base our definition of process-related risk on the definition of process-
related fault.
A process-related fault, also called a threat, is an unwanted situation
that will negatively impact upon the objectives of a business process.
A fault is identified by a condition and a consequence. The condition de-
scribes the unwanted situation, while the consequence describes how the fault
may impact the process objectives. In particular a consequence is represented
using the magnitude of the impact, e.g. the amount of money lost due to the
fault. An example of a process-related fault is an overtime fault for a payment
process. A Service-Level Agreement (SLA) may establish that the process may
not last longer than a Maximum Cycle Time, MCT. An overtime process fault
happens if the process execution time exceeds the MCT. The consequence in this
case is a fine proportional to the exceeded time.
Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between process-related risk and fault.
A process-related risk is the chance of a process-related fault happen-
ing and is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood.
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Process-related
Fault
Condition Consequence
Process-related 
Risk
Consequence Condition
Likelihood Threshold
Figure 1.1: Process-related Fault and Risk: Definition and Relationship.
The consequence of a process-related risk is inherited from the fault’s conse-
quence since the eventuation of a risk is a fault. The likelihood of a process-related
risk is considered in correlation to a threshold. The threshold identifies the limit
above which a risk is no longer tolerable for that business process. Finally, though
the product of consequence and likelihood for a risk may be relevant for its treat-
ment, it is not strictly required for its detection, thus we did not include this
product in the definition of process-related risk. Considering the overtime fault
illustrated before, the risk associated with this fault is defined as the probability
that the remaining time needed for the completion of the process plus the time
used will exceed the MCT.
1.2.1 Business Process Management
Business Process Management (BPM) is a holistic approach whose ultimate goal
is improving organizational business processes. BPM has its roots in a number of
concepts including Business Process Reengineering, Quality Management (e.g.,
Total Quality Management, Six Sigma), Operations Management (e.g., Manufac-
turing resource planning, Lean Management), Business Process Modelling and
Process-Aware Information Systems (e.g., Business Process Management Systems
and Service-Oriented Architectures).
BPM stresses a process-centered view of the organization. Accordingly, a
business process describes a group of activities that need to be executed in a
logical and temporal order to pursue a business goal. An example of a business
process is a collection of activities which deals with the arrival of an insurance
claim all the way to its payment or rejection. With the spread of information
technology the execution of business processes becomes possible through the use
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New
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Yes
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Fr
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d
Figure 1.2: Process model of Claim Handling process modelled using the BPMN
language
of Business Process Management Systems (BPMSs).
BPMSs are a particular type of PAIS that coordinate the interaction among
resources, applications, and external information sources during the execution
a business process as a continuous flow of activities [DAH05, HAAR10]. The
execution of a business process is guided by a business process model. A busi-
ness process model describes (often via a graphical representation) the relation
among activities, resources involved in the execution of these activities, data
items processed by these activities, etc. Several description languages have been
provided (e.g. BPMN, BPEL, EPC, YAWL), but none of them has been adopted
as standard until recently, when in January 2011 the Business Process Model
and Notation (BPMN 2.0) language was standardized by the Object Manage-
ment Group [Obj11], Figure 1.2 shows the model of an claim handling process
modelled using the BPMN language.
Though BPMSs, with the automation of business processes, increase organi-
zational productivity and reduce the possibility of committing errors, they cannot
assure the correct execution and completion of a business process. During the
execution of a business process a fault may occur with a resulting loss of profit
for the organization. Although the modification and improvement of business
processes can protect organizations from faults due to incorrect analysis of their
business processes, this is not always the solution. Faults can be caused by ex-
ceptions thrown by the BPMS, or by errors and delays introduced by resources.
The actual BPMS provide remedial actions for faults caused by the system itself
(a feature known as exception handling [AHEA05]). In the case of faults caused
by an (un)intentional error made by an external agent (e.g. a resource, a service,
etc.) few approaches have been proposed [RMBCO07, MRM12, BKB+14]. They
use a planner to generate new process models that will be executed in place of the
faulty process instance. Fault prevention is a topic relevant in the Risk Manage-
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ment discipline and, in general, faults are prevented with the support of a solid
risk analysis [LSS11].
1.2.2 Risk Management
Risk management is a discipline that focuses on the identification, assessment,
prevention, and treatment of risks. In the literature, the concept of risk presents
several definitions. In general a risk is the chance of something happening that
may impact organizational objectives. Several risk standards have been proposed
such as those from the Project Management Institute (PMI), the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) [Sta04, Sta09]. Despite the fact that methods and
goals for risk management may vary in relation to context and standard, risk
management strategies typically aim to avoid the risk, reduce its negative effect
or its likelihood. In general, the prevention of a fault requires: i) the definition
of a risk associated with the fault (risk definition), ii) the detection of this risk
(risk detection), iii) the prevention of such a risk (risk prevention), and iv) the
execution of proper remedial actions (risk mitigation).
Despite Risk Management being a well established discipline [Sta04, SGF01,
Hop10, LSS11], it is largely disjoint from BPM and these two disciplines operate
independently of one another. In industry they are usually handled by different
organizational units. There is no widely recognized, theoretically sound and em-
pirically validated approach for quantifying and managing risks within business
processes [SWW+14]. The identification of risks related to business processes can
be useful during risk definition but it is inadequate if risk management is not sup-
ported during process execution. In fact the simple definition of a process model
is not enough if it is not assisted by a mechanism for near real-time detection
of process-related risks during the execution of a process. Though risk detec-
tion may reduce the effects of a risk when performed in time (e.g. by increasing
the level of attention paid during the execution of a process), it becomes much
more useful when used in combination with automated risk prevention and risk
mitigation strategies.
1.3 Problem Statement
Barring a few exceptions, current research in the area of Risk Management mostly
provides generic guidelines for the identification, analysis, evaluation and han-
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dling of risks [Sta09] or is specific to a particular area of interest such as financial
fraud and investment [AAAZ08, HS65]. Despite the recent efforts undertaken
to integrate BPM with Risk Management (see Chapter 2 for a detailed analysis
of the literature) there are some lacunae that limit a proper integration of risk
management in the context of BPM. Specifically, we have identified the following
shortcomings during this research:
Lack of an end-to-end approach for the definition of risks related to business
processes, their detection during process execution, their prevention, and their
mitigation - Despite the efforts made by academics in recent years, a well defined
methodology is missing. Different approaches have been proposed but none of
them covers all of the aspects of risk management [SWW+14]. Most of them can
be used only for the definition of risks [MH05], or only for their detection [KCK09].
Mitigation when supported only deals with deadline-based or quality of service
(QoS) risks [GPL+10, HSD10]. A few approaches propose risk-informed business
process design [SGD+08] as a form of risk mitigation. Finally, no approaches
were proposed for risk prevention.
Lack of tool support for an end-to-end approach for the definition of risks
related to business processes, their detection during process execution, their pre-
vention, and their mitigation - Solutions for process-related risk detection pro-
posed until now present two problems. One class of approaches computes risk
probabilities based on current process execution data only [Ora11], i.e. histor-
ical execution data is neglected. The other class only provides support for
detection of process-related risks through the use general purpose event pro-
cessing languages [Syb11], or are limited to the detection of abnormal termina-
tion [KCK09]. Finally, mitigation, when supported, only deals with deadline-
based or QoS risks [GPL+10, HSD10]. Moreover, no approach defines a concrete
method usable in the case of process-related risks, e.g. the risk of an underpay-
ment during an order fulfillment. The solutions proposed suggest the use of some
predefined remedial actions that will automatically be executed by the BPMS
[GPL+10] or the skipping of tasks previously marked as optional [HSD10].
1.3.1 Research Questions
These research addresses the above shortcomings by developing an approach for
defining, detecting, preventing, and mitigating process-related risks related to ex-
ecutable business processes. Specially, this research project answers the following
research questions:
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• How can we formally define process-related risks in order to allow their
automatic detection at run-time?
• How can we automatically detect process-related risks during process exe-
cution?
• How can we automatically predict risk eventuation?
• How can we automatically provide run-time suggestions to prevent risk
eventuation?
• How can we automatically identify remedial actions that can be performed
on a running process to mitigate the related risks?
1.3.2 Solution Criteria
The solution resulting from this research will be evaluated using the following
criteria:
• Formal: the solution should be supported through a formal definition of
the underlying techniques proposed, to provide a clear and unequivocal
interpretation of the solution.
• Executable: the solution should be able to be performed during the execu-
tion of a business process.
• Acceptable performance: detection and mitigation of process-related risks
as well as risk-informed prediction should be executed in an amount of time
that is acceptable for near real-time application. In other words, these
operations should provide a timely response whenever they are utilized.
• Comprehensive: the solution should be able to address all identified issues
for the management of process-related risks, i.e. process risk definition,
detection, prevention and mitigation.
• Language and Tool Independent: the solution should be applicable without
restrictions to a specific process modeling language or BPMS.
1.3.3 Research Benefits and Innovation
The importance of this research is emphasized by the need of many organiza-
tions to manage business processes, as shown by Gartner’s 2013 survey [Gar14].
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Gartner asked 2,053 CIOs in 41 countries, representing more than $230 billion
in CIO IT budgets, what were the Top 10 CIO Business and Technology Pri-
orities in 2013. The results show that six out of ten top priorities are related
to the management of business processes and “improving business processes” is
the 10th business priority. This management must, however, be governed by ap-
propriate risk management and mitigation strategies. Organizations will benefit
from this research, since they will be able to reduce economic and/or reputa-
tional losses caused by risks that happened during the automated execution of
business processes and that negatively impact their business. In particular, the
results of this research will allow companies to have a better understanding of
their process-related risks. Companies will also be supported by techniques and
tools that will allow a timely and automatic resolution of process-related risks,
that will ultimately result in an improvement of the reliability of automated busi-
ness processes. Moreover, this research is innovative because it is the first time
that:
• A functional (i.e. supported by tools) link between risk management and
business process management is realized.
• A technique is devised for providing operational support aimed at the pre-
vention of risk during the execution of business processes.
• A technique is devised for automating the mitigation of process-related risks
during the execution of a business process.
1.4 Research Approach
The purpose of this research is to devise and operationalize a holistic approach
for the near real-time management of process-related risks. In this context near
real-time refers to the capability of the approach to operate during the execution
of a business process within minutes from the occurrence of a trigger [Wer78].
Specifically, this approach provides support for the definition, and near real-
time detection, prevention, and mitigation of risks related to running business
processes.
The research approach of this project is design science [HMPR04]. Design
science is based on two pillars: relevance and rigor. The term relevance is used
to address research that introduces new knowledge on a topic, proposing a novel
and better approach to a problem or a solution to an unsolved problem. The
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Figure 1.3: Risk-aware Business Process Management lifecycle.
term rigor is used to identify a scientific approach usually achieved by apply-
ing established foundations and methodologies. This research will be relevant
because both practitioners and academics have recognized the importance of in-
tegrating the concept of risk (and its management) into the BPM discipline, and
academics are trying to fill this gap [NCMR06, MH05, TJQ08]. The rigor of this
research is guaranteed by the use of formal methods, by the implementation of
the envisaged concepts in prototype tools, by the use of (but not limited to) well
established languages such as YAWL and BPMN, and the empirical evaluation
of each technique.
This research embeds elements of risk into all four phases of the lifecycle of
executable process models in the context of PAISs [DAH05], as shown in Fig-
ure 1.3. Input to this “risk-aware” BPM lifecycle is a Risk Analysis phase, where
risk analysis is carried out to identify risks in the process model to be designed.
Traditional risk analysis methods such as Fault Tree Analysis [Com90], Root
Cause Analysis [Joh73] or CORAS [LSS11], can be employed in this phase. The
output of this phase is a set of risks, each expressed as a risk condition. It is
important to note that not all risks identified during risk analysis can be avoided
by preemptively modifying the business process in which they may eventuate,
and this is why near real-time risk management is required. For example, the
risk associated with an overtime fault cannot be prevented through a preemptive
modification of the business process since a delay may occur independently of the
process. Next, in the Process Design phase, these high-level risks are mapped
down to process model-specific aspects. The result of this second phase is a
risk-annotated process model. In Process Implementation, these risks are linked
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to workflow-specific aspects, such as values of variables, and resource allocation
statuses. The risk-annotated process model resulting from the Process Imple-
mentation phase is then executed by a risk-aware process engine during Process
Enactment. In this phase “decision support” for risk prevention is provided by
suggesting which decision to take in order to keep the level of risk under control,
during the execution of a process instance. Finally, historical data stored in pro-
cess logs, and current execution data coming from process enactment, is filtered,
aggregated and analyzed in the Process Diagnosis phase, in order to evaluate
the possibility that a risk may happen. When a risk is detected, the system will
automatically identify an adequate remedial action to mitigate the likelihood of
a fault to occur.
This research covers four aspects of the management of process-related risks.
These four aspects (see Figure 1.4) and the phases where they are performed
are: risk definition during process design, risk detection during process diagno-
sis, risk prediction during process enactment, and risk mitigation during process
diagnosis. Firstly, a formal method to specify risks is defined. On top of it, an
interpreted language (i.e. a language that a machine can understand and convert
in binary code at run-time) for the definition of risks in a business process (i.e.
risk definition) is defined. Based on this language an architecture for the detec-
tion of risks is devised and implemented (i.e. risk detection). The architecture is
based on sensors. Such sensors monitor the execution of business processes and
detect risks (defined using the interpreted language). The detection of risks is
carried out through the analysis of information related to the current executions
(activities’ variables, activities’ status, resources allocation status, etc.) and in-
formation related to previous executions (i.e. historical data that has been logged
by the process engine).
The following step is the definition of a method for risk prediction and risk-
informed business process execution. The idea is to guide at the user during
the execution of a business process, suggesting which step to execute in order
to reduce the likelihood of risks occurring. We present a method that predicts
the future status of a process instance, via decision trees, trained using historical
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Figure 1.5: Process execution with risk support.
data (i.e. completed process instances), and with it the values of the risk con-
ditions associated with the process instance. This information is then used to
solve an optimization problem, in particular a mixed integer linear programming
problem, where the goal is minimizing risk eventuation. The solution discovered
is then used to provide suggestions to process participants about what activity
they should perform. Finally, a prototype of this method is developed. After
integrating this prototype with the risk detection architecture, evaluations are
carried out to measure the feasibility of the approach, verifying in the end if the
requirements of the project are met.
Finally, this research presents a method for risk mitigation. Mitigations are
discovered using the simulated annealing algorithm. In particular, we first identify
a set of controlled changes that can be applied to a process instance. We then
definy functions that are used for the identification of the perturbations (i.e.
controlled changes) that can guarantee a (sub-)optimal mitigation. Finally, based
on the results of this analysis a prototype for automatic risk mitigation is defined
and realized. After integrating this prototype with the risk detection architecture,
evaluations are carried out to measure the feasibility of the approach, verifying
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in the end if the requirements of the project are met.
Figure 1.5 shows (using the BPMN language) how our approach supports risk
management during the execution of a business process. Let’s assume we have
an claim handling process that is exposed to the risk of fraudulent claims. We
define the risk as equal to 20% for claims below $1000, while for claims over $1000
the risk is 60% if the assessment is performed by a junior employee, 30% if the
assessment is performed by a senior employee, and 50% if the assessment is not
performed. Moreover, the risk has a tolerance threshold defined in such a way
that it is equal to 70% for claims below $1000 and 50% otherwise. After defining
the risk, we can start the execution of the process. After receiving a new claim
for $5000 and collecting the details of the customer, we proceed recording this
information in the database. Here, our risk monitoring technique detects that the
claim may be fraudulent with a likelihood of 50%, and proceeds with notifying
the Process Administrator and the Process Participants. At this point in time we
have to check the history of the customer (if the customer has one) and perform
the assessment. In this case, our approach will suggest to Process Participants
to perform the check (lower predicted likelihood) before the assessment, because
an employee aware of previous claims could then easily identify non-claimable
damages during the assessment. Next, the assessment is performed by a Junior
Claims Handler, in which case the monitoring technique detects that the risk has
now increased to a likelihood of 60%. Here the Process Administrator can request
our approach to find a possible mitigation, that will reassign the assessment of
the claim to a Senior Claims Handler, given the high likelihood of this claim being
fraudulent.
Finally, the techniques presented in this thesis are realized on top of the
YAWL system1 [HAAR10]. We decided to extend the YAWL system for the
following reasons. First, this system is based on a service-oriented architecture,
which facilitates the seamless addition of new services. Second, the system is
open-source, which facilitates its distribution among academics and practitioners
(the system has been downloaded over 100,000 times since its first inception in
the open-source community). Finally, the underlying YAWL language is very
expressive as it provides support for the workflow patterns [HAAR10].
1Available at http://www.yawlfoundation.org
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1.5 Research Scope
In the context of this research we do not propose techniques for the assessment of
process-related risks. Instead, we use established risk analysis techniques present
in the literature such as Fault Tree Analysis. Also our approach does not identify
unexpected risks but only risks identified during the risk assessment phase. For
this reason, we are not be able to provide any mitigation in case of unexpected
risks.
In Figure 1.3, a connection between the Process Diagnosis phase and the
Process Design phase is shown. This connection shows that the Process Diagnosis
phase may, in principle, influence the redesign of a process, e.g. by removing or
mitigating certain process risks by design. How this can be achieved falls outside
the scope of this research. Similarly, post-execution analysis (during the Process
Diagnosis phases) are not addressed in this work since the scope of this research
is providing an approach for managing risks during process execution.
The context in which a risk may manifest itself is also interesting and worthy of
further investigation. However, in this research we focus on process-related risks
that can be identified within the boundaries of a business process. In particular,
we only consider process-related risks which depend on information available dur-
ing process execution, e.g. task input and output data, allocated resources, time
performance. This implies that process-related risks depending on information
outside the process boundaries, i.e. the process context (e.g. market fluctuations
or weather forecast) cannot be detected. For this reason organizational risks in
general are not addressed, such as those related to partners going bankrupt, or the
price of fuel going up. Moreover, since we require process execution information
we only consider “executable” business processes. These processes should either
be executed by a BPMS on the basis of a process model or be supported by an
information system that produces event logs [Aal11], i.e. logs of process-related
information which we can use to reconstruct the process instances being executed
by aggregating events, such that each instance can be unequivocally identified.
Finally, in our approach a risk is detected when its likelihood exceeds a user-
defined threshold. The product of likelihood and consequence is not be considered
for the detection of a risk since we assume that a risk’s threshold (e.g. 70%) itself
is an indication of the degree of risk an organization is willing to accept. This as-
sumption does not, however, prevent us from considering this product during the
mitigation of a risk, where mitigating risks with high likelihood and consequence
is preferable to mitigating risks with high likelihood but low consequence.
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1.7 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on risk-
aware business process management, and positions the research presented in this
thesis. Chapter 3 provides the formal foundations for various notions that will
be utilized throughout this thesis, such as the definition of a process model,
specifically a YAWL specification, the conceptualization of an event log resulting
from the execution of a business process, and an introduction to optimization
techniques such as linear programming and simulated annealing. Chapter 4 in-
troduces a technique and corresponding tool implementation for risk definition
and risk monitoring based on sensors. Chapter 5 presents a technique and corre-
sponding tool implementation for predicting risk eventuation. Chapter 6 resents
a technique and corresponding tool implementation for risk mitigation based on
the use of simulated annealing, as optimization technique. Finally, Chapter 7
concludes this thesis summarizing the work presented and discussing possible
avenues for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter reviews existing literature on risk-aware business process manage-
ment, and positions the research presented in this thesis. In particular, Section 2.1
describes the state of the art of business process management. Section 2.2 presents
risk management and some methodologies and methods proposed, with a focus on
those proposed in the context of business process management. Section 2.3 briefly
introduces business rules. Section 2.4 describes business process monitoring and
in particular two possible methods for its realization (i.e. Business Activity Mon-
itoring and Complex Events Processing). Section 2.5 presents business process
adaptation and exception handling. Section 2.6 discusses on business process im-
provement. Finally, Section 2.7 outlines business intelligence and its application
to business processes with particular a emphasis on business process mining. This
chapter elaborates on and extends work published elsewhere [SWW+14].
2.1 Business Process Management
Improving the performance of business processes has always been one of the main
foci for organizations. Moreover the possibility of improving business processes
in a short amount of time is desirable not only from the point of view of resource
consumption (regarding the time spent to modify the process) but also because
a quick adaptation of the process can bring a quick improvement to the busi-
ness. This need brought about the birth of business process management (BPM)
defined by Dumas et al. [DLMR13] as: “the art and science of overseeing how
work is performed in an organization to ensure consistent outcomes and to take
advantage of improvement opportunities”.
Companies that want to engage in a BPM initiative need to go through sev-
eral phases (see Figure 2.1): i) process identification, where relevant processes
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Figure 2.1: The BPM lifecycle [DLMR13].
are identified and related to each other; ii) process discovery, in which the cur-
rent state of each of these processes is documented (as-is processes); iii) process
analysis, where issues related with as-is processes are identified; iv) process re-
design, in which such issues are addressed through changes in these processes;
v) process implementation, where to-be processes are created to allow their au-
tomation; finally vi) process monitoring and controlling in which data related to
such processes is collected and analyzed in order to identify bottlenecks, errors,
and deviations from the intended behavior.
A business process has to go through an additional phase in order to be
executed. Van der Aalst et al. [AHW03] identified four phases in the lifecycle of an
automated business process (see Figure 2.2): i) process design, which corresponds
to the process discovery phase of the BPM lifecycle; ii) process implementation;
iii) process enactment, in which the business process model is executed; and iv)
diagnosis, which corresponds to the process monitoring and controlling phase.
In this thesis when we refer to the BPM lifecycle we refer to the lifecycle for
automated processes.
Ter Hofstede et al. [HAAR10] discuss the role of models in BPM. In particular
they identify three main purposes for a model:
• Providing insight : Process models can be used to provide a clear overview
of aspects related to the process to different stakeholders involved in the
process. For example, process models can be used to discuss requirements,
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Figure 2.2: The lifecycle of automated processes inspired by [AHW03].
to support design decisions, validate assumptions, etc.
• Analysis : Process models can be analyzed, depending on the type of model,
to check the performance of the system or to detect errors and inconsisten-
cies in the process.
• Process enactment : Process models can be used to execute business pro-
cesses. Based on the languages used for their definition the models can be
directly executed on BPM systems or be used for automatic creation of a
machine-readable format.
2.1.1 Business Process Modeling Languages
Different business process modeling languages have been defined for the creation
of business process models. Weske [Wes07] discussed the constructs used in sev-
eral modeling languages. Different modeling languages support different levels of
abstraction. Languages created with the purpose to facilitate requirement analy-
sis and communication focus on capturing conceptual business processes and do
not necessary include non-functional information. Executable languages must en-
code business processes using a format that can be interpreted by a machine, i.e.
a process engine. In general, executable languages use Extensible Markup Lan-
guage (XML) or are XML-like. The main languages used for process modeling
are: Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) [Obj08a], extended Event-
driven Process Chains (eEPCs) [DB07] and Unified Modelling Language (UML)
activity diagrams [Obj09a, Obj09b]. Languages that support process enactment
are Yet Another Workflow Language (YAWL) [HAAR10] and the Business Pro-
cess Execution Language (BPEL) 2.0 [AAB+05].
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Figure 2.3: YAWL model of the Claim Handling process shown in Figure 1.2.
Using these languages it is possible to model activities, events, gateways, data
objects and participating resources to various degrees of abstraction. The activity
construct models an operation (task) inside a business process. Depending on
the language used, it is possible to define different types of tasks: atomic task,
composite task (used for subprocesses), and resource task. The event construct
models the occurrence of situations which comes from outside and which can
activate a process or an activity. In general the events supported by process
modeling languages are: trigger events, message events, and error events. The
gateway constructs are used to model the flow of the process, beyond a simple
sequence of activities. Typical gateways constructs are: AND-split, AND-join,
OR-split, OR-join, XOR-split, XOR-join which allow various forms of branching,
merging and synchronization. Data objects manage information used for the
execution of an activity. In general, data objects can be defined at the activity
level or at the (sub)process level. Often an activity is to be performed by a
resource (also named actor, performer, originator or participant). In such a case,
the model may also specify the resource allocation strategy (e.g. offered by the
system, allocated by the system, started by the system, etc.). The allocation
strategy can refer to a specific resource or to a role or capability.
Finally, Figure 2.3 again presents a model of the claim handling process pre-
sented in the Introduction, this time using the YAWL language. As previously
specified, in a process model we may have several activities (or tasks) that need
to be executed. Example of tasks are: review claim, approve claim, check fraud,
etc. Processes under execution are referred to as process instances or cases and it
is possible to have several instances of the same process. During the execution of
a process instance every time a task needs to be executed a work item is created.
A work item is an instance of a task, and in the context of a process instance it
is possible to have several work items for the same task.
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2.1.2 Workflow Reference Model
Business process models are executed using Business Process Management Sys-
tems. Figure 2.4 shows the main components that constitute the architecture
of a BPMS. The core of the architecture is the execution engine. It provides a
run-time environment where instances of processes can be executed. An execu-
tion engine takes care of creating process instances, distributing work to process
participants, and retrieving and storing data required for the execution. The
execution engine interacts with a process modelling tool, which can store and
retrieve process models from a process model repository. The execution engine
does not directly interact with process participants but instead uses a worklist
handler. Finally, it can also interact with external services, for example in case
of automated activities.
In Figure 2.5 the meta-model for process definition as proposed by the Work-
flow Management Coalition (WfMC) is shown. This model identifies a set of
object types for the representation and interchange of process definitions. In
this model the WfMC identifies six main object types that can be extended and
integrated with other types, based on the necessity of the vendors. These six
types are: i) Workflow Type Definition containing workflow process name, ver-
sion of the process, starting condition, terminal condition, and control data; ii)
Activity containing activity name, activity type, pre- and post- conditions, and
scheduling constraints; iii) Transition Conditions containing flow or execution
conditions; iv) Workflow Relevant Data containing data name and path, and
data types; v) Role containing name and organizational entity; vi) Invoked Ap-
plication containing generic type or name, execution parameters, and location or
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Figure 2.5: Basic Process Definition Meta-model [Hol95].
access path.
2.2 Risk Management
The term “risk” is often used in many contexts and domains, and different def-
initions of risk can be found in the literature. The AS/NZS ISO 4360 Stan-
dard [Sta04] defines a risk as “the chance of something happening that will have
an impact upon objectives. It is measured in terms of consequences and likeli-
hood”. It is common to see it linked to different kinds of risks (e.g. economic
risk, environmental risk, security risk, etc.). The need to manage these different
risks led to the birth of different notions like “risk analysis”, “risk evaluation”,
“risk treatment”. All of these concepts can be grouped under Risk Manage-
ment [Sta09, Int09]. Risk management is defined as “the systematic application
of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of establishing the
context, identifying, analyzing, assessing, treating, monitoring and communicat-
ing risk” [Sta04]. Figure 2.6 shows an overview of the risk management process
according to the Australia and New Zealand Standards [Sta04]. The main ele-
ments constituting this process are described here:
• Establish the context : identifies the contexts (i.e. strategic context, organi-
zational context, risk management context) in which the risk management
process is adopted, establishes the criteria for the risk evaluation and defines
the structure of the analysis.
• Identify risks : identifies possible threats that can constitute risks, also for
risks that are not under the control of the organization.
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Figure 2.6: Risk Management overview [Sta04].
• Analyze risks : determines consequences and likelihood of risks identified.
• Evaluate risks : ranks risks using pre-established criteria according to their
severity in order to decide whether to treat a risk or not.
• Treat risks : apply selected treatments to high-priority risks.
• Monitor and review : monitors and reviews the performance of the system
and the changes that might affect it.
• Communicate and consult : communicates and consults with internal and
external stakeholders about the process as a whole.
The first five elements of the risk management process are identified as the
risk analysis process. Under the heading “risk analysis” one can find different
approaches [LSS11]. Usually it is possible to group these approaches into two
main categories: i) Offensive approaches concerned with balancing potential gains
against eventual risks associated with a certain choice; ii) Defensive approaches
concerned with preserving actual conditions against unexpected or unwanted ex-
ternal interactions.
Lund et al. [LSS11] introduce another classification for risk analysis approaches.
They subdivide these approaches into two groups: risk analysis methods and risk
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analysis techniques. A risk analysis method provides advice on the performance
of all stages of the risk analysis process, while a risk analysis technique only
provides advice on some of these.
2.2.1 Risk Analysis Methods and Techniques
As mentioned before, risk analysis methods provide support during all the five
steps of the risk analysis process (i.e. establish the context, identify risks, esti-
mate risks, evaluate risks, treat risks) while risk analysis techniques only provide
support for some phases of the risk analysis process. For example, the following
approaches can be classified as risk analysis methods: CORAS [LSS11], Opera-
tionally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) [AD01],
and CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) [BD92]. Risk
analysis techniques are: Hazard and Operability (HazOp) [Int01], Failure Mode
Effect Analysis/Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMEA/FMECA)
[US 49], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [Com90], Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [Com95],
and Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) [Nie71].
CORAS is an asset-driven approach which focuses on defensive risk analysis
providing a UML-like graphical language for threat and risk modeling. An asset
for CORAS is something valuable that a “party” (e.g. organization, company,
person, etc.) wants to protect. In CORAS, risk analysis is conducted in eight
steps: i) Preparations for the analysis during which the target and the scope of
the analysis are identified; ii) Customer presentation of the target is the intro-
ductory meeting with the customer (i.e. who will benefit from the risk analysis),
to achieve a common initial understanding of the target; iii) Refining the tar-
get description using asset diagrams aims to ensure a common understanding of
the target including its focus, scope and main assets; iv) Approval of the target
description aims to ensure that the background documentation for the rest of
the analysis is correct and complete; v) Risk identification using threat diagrams
aims to conduct a systematic identification of threats, unwanted incidents and
vulnerabilities [LSS11] linked to assets using structured brainstorming; vi) Risk
estimation using threat diagrams aims to determine the risk level of the identified
risks; this phase is carried out using brainstorming and produces an estimation
of likelihoods and consequences of unwanted incidents; vii) Risk evaluation using
risk diagrams aims to decide which of the identified risks are acceptable and which
need treatment; viii) Risk treatment using treatment diagrams aims to identify
and analyze treatments for unwanted situations; this phase should produce a
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treatment that reduces likelihood and/or consequences of an unwanted situation.
OCTAVE is an approach for risk-based information security strategic assess-
ment and planning. The OCTAVE approach focuses on two aspects: operational
risk and information security practices. This approach is defined through a set
of criteria. These criteria are principles, attributes, and outputs. Principles are
the concepts driving the evaluation process. Attributes and outputs identify the
requirements of the evaluation. Attributes are derived from the OCTAVE prin-
ciples and define what is necessary to make the evaluation a success. Outputs
define the outcomes that must be achieved during the evaluation. OCTAVE is
composed of three phases. The first phase (Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles)
involves the evaluation of the company’s security strategy and identifies critical
assets and threat profiles. The second phase (Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabil-
ities) involves the evaluation of the information infrastructure to determine key
components and vulnerabilities. Finally, the third phase (Develop Security Strat-
egy and Plans) uses the information collected during previous phases to assess
the risk of data compromise and the risk associated with the company’s busi-
ness activities. All these phases are discussed during workshops using structured
brainstorming and the results are documented using tables and threat trees.
CRAMM is based on the UK Government’s Risk Analysis and Management
Method. In this approach risk analysis covers the aspects related to the iden-
tification and assessment of security risks, while the identification of adequate
treatments of these risks is solved by risk management. The CRAMM method
has three phases, the first two phases focus on risk analysis while the last phase
focuses on risk management. The first phase (The establishment of the objec-
tives) aims to the identification and the valuation of the assets that are part of
the system. The second phase (The assessment of the risks) calculates measures
of risks using threats and vulnerabilities identified in the previous phase. Finally,
the third phase (Identification and selection of countermeasures) identifies coun-
termeasures that are commensurate with the measures of risks calculated in the
second phase.
These three methodologies (i.e. CORAS, OCTAVE, and CRAMM) can be in-
discriminately used in our context for the identification of risks, as this research
does not intend to support risk identification but requires it for risk detection,
prevention, and mitigation. Though using different names and different phases,
these three methodologies focus on three main elements: i) identification of risks
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using brainstorming sessions; ii) evaluation of criticality of the risks identified;
iii) identification of treatments for the risks identified. While the first two ele-
ments require support from one of these methodologies, for the identification of
treatments we use the methods that will be developed as part of this research.
HazOp is a technique for risk identification that requires gathering a number
of participants that through brainstorming identify hazards related to a target
system. The brainstorming sessions are structured around system documentation
and are driven by the HazOp leader through the use of a set of guide words used
to formulate questions to the participants about components of the system. The
results are presented in tables that document the hazards identified.
FMEA/FMECA is a bottom-up technique that focuses on identifying possible
failure modes and determining their consequences. The identification is carried
out through structured brainstorming. Once all the failure modes have been
identified, the level of risk and the probability of the failure modes are quantified.
The results are documented using FMEA/FMECA tables that highlight failure
modes, effects and criticality for each component.
FTA is a top-down risk analysis technique based on fault-trees. A fault-tree is
a graphic notation to model a pathway that, connecting events and conditions
with standard logic symbols (i.e. AND, OR), leads to an undesirable event. Once
the fault-tree is defined, the probability of an unwanted event can be calculated
using a bottom-up approach by propagating probabilities of leaf nodes through
the gates (i.e. standard logical symbols).
ETA is a bottom-up risk analysis technique that uses a tree notation to rep-
resent the outcome and the probability of an event. The tree is created starting
from an unwanted event, which is connected with a success or failure conclusion
through a set of branches. A new branch is created at each decision/action that
must be taken/executed. This technique can be used for qualitative analysis
(showing outcomes for an event) and for quantitative analysis (estimating the
likelihood of each outcome).
CCA is a graph-based technique that combines features of both fault and event
trees. The graph is constructed starting from an unwanted event. From this event
the diagram is developed finding causes (as a fault tree) and consequences (as an
event tree) of the event.
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Among these five methods for the identification of causes/effects of risks, the
first two approaches are not relevant for our research because they are based on
brainstorming sessions while we require our solution to be executable. The last
three methods, on the other hand, are quite relevant, in particular the FTA,
since it provides a logical representation of risks based on conjunctions of simple
elements.
2.2.2 Process-Related Risk Management
Previous process-based research recognizes the importance of explicitly linking
elements of risk to business process models. In this section, based on Suriadi
et al. [SWW+14], these approach are discussed and evaluated against a set of
criteria. These criteria measure if a given approach covers the BPM lifecycle
providing risk-aware support in each of its phases and what type of support
they provide, i.e. risk identification, risk monitoring, risk prevention, and risk
mitigation.
The list of approaches taken in consideration is shown in Table 2.1. We
categorized these approaches into three groups. In particular we categorized
them as approaches that mainly work at i) design-time, ii) run-time, and iii) post-
execution. The approach code column shown in Table 2.1 indicates the group to
which each of these approaches belongs: those approaches with an “approach
code” starting with the letter “D” belong to the first group, those with “RT”
belong to the second group, and those with “PE” belong to the third group.
DI01: The Risk-Oriented Process Evaluation (ROPE) methodology [JGTQ08,
TJQ08, TJGK10, TJGQ08, TJG+11, JTQ07, JTGK10a, JNT09, EFKW07, JT09,
JTGK10b, GEF+08] proposed by Jakoubi et al. is a methodology that captures
the notion of “risk” in business management with the purpose of making busi-
ness processes safer. The ROPE methodology is composed of five iterative steps.
The first step is the Strategic Decision Process. During this phase all the busi-
ness processes that are relevant for the company are identified and prioritized.
The second step is the Re-Engineering Process. This phase consists of five sub
processes (i.e. criteria selection stage, acquisition stage, analysis phase, design
stage, and evaluation stage) which use the criteria defined during the first step to
develop a target model (i.e. a model that can be used for simulation) of the busi-
ness model. The third step is the Resource Allocation Process, where resources
required for the execution of the business process are identified, assigned, and co-
ordinated. The fourth step is the Workflow Management Process. In this phase
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Authors Code Reference(s)
Jakoubi et al., Tjoa et al. DI01 [TJQ08, TJGK10, TJGQ08, TJG+11,
JTQ07, JTGK10a, JTGK10b, JNT09,
EFKW07, JT09, JGTQ08, GEF+08]
Sienou et al. DI02 [SLPK10, SLPK08, SLKP07, SLPK09,
SLP08, SKP06, SKLP08, KSLP07,
Sie09]
Cope et al. DI03 [CKE+10, CKE09, CDE+10]
Weiß and Winkelmann DI04 [WW11]
Asnar and Giorgini DI05 [AG08]
Mock and Corvo DI06 [MC05]
Rosemann and zur Muehlen DI07 [RM05]
Rotaru et al. DI08 [RWCN08, NCMR06, RWC+11]
Betz et al. DI09 [BHO11]
Herrmann and Herrmann DI10 [HH06]
Strecker et al. DI11 [SHF10]
Karagiannis et al. DI12 [KMS07]
Taylor et al. DI13 [TGM08]
Panayiotou et al. DI14 [POAG10]
Lambert et al. DI15 [LJJ06]
Bai et al. DI16 [BBK06, BPK07, BPK06]
Bhuiyan et al. DN01 [IBKG09, BIK+07]
Fenz et al. DN02 [FN09, FEN09, FE09, Fen10]
Kaegi et al. DN03 [KMZN06]
Bergholtz et al. DN04 [ABE+05, BGJ+05, SGD05]
Jallow et al. DN05 [JMV+07]
Singh et al. DN06 [SGD+08]
Kang et al. RT01 [KCK09]
Jans et al. PE01 [JWLV11, JLV01, JDV11]
Wickboldt et al. PE02 [WBL+11]
Pika et al. PE03 [PAF+13a, PAF+13b]
Suriadi et al. PE04 [SOAH13]
Table 2.1: Risk-Aware BPM Approaches - Authors, Code, and References.
the business process is executed. Finally, the fifth step is the Performance Eval-
uation Process. During this phase the output of the execution is used to carry
out a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the risk-aware business process.
The Re-Engineering Process phase is the one that makes business processes risk-
aware. In this phase faults (here called “threats”) are identified and modeled. If
faults occur they impact the functionality of resources until one or more affected
resources are no longer available. In the worst case a resource represents a single
point of failure and consequently if it fails will hinder the execution of the related
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process activity. If a threat is detected, an appropriate countermeasure process
is invoked to counteract the threat. However, if this cannot be done, a recovery
process can be invoked to re-establish the functionality of the affected resources
until they are available again for the respective business process activity. On the
basis of the ROPE methodology, a reference model for risk-aware BPM is pro-
posed by Jakoubi et al. [JT09, JTGK10b]. The main limitation of this approach
is that it does not provide support during the execution of a business process but
only helps in the identification of risks and their possible mitigations at design
time.
DI02: In the approach proposed by Sienou et al. [SLPK10, SLPK08, SLKP07,
SLPK09, SLP08, SKP06, SKLP08, KSLP07, Sie09], an integrated framework,
called Business Process - Risk Management - Integrated Method (BPRIM), com-
bining the domain of risk management and business process management is pro-
posed. In particular, in this approach, activities that are commonly undertaken
during the design stage of a business process (such as process modelling and
analysis) are systematically linked to those activities from the risk management
lifecycle [Sta09] to produce an integrated BPM and risk management (RM) lifecy-
cle. Furthermore, the relationships between the concepts commonly encountered
in the field of BPM (such as activity and resource) and RM (such as risk event) are
explicitly studied and modelled (using class diagrams). Finally, a set of graphical
notations, based on the Event-driven Process Chains (EPC) language, that can be
used to annotate business process models with risk-related information (such as
risk factor, control, and stakeholder) is proposed. Despite models are annotated
using a language formally defined, the approach does not support implementation
and cannot be used during process execution.
DI03: Cope et al. [CKE+10, CKE09, CDE+10] propose an approach in which
a number of risk-related modeling constructs are defined. These constructs are
an extension of the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) [Obj08a] lan-
guage. By applying these constructs, one can encode risk-related information in
a process model, such as the various risk events that can occur and the miti-
gation actions that can be taken. Furthermore, this approach also introduces a
state-change event notation such that the “causal chains of failure” of a resource
can be captured. This approach is somewhat inspired by the Bayesian network
analysis technique, and it is limited to design time analysis.
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DI04: In the approach proposed by Weiß and Winkelmann [WW11], the Se-
mantic Business Process Modelling Language (SBPML) [BTWW10] is extended
with a number of risk-related constructs, expressed as a set of graphical nota-
tions, such that the inclusion of risk-related information (such as risk events, risk
control actions, and risk type) into business process models can be achieved. This
approach has been specifically developed in the financial domain. It addresses a
type of risk commonly encountered for the financial industry, called “operational
risk”. The approach does not support implementation and cannot be used during
process execution.
DI05: The work by Asnar and Giorgini [AG08] addresses business process risks
in the context of business continuity management. Building upon the Tropos
Goal-Risk Framework [AG06] (defined by the same authors) and the Time De-
pendency and Recovery Model [ZBES07], an extended goal-risk framework is
proposed. This framework consists of three layers: the asset layer which consists
of business process goals, activities, and business artefacts; the event layer which
consists of various events (including risk events) that can impact the asset layer;
and the treatment layer which consists of a set of risk treatment activities that
can mitigate the impact of the occurrence of the risky events modeled in the event
layer. Several risk analysis techniques based on this extended goal-risk framework
are also proposed. These techniques are strongly influenced by existing risk anal-
ysis techniques (notably the Cost-Benefit analysis technique and the Treatment
analysis technique), and are limited to design-time analysis.
DI06: In the approach proposed by Mock and Corvo [MC05], a number of risk-
related constructs are proposed, which can be used to annotate an EPC process
model with risk events. The severity of each risk event (also called the risk
priority number) and the causal chains of risk events can also be modeled. To
complement these constructs, this approach applies the failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) method for risk analysis [US 49] to identify the risk events in
a process and the propagation of those events, but it is limited to design-time
analysis.
DI07: Rosemann and zur Muehlen [RM05] propose a taxonomy of risks related
to business processes. They identify five risk types: goal risks, structural risks,
data risks, information technology risks, and organizational risk. Goal risks iden-
tify risks that can compromise the achievement of process or activity objectives.
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Structural risks represent errors committed during the process design phase which
may prevent the process from achieving its goals. Data, information technology,
and organizational risks are risks that can compromise the correct execution of
a process by damaging integrity of data, reducing system availability or reduc-
ing the performance of a resource. These five types of risks can be represented
using four risk model types: i) risk structure model describing the hierarchical
relationships between risks; ii) risk goal model defining, with the use of matrices,
possible occurrences that could lead to a situation where the goal is not achieved;
iii) risk state model describing the dynamic characteristics of a risk through non-
hierarchical interrelationships between risks and the causal relationships between
risks and consequences; iv) Event-driven Process Chains (EPCs) extended with
risks that can be assigned to individual process steps. An extension of this work
is proposed in [NCMR06], where the authors describe a four-step approach to
integrate risks in business processes at the operational and strategic levels via
value-focused process engineering, despite this extension the approach is limited
to design-time, as is the original approach.
DI08: In the proposal by Rotaru et al. [NCMR06, RWC+11, RWCN08], the
Value-Focused Process Engineering (VFPE) model [KT98] (which is based on
the extended e-EPC meta-model) is further extended to formalize the concept
of risk within business process models. In particular, this approach attempts to
provide a common syntax to represent risks in a goal-oriented business-process
model [RWCN08]. Moreover the authors propose a utility calculation technique
that can be used at design-time to determine optimal risk countermeasure so-
lutions. However, the utility calculation technique proposed does not work for
running process instances and requires a set of countermeasure solutions as input.
DI09: Betz et al. [BHO11] use XML Nets [LO03] (a variant of Petri Nets) to
model risk-aware BPM systems. In particular, they define a risk construct as a
risk event caused by resources. Such risk constructs are linked to activities of a
process. Then, risk countermeasure tasks are explicitly modeled as sub-processes
of the activities affected by the risk events. If there is more than one counter-
measure activity that can be applied to address a particular risk event, several
process models will be generated, each capturing a particular countermeasure
activity. This approach then proposes a method based on simulation to choose
the best process model variant based on process cost and flow time information.
This approach provides some support for risk mitigation, but only at design-
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time. Moreover it requires a predefined set of mitigations as it is not capable of
discovering any by itself.
DI10: The approach proposed by Hermann and Herrmann [HH06] focuses on
data security risks in BPM. A set of graphical notations representing the security
requirements of business processes is proposed. These security requirements then
guide the evaluation of the security risk of the business processes (in terms of the
non-satisfaction of the requirements). If the security risk is higher than a pre-
defined tolerance level, a set of risk mitigation activities are added at design-time
to the model as risk treatment such that the process security risk can be reduced
to an acceptable level. The limitation of this approach is that the risk mitiga-
tion support provided is a hard coded approach that only provides mitigations
calculated at design-time.
DI11: Strecker et al. [SHF10] propose a multi perspective risk modeling method
for an IT infrastructure based on the Multi-Perspective Enterprise Modelling
(MEMO) Meta Modelling Language (MML) [Fra10]. In this approach, a risk
modeling language (RiskML) is proposed, that can be used to express risk-related
information (such as the risk events, risk countermeasure activities, and risk prop-
agation) using the MEMO MML as the “conceptual foundation” [SHF10]. Risk-
related information annotations can be added to existing organizational models at
different levels of granularity (strategic level, business process/operational level,
and IT/infrastructure level). Despite models are annotated using a language for-
mally defined, the approach does not support implementation and cannot be used
during process execution.
DI12: The approach proposed by Karagiannis et al. [KMS07] focuses on ad-
dressing the (non-)compliance risk of business processes to the Sarbannes-Oxley
Act [10702] standard. This approach, specifically focused on the financial do-
main, introduces several risk-related constructs to capture risk-related informa-
tion. Such constructs can then be used to annotate business process models with
information related to risks. This approach also describes how risk annotation can
be used for risk-informed business process design assisting the modification of the
process model through the addition of control activities. A six-step framework
that can be used to realize a risk-aware business process management system is
proposed.
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DI13: In the approach proposed by Taylor et al. [TGM08], a simulation envi-
ronment is developed using the jBPM stack and the jBPM Process Definition Lan-
guage (JPDL). Several risk-related constructs, such as key risk indicator (KRI),
key performance indicator (KPI), and risk event, are proposed. These constructs
are used to annotate process models with risk information. Both qualitative mea-
surement and quantitative measurement of KPI and KRI are supported. Through
the application of simulation and fuzzy logic, the effects of risk events on some
pre-defined KPIs and KRIs are evaluated. Despite executable process models are
used as part of this approach, it is not meant to cater for risk identification at
execution time.
DI14: Panayiotou et al. [POAG10] propose an internal audit process as a
method to perform risk assessment and identify relevant risk mitigation actions
for virtual enterprise networks. In particular, this approach defines a technique
to collect relevant information about processes in a structured manner such that
it can be subsequently filtered and reported for the purpose of risk analysis. Rel-
evant templates and tools (developed using the Sybase PowerDesigner enterprise
modeling software) that can be used to aid the application of the proposed ap-
proach are provided. A number of risk-related constructs that can be used to
annotate at design-time process models with risk-related information (such as
risk mitigation activities) are also proposed.
DI15: In the approach proposed by Lambert et al. [LJJ06], the integrated defi-
nition (IDEF) language [IDE93] is used to model business processes and extended
to include the concept of “source of risk” into business process models. Several
simple examples demonstrating the use of the proposed construct are shown, but
the syntax proposed is not formally defined and there is no implementation that
supports the approach during process execution.
DI16: In the work by Bai et al. [BBK06, BPK07, BPK06], business process
models are represented as graphs: nodes represent tasks and arcs represent gate-
ways. A precedence matrix is also used to define the topology of process models.
Process-related errors and error-mitigation activities are annotated in the cor-
responding error and control models proposed by this approach. These models
are then used to reason about risks of processes. This approach makes use of
optimization techniques to determine the best place(s) in the workflow graph to
position relevant error mitigating tasks. This approach applies several existing
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risk analysis techniques, such as the Conditional Value-at-Risk technique [RU00],
to evaluate risks by taking into consideration the likelihood of the risk events
modeled, their consequences, their propagation, as well as the risk mitigation ac-
tivities applied. The ultimate goal of the design-time analysis is to ensure that an
optimal placement of risk mitigation activities is achieved. The limitation of this
approach is that the optimization placement of risk mitigations is executed at
design-time, requires a predefined set of mitigations, and generates a predefined
“mitigation” for every possible instance of a process model.
DN01: Bhuiyan et al. [BIK+07, IBKG09] proposed a technique to quantify the
criticality and vulnerability of actors in a business process. This is achieved by
analyzing the incoming and outgoing edges of actors in an actor dependency
model represented using the i∗ framework notations [Yu97]. The results of this
analysis are then used to inform the design of the corresponding BPMN business
process models in order to reduce/mitigate the negative consequences resulting
from the failure/unavailability of critical actors. Therefore, risk-informed business
process design is also proposed. This approach is developed mainly to address
organizational risk using the taxonomy proposed in [CSI11]. Also in this case
the risk mitigation support provided is limited to design-time, providing only
predefined and static mitigation strategies.
DN02: Fenz et al. [FN09, FEN09, FE09, Fen10] propose a design-level approach
based on a set of techniques that can be used to analyze risks of a business process,
mainly considering risks from a resources (such as IT assets) point of view. This
approach focuses on the consequence analysis of a risk event, its likelihood, its
propagation, and the overall risk level of a business process. Such an analysis
is carried out through the application of the “resource importance” calculation
formula based on the structure of the Petri-net model in which the corresponding
business process is depicted. The analysis of the occurrence probability of a risk
event (and the propagation of risk events) is achieved through the application
of a Bayesian network analysis. The development of the Bayesian network is
based on the security ontology proposed by the same authors (expressed using
the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [MH+04]). This ontology contains concepts
related to information security and risk, such as vulnerabilities, threats, and
countermeasures. The limitation of this approach is that the analysis is executed
at design-time and no support during process execution is provided.
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DN03: In the approach proposed by Kaegi et al. [KMZN06], a process model
described in BPMN is simulated via an agent-based modeling technique to analyze
business process-related risks. A risk estimation formula is also used in the process
risk analysis. There is no evidence to suggest that this approach is prescribed for
any particular type of risk or domain. As this approach is based on simulation it
only provides support at design-time.
DN04: In the work by Bergholtz et al. [ABE+05, BGJ+05, SGD05], an ap-
proach to facilitate risk-informed business process design (driven by risk treat-
ment activities) is detailed. This approach starts with a business model described
using the Business Model Ontology (BMO) [Ost04] language. Such model is then
transformed into a value-web model described using the e3-value model nota-
tion [GYR06]. Then, through the aid of the corresponding activity-dependency
diagram, the value-web model is transformed into a BPMN-based process model.
At each stage of the model transformation, the approach suggests the determina-
tion of risk events that may occur in the model being studied, and the modification
of the model such that relevant risk mitigation activities are integrated into the
final (derived) business process model. In other words, the end product of such a
process is a risk-informed business process model which already contains relevant
risk mitigation activities. In this case the support provided for risk analysis and
the risk mitigation is limited to design-time.
DN05: In the work by Jallow et al. [JMV+07], an approach to analyze risks
in business processes is proposed. Given a set of identified risk events and their
occurrence probabilities, Monte Carlo simulation [Met87] is applied in order to
assess and quantify the impact/consequences of these risk events (in terms of
time, cost, performance, and other objectives) on each process activity and on
the overall process. As this is a simulation-based approach, it only provides
support at design-time.
DN06: In the approach proposed by Singh et al. [SGD+08], a technique to
evaluate a workflow’s non-completion risk due to uncertain/dynamic informa-
tion is proposed. The term ‘non-monotonic predicate’ is used to refer to such
information. Examples of non-monotonic predicates include the number of in-
jured passenger(s) in a car accident, or the status of traffic at the time of the
accident. This information is not likely to be known until run-time. A method
to quantify the confidence level of the non-monotonic predicates of a workflow
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is also proposed. When the confidence level of a non-monotonic predicate of a
workflow is below a certain threshold, the workflow is considered to be risky. In
this situation, this approach suggests the use of a backup workflow such that
the non-completion risk of the related workflow instance is mitigated. Finally,
an approach to generate a backup workflow based on workflow execution history
is also briefly described. It produces an additional branch in the process model
that can be taken in case the normal execution turns out to be risky. The main
limitation of this approach is that it only provides support at design-time and
that a solution is hard-coded in a process model.
RT01: In the approach proposed by Kang et al. [KCK09], a technique to es-
timate the probability that a process instance enters an abnormal termination
state is defined. Process-related historical data, containing information about
the normal or abnormal termination of process instances, is used to inform the
probability estimation calculation. Then, a run-time risk estimation algorithm is
developed such that appropriate risk alerts can be produced when risky situations
are detected. This approach does not seem to be prescribed for any specific type
of risk and can be applied to any domain. However, it only looks at abnormal
termination states, not at any other possible exception that may affect a process
instance. Finally, the approach requires the generation of a Representative Pat-
tern (RP) “defined as the comprehensive set of all events that a process instance
in a process model should have until completion” [KCK09]. This requirement
clearly cannot be satisfied in case of business process models containing loops.
PE01: In the work by Jans et al. [JDV11, JLV01, JWLV11], business process
logs are analyzed, such that risks related to financial fraud can be identified and
the occurrence probability of these risks can be estimated. In particular, the
ProM tool is used to aid the reasoning about the inadequacy of internal controls
and the estimation of the likelihood of a user subverting existing processes, such
that transaction fraud can be committed. Interesting fraud-related properties,
such as segregation of duty, were verified using the logs. This approach managed
to uncover suspicious process instances that were not detected during traditional
internal audit processes [JDV11].
PE02: In the approach proposed by Wickboldt et al. [WBL+11], historical in-
formation (such as logs) from business processes is annotated with a number of
risk-related constructs, such that various types of risk analyses can be conducted.
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Process Process Process Process
Design Implementation Enactment Diagnosis
Risk Identification DI01, DI02, DI01, DI09, DI12, - PE01, PE02,
DI03, DI04, DI13, DN03, DN04 PE03, PE04
DI05, DI06,
DI07, DI08,
DI09, DI10,
DI11, DI12,
DI13, DI14,
DI15, DI16,
DN01, DN02,
DN03, DN04,
DN05, DN06
Risk Monitoring n.a. n.a. RT01 n.a.
Risk Prevention - - - -
Risk Mitigation DI01, DI02, - - -
DI05, DI08,
DI09, DI10,
DI12, DI14,
DN01, DN04,
DN06
Table 2.2: Risk Management activities supported by each evaluated approach.
In particular, techniques to identify and evaluate risks in business processes (in-
cluding risk probability estimation and impact analysis) are proposed.
PE03: Pika et al. [PAF+13a, PAF+13b] propose an approach for predicting
overtime risks based on statistical analysis. Logs are analyzed to identify five
process risk indicators whereby the occurrence of these indicators in a trace indi-
cates the possibility of a delay. The main limitation of this approach is that they
limit their scope to the identification of indicators of risks or of causes of faults.
Moreover, these indicators do not consider the data perspective and have been
designed to support overtime risks only.
PE04: Suriadi et al. [SOAH13] propose an approach for Root Cause Analysis
based on classification algorithms. After enriching a log with information like
workload, occurrence of delay and involvement of resources, they use decision
trees to identify the causes of overtime faults. The cause of a fault is obtained as
a disjunction of conjunctions of the enriching information. This approach suffers
from two shortcomings. Firstly, the approach is limited to the identification of
fault causes without proposing possible solutions in order to avoid such causes.
Secondly, fault causes do not take in consideration the data prospective.
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the types of risk-related activities that the
approaches described so far support at each stage of the BPM lifecycle. With
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respect to the BPM lifecycle shown in Figure 2.2, all the above proposals only
cover the phases of risk analysis and process modeling, except for the approach
by Kang et al. that is specifically focused on run-time analysis, and a few ap-
proaches, out of our scope, that are focused on post-execution analysis. Among
these approaches, none of them specifies how risk conditions can be concretely
linked to run-time aspects of process models such as resource allocation, data
variables and control-flow conditions. The few approaches that cover the pro-
cess implementation phase do it only for simulation purposes. Given that none of
these approaches deal with run-time aspects (i.e. execution) of business processes,
the topics of risk monitoring, risk prediction and prevention, and risk mitigation
are not yet explored.
2.3 Business Rules
Business Rules is a approach that uses rules to model business processes. The
Business Rules approach formalizes an enterprise’s critical business rules in a
language that managers and technologists can understand (e.g. “It is obligatory
that each product pass a quality test”). Business rules have been defined as a
“declaration of policy or conditions that must be satisfied” [JO98], and create
an unambiguous statement of how information is used in a business to make a
decision.
Business rules can be represented using the same structure as rules in active
databases [DBM88] using three basic elements: i) an event that specifies when
the rule must be used; ii) a condition that must be verified before an action is
executed; iii) an action that specifies what must be done. Rules that use this
format are usually named ECA. Different extensions of the ECA (Event Condition
Action) rules have been provided. For example, the ECAA rules provide the
possibility of an alternative action if the condition is not verified, the EA rules
are condition-less, and the ECmAn rules have multiple conditions and actions.
Business rules can also be used to model processes and workflows, e.g. in the
work by Knolmayer et al. [KEP00]. The authors show how to model sequential
actions, parallel actions, interaction of actions and other flow constructs. They
also propose a way to model actors and data. Though business rules can be used
to model business process, they also introduce disadvantages as, for example, the
creation of a new process may be difficult because new rules may contrast with
old rules. In order to provide support for business roles standards, such as the
Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR), have been defined
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and both academic and commercial engines, such as DECLARE and the Web-
Sphere ILOG JRules Business Rule Management System, have been produced.
The sensor architecture that will be presented in this research resembles sim-
ilarity with business rules, despite it is not based on them.
The Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR) [Obj08b]
is the Object Management Group (OMG) implementation of business rules. It
is an adopted standard that aims to define a “structured natural language” for
capturing business processes. SBVR is an integral part of the OMG’s Model
Driven Architecture.
The SBVR defines the vocabulary and rules for documenting the semantics
of business vocabularies, business facts, and business rules.
2.3.1 Academic business rules engines
Among the academic business rules engines relevant is DECLARE [PSA07]. It
is a constraint-based BPMS developed by the Eindhoven University of Technol-
ogy. It proposes a declarative constraint-based approach for process modeling
and execution. The system is composed of three components [PSA09]: i) a De-
signer used for creating constraint templates, define organizational structures,
and creating and verifying constraint models; ii) a Framework to execute and dy-
namically change models; iii) Worklists that allow user to access active instances
and perform tasks.
In DECLARE, constraints are semantically specified using Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL). These constraints can be created using constraint templates. There
is no limit on the number of constraints that can be specified for a model. DE-
CLARE supports two types of constraints: mandatory and optional. The system
is realized so that it can support the execution of a process model and provide the
opportunity to modify a process during its execution. Finally, the system auto-
matically verifies if errors have been introduced after the modification of a model.
The system can verify the presence of dead activities, conflicting constraints, and
history based errors.
Though quite interesting as an approach, especially for the low-impact mitiga-
tion that the system provides, DECLARE is not particularly suitable for modeling
large and complex business processes. The specification of a process may require
a lot of constraints, that make process models difficult to read and that dur-
ing their definition can easily introduce errors. Moreover, these constraints can
only use events regarding the execution of activities and do not consider other
information related to the execution of processes (e.g. variables, resources, etc.).
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 39
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.3.2 Commercial business rules engines
Among the commercial business rules engines is worth mentioning the WebSphere
ILOG JRules Business Rule Management System [Sti09]. This tool, which we
refer to as JRules, is a business rules management system developed by IBM.
JRules consists of three components allowing business users to create and
execute business rules. These are:
• eXecutable Object Model (XOM). This is the model that enables the exe-
cution of rules, which can be created from compiled Java classes or XML
Schema.
• Business Object Model (BOM), is an abstract object-oriented representation
of the “information model” that defines the concepts of a given business. It
contains a set of classes which the rules act up on, and it is mapped onto
the XOM.
• Business Rules, are expressed in a structured natural language. For their
definition the user can use business objects taken from the domain repre-
sented in the BOM and the vocabulary model (VOC).
2.4 Business Process Monitoring
Among practitioners and academics an emerging need is the possibility of mon-
itoring the status of a business process execution. Business Process Monitoring
has been the response to this need. In particular, two main streams can be identi-
fied in this area: i) Business Activity Monitoring (BAM), and ii) Complex Event
Processing (CEP).
2.4.1 Business Activity Monitoring
The term BAM, originally coined by Gartner [Gas04], refers to real-time filtering,
aggregation, analysis, and presentation of information about activities executed
as part of a process. Generally, BAM focuses on providing a real-time summary
of business activities to operations managers through the aid of dashboards con-
taining key performance indicators (KPIs). BAM solutions are mainly proposed
by commercial vendors. In the following we will present the Oracle Business
Activity Monitoring (Oracle BAM) [Ora11], which is based on sensors like the
approach presented in this thesis.
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Oracle BAM is the BAM solution proposed by Oracle. It monitors the occur-
rence of specific events of a BPEL [AAB+05] process through the use of sensors
(BPEL Process Manager Sensors). Several types of sensors can be defined on the
basis of the context in which they operate. The types of sensors provided are:
activity sensors, variable sensors, and fault sensors. Activity sensors monitor the
execution of activities in a BPEL process. They can monitor the execution time
of an activity or variables that the activity modifies. Variable sensors are used
for monitoring the values of variables modified by a BPEL process. In this way
the sensor can monitor the value of input and output data of a process. Finally,
fault sensors can monitor BPEL faults.
Sensors operate at run-time during the execution of a process. When a sensor
is triggered, a new sensor value (i.e. value monitored and time stamp) is created
and all actions associated with the sensor are performed, such as storing the
information retrieved in a database or publishing the information to external
sources. The triggering of a sensor is dictated by an Evaluation Time specified
during the definition of the sensor. Five evaluation times can be specified: i) on
Activation means that the sensor fires just before the activity is executed; ii) on
Completion means that the sensor fires just after the completion of the activity;
iii) on Fault means that the sensor fires if a fault occurs during the execution of
the activity; iv) on Compensation means that the sensor fires when the associated
scope activity is compensated; and v) on Retry means that the sensor fires when
the associated activity is retried.
An interesting point of this approach is the use of sensors to monitor the
execution of a business process. In general, sensors are used in different ar-
eas [ONS96, Che´97, BW04], principally because they are light-weight and not
expensive (in terms of resource consumption). In the context of Oracle BAM,
sensors cannot monitor sophisticated conditions. It is impossible to define condi-
tions incorporating information such as resource allocation strategies and order
dependencies. Furthermore, sensors can only retrieve information specific to the
current running instance, making impossible the definition of conditions that use
historical data and information from other running process instances. Moreover,
in this approach sensors can only be triggered by process events impeding the
definition of a condition for monitoring deadline risks. These two limitations
make this approach not a not suitable solution since we required a solution that
could address any type of risk related to business processes.
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2.4.2 Complex Event Processing (CEP)
Complex event processing (CEP) is an emerging technology for analyzing and
controlling complex series of events. Events can be produced by different sources
such as databases, email accounts as well as process engines. These sources
generate simple and independent series of events, which using rules are aggregated
to form relationships and patterns. These relations and patterns are detected by
CEP engines. A CEP engine is a system capable of analyzing a stream events and
identifying the significant ones. Generally, CEP engines use languages similar to
Structured Query Language (SQL) for the definition of rules [WREW11]. The
definition of a rule requires the specification of a sequence of events, the occurrence
of which identifies the manifestation of a complex event. The condition of a
complex event can also be defined in terms of attributes belonging to simple
events. Moreover, a temporal window within which these events must happen
can be specified.
Although a CEP engine is a generic tool, commercial vendors integrated it
in their BPMSs, e.g. webMethods Business Events1, ARIS Process Event Mon-
itor [DB07], and SAP Sybase [Syb11]. The use of CEP engines for monitoring
purposes has also been explored in academia [GPL+10, HSD10].
Gay et al. [GPL+10] propose the use of complex event processing for work-
flow monitoring. In their approach, based on Petri nets, they identify six events
representing the basic activities that a workflow can perform (i.e. Transition acti-
vation, Resource allocation, Resource liberation, Advance token, Start workflow,
and End workflow). Using these simple events they have created six complex
events that represent unwanted situations: i) Lack of resource, this situation oc-
curs when a transition activation event (i.e. and transition is ready to be fired)
is detected and after the estimated time needed to process a token an advance
token event (i.e. a transition produces a token in a place) is missing; ii) Activity
delay, this situation occurs when within a specific time window (i.e. the estimated
time needed to process a token) two advance token events are expected, but only
the first one is detected; iii) Lack of resource delay, this situation occurs if a lack
of resource and activity delay are detected; iv) Transition delay, this situation
occurs if an activity delay is detected and a transition activation event is missing;
v) Workflow delay, this situation occurs when within a specific time window (i.e.
the estimated time needed to execute the entire process) a start workflow event
and an end workflow event are expected, but only the first event is detected;
and vi) Interruption warning, this situation occurs when within a specific time
1http://www.softwareag.com/au/products/wm/events/overview/default.asp.
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window (i.e. the estimated time needed to execute the entire process) a complex
event transition delay a transition activation event are expected, but only the
first is detected. Finally, Gay et al. suggest an eventual mitigation that requires
the invocation of some remedial actions when an unwanted situation is detected.
A different approach is proposed by Hermosillo et al. [HSD10], which is con-
cerned about Quality of Service (QoS) for on-line applications. They propose a
framework named CEVICHE (Complex Event processIng for Context-adaptive
processes in pervasive and Heterogeneous Environments) for dynamic business
process adaptation. Their solution uses the AO4BPEL (Aspect-Oriented exten-
sion to the Business Process Execution Language) framework [CM07], to provide
the possibility of adding and changing a service. AO4BPEL integrates Aspect-
Oriented Programming with BPEL creating a wrapper around the BPEL inter-
preter. To be able to add and change a service, AO4BPEL needs to know where
the adaptation must be applied and what kind of adaptation must be executed.
The information about the business process (BPEL), the adaptation condition
(CEP rules), and the adaptation definition are stored inside a specific type of
file (SBPL file). During the execution of a process the CEP engine will check
the events produced filtering them using the rules defined. If the CEP engine
detects a delay during process execution the system will automatically apply the
adaptation specified in the SBPL file.
Though the use of a CEP system for risk monitoring can be an interesting
solution, performance is a strict requirement for this research and CEP systems
typically suffer from performance overheads which limit their applicability to
real-time risk detection [WREW11]. Moreover a CEP system can only detect sit-
uations using event-driven triggers, and these cannot be used to detect a deadline
risk. Finally, the solution by Hermosillo et al. [HSD10] is not adequate for risk
monitoring. The main limitation of the first solution is the finite set of unwanted
situations which this approach can detect. While, Guy et al. [GPL+10] suggest
a possible future development of remedial actions to invoke as a consequence of
a detection but do not implement it. The second approach, on the other hand,
mainly focuses on mitigating QoS problems using predefined remedial actions.
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2.5 Business Process Adaptation and Exception
Handling
The achievement of effective risk mitigation requires dynamic changes on busi-
ness process models at run-time. The safe application of changes to a running
business process is not trivial and it is investigated in the area of Business Pro-
cess Adaptation. Business Process Adaptation covers that branch of the BPM
discipline that studies how to modify (usually at run-time) business process mod-
els without affecting negatively the execution of business process instances. In
the area of Business Process Adaptation several approaches have been proposed,
among which we can find adaptation patterns [WRRM08] and adaptation frame-
works [RRD03, RRD04, MGR04, WWB04, KKK07, SMBH11].
The topic of adaptation patterns has been investigated in the work by Weber
et al. [WRRM08]. They identify a set of 18 change patterns, which are commonly
used to modify business process models. They subdivide the patterns into two
groups: adaptation patterns and patterns for changes to predefined regions. The
first group allows structural modifications to a process model using high-level
change operations and contains 14 of the 18 patterns identified (e.g. Insert Process
Fragment, Delete Process Fragment, Move Process Fragment). The second group
contains patterns that allow participants to add information about unspecified
parts of the process model.
In order for adaptation patterns to be supported adaptation frameworks are
required. The most advanced framework for process adaptation is based on the
work by Reichert et al. [RRD03, RRD04]. In their work, they propose a generic
framework for supporting process model and process instance changes and cri-
teria for correctly propagating process changes to executing instances. Using
Well-Structured Marking-Nets (WSM-Net), they propose a set of propositions
which can guarantee, under some pre-conditions, the prevention of deadlocks,
missing input data and lost updates. The result of their research produced the
ADEPT/AristaFlow system [DR09].
Various other frameworks have been proposed for the dynamic adaptation
of process instances. Mu¨ller et al. [MGR04] propose the workflow management
system AgentWork, which provides the ability to modify process instances by
dropping and adding individual tasks based on events and rules. Weber et
al. [WWB04] instead propose the workflow management system CBRFlow, which
uses case-based reasoning to support run-time adaptation by allowing users to
define business rules during process execution. Hermosillo et al. [HSD10] pro-
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pose the framework CEVICHE, which is a service-based framework that uses the
AO4BPEL (Aspect-Oriented for BPEL) language [CM07] to provide the option
of skipping or reallocating tasks to other services in an ad-hoc manner.
Kim et al. [KKK07] propose an approach for dynamic business process man-
agement using process change patterns. In their approach they propose the use
of CVS for the creation of different versions of a process based on the concepts
of revisions and variants. This approach proposes to use a common version of
the model until a variation point is reached, then the particular version of the
model is loaded. Variation points are constructed using a combination of pat-
tern blocks. The patterns identified have been classified in three main groups: i)
Activity Split ; ii) Activity Merge; iii) Activity Extend/Delete.
Finally, Schick et al. [SMBH11] propose an approach for run-time adaptation
of business process models. In their approach they propose the creation of por-
tions of process at run-time. Schick et al. extend the YAWL system with two
types of tasks: observer tasks and generator tasks. Observer tasks identify a
point in the business process model where external messages and data are in-
vestigated using matching rules. The results of the investigation are used by a
generator task. Using some predefined construction rules a generator task com-
poses a subprocess joining predefined specific activities named bricklets. Once
the sub process is ready it is executed as replacement of the generator task.
When considering Business Process Adaptation a topic that is often men-
tioned is exception handling, since dealing with exceptions often requires dy-
namic changes in a process. In general, the term exception handling refers to
the process of responding to the occurrence of an exception with the purpose of
re-establishing the execution of the process. Managing exceptions raised by the
system during a process execution is essential for the completion of a process but
not always possible. Different approaches have been proposed in the literature.
Interesting are the approaches proposed by Hagen and Alonso [HA00] and by
Adams et al. [AHEA05].
Hagen and Alonso [HA00] propose the integration of transaction concepts into
exception handlers. In their approach, the transaction concepts provide a partial
backward recovery (e.g. compensation and holistic back-out) while the exception
handlers guarantee forward progress.
Adams et al. [AHEA05] propose dynamic exception handling through exlets.
In their work they see an exception as a natural deviation from the normal work
plan. To manage these deviations they propose the use of exlets. An exlet is
a complete workflow process that can be automatically loaded by the system to
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manage an exception. The selection of which exlet is necessary to load is achieved
through the use of modified Ripple Down Rules [CJ88].
Finally, in the areas of Business Process Adaptation and Exception Han-
dling, we can find approaches based on the use of planners [RMBCO07, MRM12,
BKB+14]. These approaches use planners to automatically generate process mod-
els, which are used to mitigate instances for which an exception occurred. In order
to generate a process model a planner requires knowledge about a goal (a set of
conditions that should be fulfilled) that should be reached at the end of the pro-
cess, and a set of activities that could be used as part of the process. For each
activity it also requires a set of preconditions that need to be satisfied in order
for the activity to be executed and a set of post-conditions resulting from the
execution of the activity.
While the approaches discussed in this section could be used for risk mitigation
purposes, they do not provide any help with the identification of which particular
mitigation actions to use. On the other hand they can be used to provide support
for the actuation of the mitigation actions that our approach will identify. In
particular, for the purpose of this research, the approach proposed by Reichert et
al. [RRD03, RRD04] is interesting because it provides a starting point to verify if
the mitigation detected can be applied to the process. A problem can be the use
of WSM-Nets proposed by the authors, as they have limitations imposed on their
structure [RD98]. The approach proposed by Kim et al. [KKK07] does not really
fit within the context of this research because a mitigation is not predefined and
the use of a CVS is useless since a mitigation is specific for a specific instance in
execution. The approach proposed by Schick et al. [SMBH11] may be of interest
but a limitation of this approach is the use of constructor tasks which require
predetermined knowledge of the remedial actions needed for mitigation. The
approach of Hagen and Alonso [HA00] is not suitable in our context since it
proposes a static handling of exception that requires to specify in advance where
and how exceptions should be managed. The approach of Adams et al. [AHEA05]
is not suitable for our purpose due to the necessity of predefining the point (i.e.
the activity) in which the exception must be handled. Finally, the use of planners
is not suitable since they require a predefined set of activities, for example a set of
mitigation activities that is used for the generation of a new process, moreover we
are not interested in producing a new business process. What we are interested
in is to bring a process instance with an eventuated risk to a state where the risk
is under control in order to allow the proper completion of the instance.
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2.6 Business Process Improvement
The mitigation of risks is a problem requiring a solution which is often specific to
the process instances for which risks eventuate. Moreover, in a large number of
cases it is a run-time problem. This does not prevent the permanent mitigation
of (specific) risks as a result of a process restructuring exercise. Restructuring
processes using a systematic approach with the aim of increasing process perfor-
mance is the goal of Business Process Improvement (BPI). This improvement is
obtained by defining strategic goals and purposes of the organization, determin-
ing the expectations of an organization’s stakeholders, and modifying business
processes to meet goals and expectations.
In general, a BPI initiative is subdivided in four phases [SM09]: i) framing
the process of interest, aiming to develop an overall process map and to identify
a set of related processes, the target process should be identified and scoped
identifying performance objectives of the process; ii) understanding the “As-Is”
process, aiming to understand the process and why its performance objectives are
not being met; iii) designing the new “To-Be” Process, aiming to design the to-be
process as consequence of a process optimization analysis; iv) implementing the
new process, aiming to create the new process design in the previous phase.
Among the different approaches proposed for business process improvement
we are going to analyze PrICE. We decided to describe PrICE because it is the
only one that has tool support.
PrICE The PrICE approach [Net10] is one of the approaches proposed for
Business Process Improvement. This approach focuses its attention on the third
of the four phases previously described, providing automated support for stages
of the third phase that do not require direct human interaction.
The PrICE approach consists of four steps: i) Finding applicable redesign op-
erations ; ii) Selecting suitable process parts ; iii) Creating alternative models ; iv)
Evaluating performance of alternatives. The first step tries to find possible re-
design operations that are applicable to the process which we want to improve.
These operations can be guided by process measures that provide a global view
of the characteristics of the process and may reveal its weaknesses, or process
mining which may reveal performance issues and possible improvements (e.g.
bottlenecks) through the analysis of logs. Possible redesign operations are: par-
allelize, sequentialize, add task, remove task, group, compose, unfold. The second
step requires the selection of process parts (i.e. components) for the application
of the identified redesign operations. During this phase possible errors can be
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produced due to the modification of the behavior. The approach for this step
provides a tool to help users during the selection of parts of the process that
fulfill the requirements of the identified redesign operations. The third step is the
creation of alternative process models. This phase is composed of two sub-phases:
“apply redesign operation on selected process part” and “update model with alter-
native process part” [Net10]. Finally, the last phase is the evaluate performance
of alternatives. In this phase the performance of alternative models is evaluated.
The evaluation is carried out through the support of the PrICE toolkit, in par-
ticular the performance of alternative models is obtained through simulation and
measured using different performance dimensions.
Despite the clear link between BPI and risk mitigation, BPI approaches can-
not be used to mitigate risks. In general, BPI approaches, such as the PrICE
approach, require a high level of interaction with human users while we aim to
automatically find the changes that are required to mitigate (thus improve) run-
ning process instances.
2.7 Business Intelligence
Supporting risk-informed decision making is a form of business process intelli-
gence. In the literature a generally accepted definition for business intelligence is
missing [PH03]. Different authors with the term business intelligence often refer
to techniques and tools to support business decision-making.
As a consequence of the lack of a definition for the term business intelligence,
different models for the business intelligence lifecycle have been proposed. In
1985, Gilad and Gilad [GG85] proposed a lifecycle composed of five phases: i)
collection, in this phase information is gathered; ii) evaluation, in this phase the
information collected in the previous phase is filtered; iii) storage, in this phase
the information filtered is stored for future access; iv) analysis, in this phase
the information is analyzed and interpreted; v) dissemination, in this phase the
information is used as input for the decision-making process.
In the following we analyze business intelligence in the context of business
processes.
Business Process Intelligence
The application of techniques of business intelligence to business processes is re-
ferred to as business process intelligence [CA09]. Usually, business process man-
agement systems produce a large number of event logs during process executions.
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Logs are not only useful for recording events, but they can be a source of impor-
tant insights into business processes. For example, these logs through adequate
cleaning, filtering, aggregation, and analysis can be used to improve the business
processes involved or predict undesirable situations.
Business process intelligence uses process information to provide support for:
problems detection (e.g. bottlenecks), decision-making, and business process per-
formance improvement. This functionality is provided by the aggregation of tools
and techniques from different application areas [CA09]. These areas are:
• Process Analysis, refers to the analysis (using process mining techniques) of
past and current process executions for the creation of explanatory, prog-
nosis and decision models used for process optimization and prediction of
critical situations;
• Process Discovery, refers to the analysis (using process mining techniques)
of event logs for the detection of process, control, data, organizational and
social structures;
• Process Monitoring, refers to the monitoring (using business process mon-
itoring techniques) of running process instances for the detection of unde-
sirable situations;
• Conformance Checking, refers to the analysis (using business process mining
techniques) of a log to verify how close the behavior recorded in the log
matches the behavior described in a process model;
• Operational Support, refers to the analysis of current and historical exe-
cution data, with the aim to predict future states of a running process
instance, and provide recommendations to guide the user in selecting the
next activity to execute based on certain objectives.
An example of a business process intelligence application providing process
monitoring and operational support can be found in the work of Casati et al. [CDS02,
CCDS04, GCC+04]. In their work they propose an architecture that supports the
management of process execution quality via analysis, monitoring, and prediction
of business process executions. The architecture uses an ETL (Extract, Trans-
form, Load) application to collect data from several applications. This data is
then stored in a data warehouse in order to be used to compute business met-
rics (i.e. measurable properties that can be associated with the data), e.g. the
predicted completion delay of an activity. These metrics can be used as input to
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condition-action rules to monitor the execution of a business process. Finally, pre-
dictive capabilities, supported by decision tree classification, are used to predict
the most likely activity to be executed next in the business process [GCC+04],
or to predict the most likely value of metrics of interest for business analysts, on
the basis of historical data [CCDS04].
The approach of Casati et al. [CDS02, CCDS04, GCC+04] is thus comple-
mentary to our approach since it deals with process performance metrics, while
our focus is on process risks. That said, their approach cannot easily be adapted
to cater for our needs since predictions are based on most frequent execution
paths, while we aim to suggest what activity to execute next on the basis of all
options available, in order to reduce process-related risks. Further, the approach
by Casati et al. does not offer mitigation capabilities.
Business Process Mining
Business process mining (also named Process Mining) is a relatively new area,
which focuses on the use of event data logs to extract process related information.
Process mining is a discipline that finds a place between the machine learning
and data mining disciplines on the one hand and process modeling and analysis
disciplines on the other hand [Aal11]. Process mining works under the assumption
that it is possible to record events such that they refer to an activity, a case, a
performer (often referred as originator), and a relative time.
The idea behind process mining is to discover, monitor, and improve business
processes using knowledge obtained from event logs of processes. In process min-
ing, event logs can be used for three main purposes [Aal11]: i) process discovery,
which focuses on the automatic generation of a process model using a log; ii)
process conformance, which verifies if an event log of a given business process
conforms to a given process model of the same business process or vice versa;
and iii) process enhancement, which focuses on the extension and improvement of
business process models using information collected from log of the process. Two
types of process enhancements can be identified [Aal11]: i) repair, which modifies
the model to provide a better representation of reality; ii) extension, that adds
new perspectives to the process model. The perspectives that can be used to
visualize a business process model using process mining are:
• control flow perspective: which focuses on process control flow i.e. the or-
dering of activities
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• organizational perspective: which focuses on resources (e.g. people and ap-
plications) involved in activities and on how they interact
• case perspective: which focuses on properties that characterize a process
instance
• time perspective: which focuses on timing and frequency of events
• data perspective: which focuses on data i.e. the information produced and
exchanged during the execution of activities
ProM The research conducted in the area of process mining led to the develop-
ment of the ProM tool. ProM [ARW+07] is an extensible framework that supports
a wide variety of process mining techniques. It has been obtained by the integra-
tion of EMiT [AD02], Thumb [WA03], and MiSoN [AS04]. The ProM framework
has been developed as an open-source and pluggable environment which can be
extended with new plug-ins.
The architecture of ProM supports five types of plug-ins: i) Mining plug-ins,
used to introduce mining algorithms; ii) Export plug-ins, used to provide the
possibility of exporting objects (e.g. graph models, Petri nets, EPCs, etc.); iii)
Import plug-ins, used to import objects in the system (e.g. logs, business process
models, etc.); iv) Analysis plug-ins, used to run analysis algorithms on mining
results; v) Conversion plug-ins, used to convert between different data format
(e.g. from EPCs to Petri nets).
Compliance Monitoring
When we talk about conformance in process mining, we also cover the area of pro-
cess compliance, i.e. if a log complies with certain rules. Compliance monitoring
addresses the problem of monitoring business process execution to detect if one
or more compliance rules are violated. Several approaches have been proposed
to address this problem [BDL+10, WZM+11, MMWA11, LRMKD11, MMA12].
Birukou et al. [BDL+10] propose an approach based on CEP for the monitor-
ing of compliance violations in the context of service-oriented architectures. Tha
approach of Weidlich et al. [WZM+11] also uses CEP to monitor the violation
of constraint in business processes using CEP. These two approaches suffer from
the typical limitations of CEP monitoring discussed in Section 2.4. Maggi et
al. [MMWA11, MMA12] proposes an approach based on linear temporal logic
(LTL) and business rules. Finally, Ly et al. [LRMKD11] propose an approach
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based on compliance rule graphs. All this approaches suffer from the same limi-
tation which is that they identify a violation only after it occurs.
Predictive Monitoring
Among the areas targeted by business process intelligence we mentioned opera-
tional support. Predictive Monitoring is a specific and relatively new type of oper-
ational support where the goal is preventing the violation of business constraints.
Several approaches for predictive monitoring have been proposed [MDDG14,
CSC+05, ASS11, FGP12, RSW13].
In the approach proposed by Maggi et al. [MDDG14], users can define business
goals, represented in the form of LTL constraints, at any time during the execution
of a process instance. These business goals are then used in combination with
data logs to generate decision trees that provide a prediction on the possible
outcome of the process instance.
Castellanos et al. [CSC+05] propose a platform for business operations man-
agement. This platform, equipped with various time series forecasting function-
alities, allows the prediction of metric values and aggregated metric values, such
as the number of orders expected for the next week.
Other predictive monitoring techniques focus on temporal aspects. Van der
Aalst et al. [ASS11] propose an approach for cycle time prediction. The algorithm
predicts the remaining cycle time of a process using an annotated transition
system (a graph where each node represents a sequence of activities). Whenever
the algorithm needs to predict the remaining cycle time of a process, it looks at
the node representing the sequence of activities executed until now and returns
the average of the remaining cycle times present in that node.
The approach of Van der Aalst et al. [ASS11] has been extended by Folino
et al. [FGP12]. They propose a predictive clustering approach for cycle time
prediction. In their approach context-related execution scenarios are clustered,
and for each cluster a state-aware time prediction model similar to the model
proposed in the approach of Van der Aalst et al. [ASS11] is built.
Finally, Rogge-Solti and Weske [RSW13] propose an approach for predicting
the remaining cycle time of a process instance using stochastic Petri nets.
In general, predictive monitoring techniques, if adapted adequately, will pro-
vide valid solutions for predicting risk eventuation. The main limitation of the
solutions presented is that they focus on temporal aspects, except for the approach
of Maggi et al. [MDDG14]. The latter approach is not limited to temporal as-
pects but it allows the definition of only one constraint per business process, and
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multiple risks can thus not be captured.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter we presented literature related to risk-aware business process
management. In particular, we started with a brief introduction of business
process management, putting some emphasis on its lifecycle [AHW03] and the
worlflow reference model [Hol95].
We then introduced the concept of risk management focusing on some of
the main risk analysis techniques and methods. In particular, we focused on
approaches for process-related risk management in which we identified 27 ap-
proaches. We analyzed and classified them using as criteria the phases of the
BPM lifecycle in which they operate and the types of risk management activity
they support. The result of our analysis shows that there are no approaches which
provide risk-related extensions of a process model that can be executed and used
to monitor risk or to influence behavior of processes at run-time. Moreover, only
two approaches perform run-time analysis [KCK09, SGD+08], but none of these
can be used for risk mitigation or risk prevention.
We also investigated the concept of business rules and business process moni-
toring in order to understand if they could be used for risk monitoring purposes.
The result of our investigation shows that the techniques available are not suit-
able either because they are not integrated with a BPMS or because they are too
generic and suffer from performance overhead.
Approaches in the area of business process adaptation and exception handling
were investigated to identify the best approach for applying dynamic changes to
a business process model as result of a mitigation. Despite the variety of ap-
proaches, none of them is suitable for our purpose mainly because predetermined
knowledge of the mitigation is required.
Finally, we investigated the areas of business process improvement and busi-
ness (process) intelligence for possible applications for risk detection, mitigation,
and prediction. In the area of business process improvement we considered the
PrICE [Net10] approach. This approach cannot be used for our research because
it requires a high level of interaction with human users while we aim to auto-
matically find the changes that are required to mitigate (thus improve) running
process instances. Business process intelligence, and in particular process min-
ing, offers several approaches that may prove useful for the realization of risk
detection, mitigation, and prediction techniques.
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In conclusion, although there exist several approaches for risk management
in the context of business process management, three main shortcomings can be
identified: (i) lack of adequate support for the detection of the eventuation of
process-related risks during process execution; (ii) lack of support for the pre-
diction of such risks and for their prevention; and (iii) lack of support for their
mitigation. In the next chapters of this thesis we present a framework for risk-
aware business process management which addresses these shortcomings. The
subsequent chapter introduces some fundamental concepts that are used several
times in the following chapters.
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Formal Foundations
This chapter introduces some notions and formalisms which will are in the fol-
lowing chapters in order to elaborate about the approach proposed. In particular
Section 3.1 discusses the concept of YAWL Specification, Section 3.2 defines the
concept of event log, and Section 3.3 discusses optimization techniques such as
linear programming and simulated annealing.
3.1 YAWL - Yet Another Workflow Language
In 1999 the Workflow Pattern Initiative was created with the intent of identifying
the core functionality required for BPMNs, and from its creation over 100 patterns
were identified. Among all modeling languages available at that time, none of
them was able to provide a comprehensive operationalization of those patterns.
In order to address this gap, Ter Hofstede et al. [HAAR10] proposed YAWL (Yet
Another Workflow Language), a rich modeling language based on workflow nets
(a subclass of Petri nets).
One of our solution criteria requires that our approach should be independent
from a specific language or BPMS. At the same time we require that our solu-
tion should be executable. In order to address these two criteria we decided to
use YAWL and its system as reference modeling language and BPMS along the
excursus of this thesis. We decided to use YAWL since it is one of the most ad-
vanced modeling languages (from a point of view of support toward the workflow
patterns) and it has been formally defined. This choice should not be interpreted
as a limitation since it will not prevent the use of our approach with different
modeling languages and BPMSs.
This section provides a simplified version of the YAWL specification, stripped
of any information not relevant in the context of this research. For the full
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definition of a YAWL specification we refer elsewhere [HAAR10]. A YAWL Spec-
ification is a set of YAWL nets that form a hierarchical graph structure, with a
root net and zero or more subnets.
Definition 1 (YAWL Specification). A YAWL specification is a tuple = (NetID,
ProcessID, NYmap) such that:
• NetID is the set of net identifiers;
• ProcessID is the process identifier of the root net, ProcessID ∈ NetID;
• NYmap : NetID → YAWLnet is a function linking a net identifier to a
YAWLnet.
A YAWLnet is a directed graph where nodes are conditions (represented as
circles) and tasks (represented as boxes). Conditions represent states of execu-
tion, for example preceding or following the execution of a task. In particular, in
a YAWLnet we can find two special conditions. These conditions are the input
condition, representing the initial state of a net, and the output condition, rep-
resenting the final state of a net. Each YAWLnet has only one input condition
and one output condition. Tasks represent activities that need to be executed as
part of a business process, that can either be automated or manual. Nodes in a
YAWLnet are connected via arcs. Tasks can be connected either to tasks or con-
ditions, while conditions can only be connected to tasks. Tasks may have join or
split behaviors. In YAWL, choices based on data are captured by an XOR-split,
if only one outgoing arc can be taken, or by an OR-split when one or more out-
going arcs can be taken. Similarly, we have XOR-joins and OR-join that merge
multiple incoming arcs into one. YAWL also provides support for AND-split and
AND-join, which are used when all outgoing arcs need to be taken (AND-split)
or all input arcs needs to be synchronized (AND-join). Finally, tasks can only be
executed by an authorized group of resources. A resource may also have special
privileges on a task that he executes such as, suspending it or skipping it.
Definition 2 (YAWL Net). Let T and C be the set of tasks and conditions,
respectively. Let V be a set of variables. Let U be the set of values that can be
assigned to variables. Let R be the set of resources. Formally, a YAWL net is a
tuple N = (TN , CN , i, o, FN , RN , VN , UN , canN , Split , Join, UserTaskPriv)
where:
• TN ⊆ T is the set of tasks in N ;
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• CN ⊆ C is the set of conditions in N ;
• i ∈ CN is the input condition;
• o ∈ CN is the output condition;
• A flow relation FN ⊆ (CN \ {o} × TN) ∪ (TN × CN \ {i}) ∪ (TN × TN);
• RN ⊆ R is the set of resources authorized to perform any tasks in TN ;
• VN ⊆ V is the set of variables that are defined in the net;
• UN ⊆ U is the set of values that can be assigned to variables;
• can : RN → 2TN is a function that associates with each resource the tasks
that the resource is authorized to perform;
• Split : TN 9 {AND ,XOR,OR};
• Join : TN 9 {AND ,XOR,OR}.
• UserTaskPriv : RN × TN 9 2Priviliges is a function that associates each
resource and task with the set of task privileges the resource is authorized
to perform on the task. Where Priviliges is the set of possible privileges,
defined as Priviliges = {Suspend , ReallocateStateless , ReallocateStateful ,
Deallocate, Delegate, Skip, Pile}.
We use the following auxiliary functions [HAAR10]. The pre-set of x, i.e. the
set of input tasks or conditions, is defined as •x = {y ∈ C ∪ T | (y, x) ∈ F}.
Similarly, we have the post-set of x, i.e. the set of output tasks, defined as x• =
{y ∈ C ∪ T | (x, y) ∈ F}.
Following the convention of Ter Hofstede et al. [HAAR10], we write e.g. TN to
access the tasks of net N . Moreover, for a YAWL specification y, Ty is the set of
tasks that occur in any of its nets, i.e. Ty = ∪N∈NetIDTN , and for a set of YAWL
specifications Y , TY is the set of tasks that occur in any of the nets of any of the
specifications, i.e. TY = ∪y∈Y Ty.
In our context we only have one Organizational model [HAAR10] and what
is relevant for us is the set of resources R, to whom work items can be as-
signed. Finally, we define the set of skippable tasks as {t ∈ TY | ∃r ∈ R[skip ∈
UserTaskPriv(r, t)]}.
When executed, a process uses a YAWL specification as a reference. In par-
ticular, YAWL Tasks are considered to be descriptions of a piece of work that
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forms part of the overall process. Thus, control-flow, data, and resourcing speci-
fications are all defined with reference to tasks at design-time. At run-time, each
task acts as a template for the instantiation of one or more work items. A work
item w = (ta, id) is the run-time instantiation of a task ta for a process instance
id.
A new process instance id is started and initialized by placing a token in the
input condition of a YAWL net. The token represents the thread of control and
flows through the net as work items are executed. The execution of a work item
(ta, id) consumes one token from some of ta’s input conditions (depending on
the task’s type of join) and produces one token in some of ta’s output conditions
(depending on the task’s type of split). In YAWL, work items are performed by
either process participants (user tasks) or software services (automated tasks).
In the definition we developed, several simplifications were applied. First of
all, we simplified the resource prospective. In the original specification, tasks
generally are not directly associated with resources, but resources can be selected
based on their roles or capabilities. In our case this simplification is possible since
at runtime the YAWL engine automatically assign tasks to eligible resources. In
the original specification, tasks can be executed as multi-instance, in our case this
possibility has been removed. We also simplified the data prospective. In YAWL
data are passed across tasks through an advance mapping of tasks variables to
net variables and the other way around, since for the work presented in this thesis
this information is not relevant we decided to leave it out.
3.2 Event Log
The introduction of PAISs allowed the automated execution of business processes,
and with it the possibility of logging the execution of such business processes.
These event logs allowed the emergence of fields like process mining. Event logs
need to contain a minimum set of information in order to be used successfully for
process mining purposes. In particular, each event in a event log should be linked
to a specific process activity and to a specific process instance. Moreover all events
should be ordered. In general, additional information is also provided. This is
the timestamp of the event, the resource that was involved with the execution of
the activity, and the data produced during the execution of the activity.
In this section will be presented the concept of event log. An event log is
composed of several traces that are sequences of events.
Definition 3 (Event). Let V be a set of variables. Let U be the set of values
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that can be assigned to variables. Let T be the set of tasks that can be potentially
executed during the execution of the business process. Let R be the set of resources
that are potentially involved during the execution of the business process. Let
T ⊆ N be the universe of timestamps. Let Φ be the set of all partial functions
V 6→ U that define an assignment of values to a subset of variables in V . An
event e is a tuple = (t, r, d, φ), where:
• t ∈ T is a task ;
• r ∈ R is a resource;
• d ∈ T ⊆ N is a timestamps;
• Φ is the set of all partial functions V 6→ U .
Definition 4 (Trace). A trace T (a.k.a. process instance, or case instance) is a
sequence of events. In other words, T ∈ E∗.
Definition 5 (Event Log). An event log L is a multiset of traces where each trace
(a.k.a. process instance) is a sequence of events, i.e. L ∈ B(T).1
In general, BPMNs, like for example the YAWL system, during the execution
of business processes are capable of storing more information and their logs are
richer and more complex. In the context of the YAWL system additional informa-
tion is contained into a log, e.g. case id, work item associated with a given event,
or type of event. In the following we will present the definition of a YAWL log
that can easily be represented as an event log when this additional information
is removed.
Definition 6 (YAWL Log). In the context of a set of YAWL specifications Y ,
with associated set of tasks TY and a set of root nets R, a YAWL log is an
extension of an event log L defined as L = (E , W , C, Model , WI , Case, Task ,
EvType, Time, Res , Inp, Outp) where:
• E is the set of events,
• W is the set of work items,
• C is the set of case identifiers,
• Model : C → R is a function relating cases to the root nets of the associated
YAWL specification,
1B(X) is the set of all multisets over X.
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• WI : E → W is a surjective function relating events to work items,
• Case : E → C is a surjective function relating events to cases,
• Task :W → TY is a function relating work items to tasks,
• EvType : E → StatusType is a function relating events to work item sta-
tuses,
• Time : E → T is an injective function relating events to timestamps, hence
no two events in the log can have identical timestamps,
• Res : E → 2UserID is a function relating events to sets of resources, as some
events may concern multiple resources (e.g. a work item being offered),
• Inp : E × Var  Ω is a partial function relating events and variables to
(input) values,
• Outp : E × Var  Ω is a partial function relating events and variables to
(output) values.
3.3 Optimization Algorithms
Optimization algorithms are a family of algorithms specialized in the resolution
of optimization problems. An optimization problem can be summarized as the
problem of minimizing an objective function without violating certain constraints.
Optimization algorithms constitute a core element in risk mitigation. For a risk
associated with a business process there can be a high, potentially infinite, number
of ways of mitigating it. It appears clear that mitigating a risk requires not only
the identification of a mitigation but also the identification of the best and most
effective mitigation.
In the literature we can find several studies and approaches for the resolution
of optimization problems. For example:
• convex programming studies the case when the objective function and the
constraint set are convex (a function is defined convex if its epigraph2 is a
convex set3);
• nonlinear programming studies the case where objective function and/or
constraints contain nonlinear parts;
2The epigraph of a function is the set of all points lying on or above the graph of the function.
3A convex set is a set containing all line segments between each pair of its points.
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• stochastic programming studies the case where constraints depend on ran-
dom variables;
• combinatorial optimization studies the case where the set of solutions is or
can be reduced to a discrete set;
• heuristics and metaheuristics study the case where no assumptions about
the problem are made.
In the context of this research we will utilize two types of approaches for the
resolution of optimization problems, specifically convex programming and meta
heuristics.
3.3.1 Linear Programming
A mathematical optimization problem is the problem of finding the optimal value
(minimum value) for a given function under a set of given constraints. It has the
form:
minimize f0(x)
subject to fi(x) ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Here f0(x) is the optimization function, i.e. the function that we are interested
in optimizing, and where fi(x), with i = 1, . . . ,m, are the constraints, i.e. the set
of functions that define the constraints that a solution should satisfy in order to
be admissible.
A mathematical optimization problem, is called a convex optimization problem
if its optimization function and all its constraints are convex functions. A convex
optimization problem having a linear optimization function and linear constraints,
is called a linear optimization problem or a linear programming problem. A linear
programming problem has the following (canonical) form:
minimize
∑n
j=1 cj · xj
subject to
∑n
j=1 ai,j · xj ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m.
xj > 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
It is also common to see a linear programming problem represented using
matrices as:
minimize cTx
subject to Ax ≤ b
x  0
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Here  represents component wise comparison, c ∈ Rn is the cost vector and
cT is the transpose of c, x ∈ Rn is the vector of variables, A ∈ Rm∗n is the
coefficient matrix, and b ∈ Rm is the vector of coefficients or righthand side:
c =

c1
...
cn
x =

x1
...
xn
A =

a1,1 . . . a1,n
...
. . .
...
am,1 . . . am,n
 b =

b1
...
bm

It is important to realize that each constraint is a half-plane, and all together
they create a convex polytope4 that is the space of admissible solutions. Analyzing
the space of admissible solutions it is possible to derive if the problem admits a
solution or not. If the created polytope is empty, then the linear programming
problem does not admit a solution, if it is bounded then the linear programming
problem has one or infinitely many solutions, finally if the polytope is unbounded
the problem may have one or infinitely many solutions or be unbounded5 based
on the direction of the optimization function.
Solving a linear programming problem is not a trivial operation and several
methods have been discovered during the years. The most famous is Dantzig’s
simplex method [Dan51]. The method proposed by Dantzig uses the polytope
of the possible solutions, moving along its vertexes toward the vertex with the
lowest value for the optimization function.
An integer linear programming problem is a type of mathematical problem. It
is similar to a linear programming problem but has an additional constraint, all
its variables must be integers, and it has the form:
minimize cTx
subject to Ax ≤ b
x  0
x ∈ Zn
This additional constraint drastically increases the complexity of the problem,
since in this case the space of admissible solutions is not a polytope anymore. The
absence of a polytope makes the Dantzig’s simplex method ineffective. A well
known algorithm to solve an integer linear programming problem is the Branch
and Cut algorithm [PR91]. The algorithm is a hybrid between the Branch and
Bound algorithm [LD60] and the Cutting Planes algorithm [Gom58]. It first
4A polytope is a geometric object with flat sides. For example a polygon is a polytope in
two dimensions.
5A linear program is unbounded if it is feasible but its objective function is infinite, i.e. it
can be made arbitrarily “good”.
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drops the constraint requiring that all variables must be integers, obtaining the
linear programming relaxation of the problem. If a solution is found and it is
not an integer solution, the algorithm splits the problem into two subproblems
(branches), by choosing a variable a of value j that does not have an integer
value.
The first subproblem is the original problem with an additional constraint
that requires a to be less than or equal to bjc. The second subproblem requires
as additional constraint a to be greater than or equal to dje. The algorithm then
computes the linear programming relaxation of both the problems and keeps
going until the optimal solution is found. At each step the best integer solution
is saved, and in case the value of the optimal solution for a linear programming
relaxation is not better than the optimal solution found so far the entire branch
is discarded since the optimal solution to the original problem cannot be found
in that branch.
Finally, a less restrictive version of an integer linear programming problem, is
a mixed integer linear programming problem, where at least one variable must be
integer.
3.3.2 Simulated Annealing
In mathematical optimization and in computer science, metaheuristics are gen-
eral algorithmic frameworks designed to find a solution for complex optimization
problems [BDGG09]. Metaheuristics are capable of providing a sufficiently good
solution to optimization problems and are often used in contexts where incom-
plete or imperfect information is provided or limited computation capacity is
available. Metaheuristics can be used for a variety of problems since they make
few assumptions about the optimization problem that will be solved. Metaheuris-
tics compared to optimization algorithms and iterative methods do not guarantee
that the global optimal solution will be found.
Several algorithms fall under the umbrella term metaheuristics. Since the
purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the techniques used
in this thesis, and not to provide an exhaustive description over the wide vari-
ety of metaheuristics algorithms, we will just focus on the simulated annealing
algorithm.
Simulated annealing (SA) is a metaheuristic for the combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem. It can easily explore a big search space and it is not affected by bad
candidate solutions as these are simply discarded. The algorithm does not need
any information about the problem, since it only requires to know how to com-
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pare to different solutions. The SA algorithm has been proposed by Kirkpatrick
et al. [KGV83] and it is an evolution of the algorithm proposed by Metropolis et
al. [MRR+53].
The algorithm proposed by Metropolis et al. [MRR+53] is based on the concept
of iterative improvement. Each iteration introduces small changes to the current
solution in order to (slightly) reduce the value of an objective function (energy).
At each step the algorithm checks if the solution is improved. If this is the case,
then the new solution replaces the previous one as starting point. Otherwise
the new solution is accepted with a probability proportional to the difference of
energy between the current solution and the previous solution. The algorithm
terminate when a good solution is found or after a given number of iterations.
Kirkpatrick et al. [KGV83] extended the algorithm of Metropolis et al. with
the concept of cooling down typical of annealing in metallurgy. The probability
of accepting a solution is now also related to a temperature. The temperature
initially is high and decreases with the number of iterations. The introduction of
temperature allows for a time bound where later solutions are more likely to be
better than earlier ones. Finally, Geman and Geman [GG84] proved that the SA
algorithm converges to the global optimum if annealed sufficiently slowly.
The original version of the SA algorithm has been defined for single-objective
optimization problems. In our context we will deal with multi-objective opti-
mization problems since is plausible to believe that more than one risk will be
defined for a process model. In the case of multi-objective optimization prob-
lems the original simulated annealing algorithm cannot be used. Several solu-
tions [UTO98, CJ98, SSPC00, Sum03, SEF+08] have been proposed which over-
come this limitation.
Smith et al. [SEF+08] introduce the concept of dominance and non dominance
between two solutions. Given two solutions a and b, a dominates b, i.e. a ≺ b,
if there is at least a value of an objective function of a that is lower than the
corresponding value in b, and all the other objective functions have the same val-
ues (or lower). As consequence if neither solution dominates the other, they are
non-dominating, i.e. a ⊀ b and b ⊀ a. Using these two concepts, Smith et al. pro-
pose an extension of the simulated annealing algorithm that uses the relationship
between dominating and mutually non dominating solutions. In their approach
the difference of energy is calculated taking into account the number of solutions
that the elegible solution dominates. Finally, as pointed out by Suman [Sum04]
the algorithm proposed by Smith et al. requires less computational cost than
other approaches [UTO98, CJ98, SSPC00, Sum03, SEF+08], and generates well
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diversified solutions.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we introduced a number of important concepts and their defi-
nitions used in the following chapters. In particular, we presented the concept
of YAWL specification and its formal representation. A YAWL specification is
a set of YAWL nets that together model a business process including activities,
resources, and data that are utilized during the execution of the process. This
concept will allow us have a better understanding of the techniques that will be
proposed in the following chapters, since all techniques are implemented on top
of (but not limited to) the YAWL system.
We then introduced the concepts of event log and YAWL log. An event log is
the set of events that are generated during the execution of an automated business
process and are store during the logging process. In its minimal form, an event
should contain the name activity and the id of the process instance generating the
event. Additional information can be provided such as in the case of the YAWL
log, where also information about resources, timestamps, and data are provided.
Finally, we provided a briefly introduction to operation research techniques
with an emphasis on linear programming and simulated annealing. Both tech-
niques are used to solve optimization problems. In particular, linear programming
is a mathematical approach for the solution of optimization problems where both
objective function and constraints are linear. Simulated annealing on the other
hand is a metaheuristic approach used to optimization problems via a probabilis-
tic search algorithm.
In the next chapter we present an architecture for risk monitoring based on
sensors, which is the first component of our risk-aware framework.
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Chapter 4
Risk Definition and Monitoring
In the Introduction we highlighted that effective risk management is imperative
for organizational survival, and incidents such as those described in the Introduc-
tion reveal that proper integration of risk management with process management
is now vital. Further, a focus on risk analysis alone is no longer adequate. Rather,
active, real-time risk detection, analysis and mitigation is required. Real-time risk
detection is particularly essential in mission-critical business processes or those
involving life-saving activities [CMZ09, MZW12].
In this chapter we present a technique for real-time monitoring of risks in
executable business process models, as part of the risk-aware approach described
in Section 1.4. This is achieved by incorporating risk management into all phases
of the BPM lifecycle: from process design, where high-level risks defined via a
risk analysis method are mapped down to specific process model elements such
as activities, resources and data, through to process diagnosis, where risks are
detected during process execution. By automating risk detection, the interested
users (e.g. a process administrator or a risk manager) can be notified as early as
a risk is detected (i.e. in real-time), such that remedial actions can be taken to
rectify the current process instance, and prevent an undesired state of the process
(fault for short), from occurring. Based on historical data, we can also compute
the probability of a risk at run-time, and compare it to a dynamic threshold, so
as to notify the user about the severity of a risk, when the latter is no longer
tolerable. The dynamic threshold is computed on the fly, allowing the definition
of different threshold values based for example on the resource performing a
specific task or on the value of a specific variable (e.g. the threshold is 70% if the
premium of a claim is below $1000 or 50% otherwise). This threshold could also be
dynamically set as the upper bound likelihood for a given process risk. This upper
bound value can be computed as the average risk likelihood plus its standard
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deviation, measured over a time window (e.g. within one year) from the logs,
and updated regularly based on the needs of the company under exam. In this
case the technique will identify risky process behaviour as the process instances
with a risk likelihood greater than this upper bound, i.e. the outliers. Moreover,
trends observed in the behaviour of a process (i.e. an increase or decrease of
the value of the average risk likelihood over time), can serve as indicators to
detect changes in the risk level of a process (riskier for ascending trends or safer
for descending trends), and as such, they could be used to adapt the dynamic
threshold accordingly.
Our technique is operationalized via a distributed, sensor-based architecture
on top of a BPMS. Each sensor is coupled with a risk condition capturing the
situation upon which the risk of a given fault may occur. Sensors are defined at
design-time on the executable process model. Conditions can be determined via
a query language that can fetch both historical and current execution data from
the logs of the BPMS. At run-time sensors are registered with a central sensor
manager. At a given sampling rate, or based on the occurrence of a specific event,
the sensor manager retrieves and filters all data relevant for the various sensors
(as it is logged by the BPMS engine), and distributes it to the relevant sensors.
If a sensor condition holds, i.e. if the probability of the associated risk is above a
given threshold, the sensor alerts the sensor manager which in turn notifies the
monitoring component of the BPMS. The distributed nature of the architecture
guarantees that there is no performance overhead on the BPMS engine, and thus
on the execution of the various process instances. We implemented this archi-
tecture on top of the YAWL system [HAAR10]. We extended the YAWL Editor
to cater for the design of risk sensors, and equipped the run-time environment
with a sensor manager service that interacts with YAWL’s monitoring service
and execution engine. Finally, to facilitate the definition of process risks, we im-
plemented a set of risk templates for various categories, such as organizational,
data-related and technology-related. Such templates are abstract risk definitions
which users need to bind to concrete process elements.
To prove the feasibility of the proposed approach, we used fault tree analysis
[Com90] (a well-established risk analysis method) to identify risk conditions in
a reference process model for logistics, in collaboration with an Australian risk
consultant. These risks embrace different process aspects such as tasks’ order
dependencies, involved resources and business data, and relate to historical data
where needed, to compute risk probabilities. We expressed these conditions via
sensors in the YAWL system, and measured the time needed to compute these
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conditions at run-time. The tests showed that the sensor conditions can be com-
puted in a matter of milliseconds without impacting on the performance of the
running process instances. Finally, we conducted a usability analysis of the ap-
proach and its implementation, by inviting 21 users to report on their experiences
while using the approach for analyzing and defining risk sensor conditions. The
results from this experiment show that the approach is being perceived as in-
teresting and useful, especially by novice users, confirming an intention of the
participants to use it.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 illustrates the running exam-
ple in the logistics domain. Section 4.2 presents the sensor-based architecture to
implement this approach. Section 4.3 formalizes the abstract syntax of the lan-
guage proposed for risk detection while Section 4.4 shows how the risks defined
on the running example can be modeled via this language. Next, Section 4.5 pro-
poses a set of risk templates to facilitate the definition of process risks. Section 4.6
illustrates the implementation of the sensor-based architecture, while Section 4.7
reports on the results of the performance and usability evaluations. Section 4.8
covers related work while Section 4.9 concludes the chapter.
The research presented in this chapter has been the subject of several publi-
cations [CFLH11, CLF+13b, CLF13a, CLH+13].
4.1 Running Example
In this section we use an example to illustrate how the risk of possible faults to
occur during a business process execution can be detected as early as possible. In
particular, we show how risks can be expressed in terms of process-specific aspects
such as tasks occurrence, data or available resources. Figure 6.1 describes the
payment subprocess of an order fulfillment business process which is inspired by
the VICS industry standard for logistics [Vol11]. The notation used to represent
this example is that of YAWL (see Chapter 3), although a deep knowledge of this
language is not required.
This process starts after the freight has been picked up by a carrier and deals
with the shipment payment. The first task is the production of a Shipment
Invoice containing the shipment costs related to a specific order for a specific
customer. If shipments have been paid in advance, all that is required is for a
Finance Officer to issue a Shipment Remittance Advice specifying the amount
being debited to the customer. Otherwise, the Finance Officer issues a Shipment
Payment Order that needs to be approved by a Senior Finance Officer (who is
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Figure 4.1: Order-Fulfillment: Payment subprocess.
the superior of this Finance Officer). At this point, a number of updates may
be made to the Shipment Payment Order by the Finance Officer that issued it,
but each of these needs to be approved by the Senior Finance Officer. After the
document is finalized and the customer has paid, an Account Manager can process
the shipment payment by specifying the balance. If the customer underpaid, the
Account Manager needs to issue a Debit Adjustment, the customer needs to pay
the balance and the payment needs to be reprocessed. A customer may also
overpay. In this case the Account Manager needs to issue a Credit Adjustment.
In the latter case and in case of a correct payment, the shipment payment process
is completed.
In collaboration with a risk analyst of an Australian consulting company,
we identified four faults that can occur during the execution of this payment
subprocess. In order to prevent the occurrence of these faults, for each of them
we also defined an associated risk condition by using fault tree analysis [Com90].
Accordingly, each risk condition is expressed as a set of lower-level boolean events
which are organized in a tree via logical connectives such as ORs, ANDs and
XORs, an example of fault tree is shown in Figure 4.2.
The first fault is an overtime process fault. A Service Level Agreement (SLA)
for a process or for a given task within a process, may establish that the process
(or task) may not last longer than a Maximum Cycle Time MCT , otherwise the
organization running the process may incur a pecuniary penalty. In our case, an
overtime fault occurs if an instance of the payment subprocess is not completed
within an MCT of five days.
To detect the risk of overtime fault at run-time, we should check the likelihood
that the running instance does not exceed the MCT based on the amount of
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time Tc expired at the current stage of the execution. Let us consider Te as the
remaining cycle time, i.e. the amount of time estimated to complete the current
instance given Tc, then the probability of exceeding MCT can be computed as
1 − (MCT − Tc)/Te if Tc < MCT < Te + Tc, it is 1 if Tc ≥ MCT , and it is 0
if Te + Tc ≤ MCT .1 If this probability is greater than a tolerance value (e.g.
60%), we notify the risk to the user. The estimation of the remaining cycle time
is based on past executions of the same process and can be computed using the
approach of Van der Aalst et al. [ASS11], whereby using an annotated transition
system an estimation of the remaining cycle is calculated by replaying the trace
on the transition system and returning the expected time annotated on the last
node visited (see Section 4.7 for more details).
The second fault is related to the resources participating in the process. The
Senior Finance Officer who has approved a Shipment Payment Order for a given
customer, must have not approved another order by the same customer in the
last d days, otherwise there is an approval fraud. This fault is thus generated
by the violation of a four-eye principle across different instances of the Payment
subprocess.
To detect the risk of this fault we first have to check that there is an order,
say order o of customer c, to be approved. This means checking that an instance
of task Approve Shipment Payment Order is being executed. Moreover, we need
to check that either of the following conditions holds: i) o has been allocated to
a Senior Finance Officer who has already approved another order for the same
customer in the last d days; or ii) at least one Senior Finance Officer is available
who approved an order for customer c in the last d days and all other Senior
Finance Officers who never approved an order for c during the last d days are
busy. The corresponding fault tree is shown in Figure 4.2.
The third fault relates to a situation where a process instance executes a given
task too many times. This situation typically occurs in the context of loops. Not
only could this lead to a process slowdown but also to a “livelock” if the task is in
a loop whose exit condition is purposefully never met. In general, given a task t a
maximum number of allowable executions of t per process instance MAE i(t) can
be fixed as part of the SLA for t. With reference to the Payment subprocess, this
can occur for example if task Update Shipment Payment Order is re-executed
five times within the same process instance. We call this an order unfulfillment
fault.
1A more accurate value could be obtained considering various scenarios or paths in the
transition system [ASS11] to see what fraction of these paths will lead to exceeding the MCT.
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Figure 4.2: The fault trees for Approval Fraud and Underpayment Fraud.
To detect the risk of this fault at run-time, we need to check if: i) an order
o is been updated (i.e. task Update Shipment Payment Order is currently being
performed for order o); and ii) it is likely that this order will be updated again (i.e.
task Update Shipment Payment Order will be repeated within the same process
instance). The probability that the number of times a task will be repeated
within the same instance of the Payment subprocess is computed by dividing the
number of instances where the MAE i for task Update Shipment Payment Order
has been reached, over the number of instances that have executed this task at
least as many times as it has been executed by the current instance, and have
completed. The tolerance value indicates a threshold above which the risk should
be notified to the user. For example, if this threshold is 60% for task t, a risk
should be raised if the probability of MAE i(t) is greater than 0.6.
The fourth fault is an underpayment fraud. It relates to a situation in which a
given task is executed too many times across multiple process instances. Similar
to the previous fault, given a task t we can define a maximum number of allowable
executions of t per process MAE p(t) as part of the SLA for p. In our example,
this type of fault occurs when a customer underpays more than three times within
the last five days.
To detect the risk of underpayment fraud, we need to check if: i) a debit
adjustment is currently being issued to a customer c (i.e. task Issue Debit Ad-
justment is currently being performed for customer c); and ii) it is likely that the
maximum number of debit adjustments will be issued to the same customer in
a d-day time frame. The probability that MAE p is reached for task Issue Debit
Adjustment of customer c in d days is computed by dividing the number of cus-
tomers for which the MAE p for task Issue Debit Adjustment has been reached
within d days, over the number of customers for which this task has been ex-
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Figure 4.3: Realization of risk-aware BPM lifecycle via sensors.
ecuted at least as many times as it has been executed for c within d days. If
this probability is above a tolerance value, the risk should be raised and the user
notified. Similar to the previous risk, the tolerance value indicates a threshold
above which this risk should be notified to the user. The corresponding fault-tree
is shown in Figure 4.2.
Finally, these four risks will clearly have a different impact on the process and
the organization executing the process. In order to differentiate the consequence
that each risk may have on the organization we can define a dynamic consequence
for each one of them. For example, for the overtime process the monetary conse-
quence could be proportional to the amount of time exceeding the SLA, plus an
initial fee.
In the next section we describe a sensor-based architecture to operationalize
our technique, according to the enhanced BPM lifecycle described in Section 1.4.
4.2 Sensor-based Realization
In order to realize our risk-aware BPM lifecycle, we devised a technique based on
sensors. In a nutshell, the idea is to capture risk and fault conditions via sensors,
and then monitor these sensors during process execution. An overview of this
approach is shown in Figure 4.3 using the BPMN 2.0 notation [Obj11].
Sensors are defined during the Process Design and Process Implementation
phases of our risk-aware BPM lifecycle (see Figure 1.3), for each process model
for which the presence of risks and/or faults need to be monitored. If the process
model is specified via an executable language, then these two phases coincide.
A sensor is defined through a boolean sensor condition, constructed on a set
of process variables, and a sensor activation trigger. Process variables are used to
retrieve information from the specific instance in which the sensor condition will
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be evaluated as well as from other instances, either completed or still running.
For example, we can use variables to retrieve the resource allocated to a given
task, the value of a task variable, or the status of a task. Process instances can
either be identified based on the current instance (e.g. the last five instances that
have been completed before the current one), or based on the fulfillment of a case
condition (e.g. “all instances where a given resource has executed a given task”).
The sensor condition can represent either a risk condition associated with a fault,
or a fault condition, or both. If both conditions are specified, the fault condition
is evaluated only if the risk condition evaluates to true. For example, the sensor
will check if an overtime process fault has occurred in a process instance only
if first the risk of such fault has first been detected, based on the estimation of
the remaining cycle time for this instance. Finally, the sensor activation trigger
can be either a timer periodically fired according to a sampling rate (e.g. every
5 minutes), or an event emitted by the process engine (e.g. the completion of a
task).
During Process Enactment, the defined sensors are registered with a sensor
manager, which activates them. In the Process Diagnosis phase, which starts
as soon as the process is enacted, the activated sensors receive updates on the
variables of their sensor conditions according to their trigger (timer or event).
When a sensor receives an update, it checks its sensor condition. If the condi-
tion holds, a notification is sent from the sensor to the monitor service of the
BPMS, informing the process administrator about the eventuation of a risk and
its consequence (e.g., a monetary consequence).
The sensor manager relies on three interfaces to interact with the BPMS (see
Figure 4.4a):
• Engine interface, used to register a sensor with a particular event raised
by the BPMS engine. When the event occurs the sensor is notified by the
sensor manager.
• Database interface, used to query the BPMS database in order to collect
current and historical information.
• Monitor interface, used to notify the detection of risks and faults to the
monitor service of the BPMS.
These interfaces can be implemented by the vendor or user of the BPMS where
the sensor manager needs to be installed. In this way, our sensor manager can
virtually be interfaced with any BPMS. As an example, the conceptual model of
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the database interface is showed in Figure 4.4b, where methods have been omitted
for space reasons. This conceptual model is inspired by the reference process
meta-model of the WfMC (see Section 2.1), in order to cover as many aspects
as possible of a workflow model, and meantime, to remain as generic as possible.
For example, class WorkFlowDefinition allows one to retrieve information about
the process model where the sensor is defined, such as process identifier and
name, while class SubProcess allows one to retrieve information about a specific
subprocess, and so on. This interface should be implemented according to the
characteristics of the specific database used in the BPMS at hand. For an efficient
use of the interface, one should also define indexes on the attributes of the BPMS
database that map the underlined attributes in Figure 4.4b. These indexes have
been determined based on the types of queries that can be defined in our sensor
definition language.
An alternative approach to achieve the portability of the sensor manager,
would be to read the BPMS logs from a standard serialization format such as
OpenXES [GV13]. However, as we will show in Section 4.7, this solution is
rather inefficient.
The advantages of using sensors are twofold. First, their conditions can be
monitored while the process model is being executed, i.e. in real-time. Second,
according to a distributed architecture, each sensor takes care of checking its
own condition after being activated by the sensor manager. In this way, potential
execution slowdowns are avoided (e.g., the process engine and the sensor manager
could be deployed onto two different machines).
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4.3 Sensor Definition Language: Abstract Syn-
tax
In this section we describe the abstract syntax [Mey90] of the sensor definition
language. A detailed description of all elements of this abstract syntax is reported
in Appendix A. The sensor definition language shares common aspects with pro-
gramming languages such as with query languages, since it is inspired to JAVA
from a syntactic point of view and to SQL for its semantics. During the definition
of the sensor definition language we took in consideration the design principles
discussed in [HB99, Ben86], in particular: i) expressibility: is the language ex-
pressive?; ii) completeness: can the language describe all objects of interest?; iii)
extensibility: can the language be easily extended?; iv) formal foundation: is the
language formally defined in order to guarantee unambiguity and executability?.
The definition of a sensor requires a risk condition, a boolean fault condition,
a sensor activation trigger, and a consequence which represents the gravity of
the impact the fault will have on the company in case it occurs (e.g. in monetary
terms). The trigger can be a timer based on a sampling rate, or an event produced
by the engine interface. Risk condition and fault condition are constructed on a
set of process variables. A variable is defined with a mapping among a varName
and an Info.
Sensor , v : Variables; t : Trigger ; riskCond : RiskCon;
faultCond : BoolCon; consequence : MaCon;
Trigger , timer | event
Variables , Assignment+
Assignment , result : varName; i : Info
This Info can be a constant (using Definition), or the result of a function
executed on a variable (using VarFun), or a piece of information collected from
the process instance (using CaseExp or CaseEleExp). We use a CaseExp if the
information is related to the process instance itself, while a CaseEleExp if the
information is related to an element of a process instance (that must be specified
using TaskOrNet that identifies a task by taskLabel or a net by netName).
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Info , Definition | VarFun | CaseExp | CaseEleExp
VarFun , ResCon | ResSimFun | ResComFun
Definition , c : constant
CaseEleExp , ce : CaseExp; ton : TaskOrNet
TaskOrNet , taskLabel | netName
When we use a CaseExp we must specify the instances of interest (using
CaseIDStat), and the action that identifies the piece of information (using Action).
Such Action can either be an information related to a predicate function, a pred-
icate function with input, a task or net variable (i.e. a variable at the level of
tasks or a variable at the level of processes), or a task or net subvariable (i.e. a
subvariable of a task variable or a net variable, respectively). An instance can
be identified in various ways, by its position among all the instances of the same
process model (using absExp), by its position respect the current instance (using
relExp), or by the fulfillment of some conditions (using CaseConSet).
CaseExp , cis : CaseIDStat ; a : Action
CaseIDStat , absExp | relExp | CaseConSet
Action , predAct | inputPredAct | taskOrNetVar | SubVarExp
SubVarExp , var+
These conditions can be on the identifier of the process instance (through
the use of CaseParam), or on a piece of information related to a task or a net
(using CaseCon). It is also possible to specify multiple conditions that are ob-
tained by the conjunction of several CaseParam and CaseCon elements (using
CaseConExp).
CaseConSet , CaseCon | CaseParam | CaseConExp
CaseConExp , ccs1 , ccs2 : CaseConSet ; bo : BoolOp
CaseCon , ton : TaskOrNet ; a : Action; co : CompOp; rhe : RHExp
CaseParam , i : idFun; co : CompOp; rhe : RHExp
CompOp , le | leq | ge | geq | eq | contains | isContained
Whether using a CaseParam or a CaseCon it will be compared with a RHExp.
A RHExp can be a constant , a function, a varName, or an expression containing
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those elements (using RHExpSet).
RHExp , constant | function | varName | RHExpSet
RHExpSet , rhe1 , rhe2 : RHExp; o : Op
Once all the variables have been specified the risk condition can be defined.
A RiskCon is composed of two MaCon elements, one is the risk likelihood and
the other is the risk threshold. A risk condition evaluates true if the likelihood
exceeds the threshold. A MaCon is an arithmetical expression that can use con-
stants, variables, results of functions invoked on variables (using ResSimFun, and
ResComFun), and the results obtained by the execution of loops (using MaFor ,
and FixMaFor). A MaCon may be in a conditional form, represented as MaITE ,
or be a normal expression represented as MaExp, despite it is always possible to
have conditional elements inside a normal expression. A conditional expression
MaITE is composed of a BoolCon representing the if and two MaCons repre-
senting the then and else clauses, respectively.
RiskCon , riskL, riskT : MaCon
MaCon , MaITE | MaFor | ResSimFun | MaExp |
FixMaFor | constant | ResComFun | varName
MaITE , if : BoolCon; then, else : MaCon
From the definition of the MaExp element on, the syntax describes an arith-
metical expression. In fact a MaExp element can be solved via the analysis of
an unary expression MaUnExp (i.e. a negative expression) or a binary expression
MaBinExp, that is an arithmetical operation between two MaCons.
MaExp , MaUnExp | MaBinExp
MaUnExp , s : sub; me : MaCon
MaBinExp , me1 ,me2 : MaCon; mo : MaOp
MaOp , add | sub | mul | div | exp | mod
As said before a condition expression is defined using a BoolCon. A BoolCon
is a boolean expression that can use constants, variables, results of functions in-
voked on variables (using ResCon), and the results obtained by the execution of
loops (using BoolFor , and FixBoolFor). A BoolCon may be in a conditional form,
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represented as BoolITE , or be a normal expression represented as BoolExp, de-
spite it is always possible to have conditional elements inside a normal expression.
A conditional expression BoolITE is composed of three BoolCons representing the
if, the then, and the else.
BoolCon , BoolITE | BoolExp | BoolFor | FixBoolFor |
Comp | ResCon | varName | constant
BoolITE , if , then, else : BoolCon
The BoolExp element represents a boolean expression that is describes from
this point on. In fact a BoolExp element can be solved via the analysis of an unary
expression BoolUnExp or a binary expression BoolBinExp, that can contain the
result of a comparison Comp, and so on.
BoolExp , BoolUnExp | BoolBinExp
BoolUnExp , n : neg ; e : BoolCon
BoolBinExp , e1, e2 : BoolCon; bo : BoolOp
BoolOp , and | or
Comp , ce1 , ce2 : CompElem; co : CompOp
CompElem , MaCon | ResListFun | varName | constant
CompOp , l | leq | eq | geq | g | noteq
The functions that can be invoked on a variable are identified by the elements:
ResCon, ResListFun, ResSimFun, and ResComFun. These elements can be used
only in specific points of the syntax since the result returned can be a boolean,
or a list, or a number.
ResCon , res : varName; a : Activity
ResListFun , result : varName; lrf : listResFun
ResSimFun , resource : varName; srf : simResFun
ResComFun , res1 , res2 : varName; crf : comResFun
Activity , resource : varName; lrf : ResListFun
The constructs MaFor and BoolFor are used to execute nested loops. The
definition of one of these elements requires to specify the type of loop (TypeBF
for BoolFor or TypeMF for MaFor), the list of variables (i.e. ListResult) that
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will be used to create the nested loops (one loops for each variable), and the
expression that must be executed. The constructs FixMaFor and FixBoolFor are
nested loops like MaFor and BoolFor for which the variable fixEle determines the
number of loops that need to be executed. The TypeBF and TypeMF describe
how the results of each execution will be joined. It is possible to choose among
four types of loops: and (i.e. logic AND), or (i.e. logic OR), add (i.e. addition),
and mul (i.e. multiplication).
MaFor , t : TypeMF ; lr : ListResult ; fme : ForMaCon
FixMaFor , fixEle : varName; mf : MaFor
TypeMF , add | mul
BoolFor , t : TypeBF ; lr : ListResult ; fbe : ForBoolCon
FixBoolFor , fixEle : varName; bf : BoolFor
TypeBF , and | or
ListResult , varName+
As for a condition also for loops it is possible to assume conditional or normal
forms. The expression executed inside a loop is similar to the condition expression
but with some variations. The ForMaCon is a arithmetical expression that can
use constants and variables, the difference with an MaCon is that it is not possible
to use loops or functions inside this type of expression.
ForMaCon , ForMaITE | ForMaExp | constant | varName
ForMaITE , if : ForBoolCon; then, else : ForMaCon
ForMaExp , ForMaUnExp | ForMaBinExp
ForMaUnExp , s : sub; me : ForMaCon
ForMaBinExp , me1 ,me2 : ForMaCon; mo : MaOp
The ForBoolCon is a boolean expression and does not allow the use of loops
or functions as the ForMaExp. Clarified this two points, all the elements the
name of which starts with For are equals to the elements used by an BoolCon.
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ForBoolCon , ForBoolITE | ForBoolExp | ForComp |
varName | varName | constant
ForBoolITE , if , then, else : ForBoolExp
ForBoolExp , ForBoolUnExp | ForBoolBinExp
ForBoolUnExp , n : neg ; e : ForBoolCon
ForBoolBinExp , e1, e2 : ForBoolCon; bo : BoolOp
ForComp , ce1 , ce2 : ForCompElem; co : CompOp
ForCompElem , ForMaCon | varName | constant
4.4 Risk Definition for the Running Example
The abstract syntax defined in Section 4.3 has been used as a formal foundation
for the definition of the concrete syntax of our language for sensor conditions.
During the realization of the concrete syntax we followed the dot notation typ-
ical of object-oriented languages, whereby a “.” is used as a separator between
the object on which a function is requested and the function itself. In par-
ticular, whenever a function “a()” needs to be invoked on an object “b”, the
structure used is “b.a()”. In the context of our language we follow this hierar-
chy: “case.task.action()”, “case.net.action()”, or “case.action()” for the defini-
tion of variables, and “task.action()”, or “net.action()” for the identification of
cases which satisfy certain conditions. Finally, another aspect in common with
object-oriented languages is the declaration of variables. In our concrete syntax,
conditions can only be defined using variables that have been previously declared
and defined using a mapping.
Using this concrete syntax, we now have all ingredients to show how the
risks that we identified for the Payment subprocess can be captured via sensor
conditions. There is an overtime process if an instance of the payment subprocess
is not completed within an MCT of five days (see Section 4.1). This condition
is checked by using two variables: one to retrieve the amount of time Tc expired
and the other to retrieve the Te remaining cycle time.
d = 5
Tc = case(current).Payment(PassTimeInMillis)
Te = case(current).(TimeEstimationInMillis)
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Assuming a tolerance value of 60%, the risk condition defined to monitor this
risk is:
(Tc ≥ (d ∗ 24 ∗ 60 ∗ 60000)) ∨ ((d ∗ 24 ∗ 60 ∗ 60000) < (Te + Tc)∧
(1− ((d ∗ 24 ∗ 60 ∗ 60000)− Tc)/Te) > 0.6)).
(4.1)
There is an approval fraud whenever a Senior Finance Officer (SFO) approves
two orders for the same customer within five days (see Section 4.1). Accordingly,
the corresponding risk can be detected if given an order o of customer c to be
approved, i) o is allocated to a SFO who approved another order for the same
customer in the last five days; or ii) the only SFOs available are the ones who
approved an order for customer c in the last five days.
This risk condition is triggered by an event, i.e. the spawning of a new instance
of task Approve Shipment Payment Order (see Figure 6.1). This is checked using
a variable to retrieve the status of this task in the current instance. The risk
condition itself is given by the disjunction of the two conditions described above.
The first condition is checked by using variable ASPO# to retrieve the number of
times this task was completed for customer c by the resources to whom is currently
allocated. Variable ASPO# is defined via a case condition over customer c, the
resource to whom is currently allocate (variable sfo1), the completion time of
this task (that must be greater than the start time of the current task Approve
Shipment Payment Order minus five days in milliseconds2), and the identifier of
the instance (that must be different from the identifier of the current instance).
The second condition is checked by using two variables and invoking two func-
tions. Variable sfo2 retrieves which resources completed task Approve Shipment
Payment Order, and variable sfo retrieves all resources that can be offered this
task (i.e. the current task). The first variable is defined via a case condition over
customer c and the completion time of this task (that must be greater than the
start time of the current task Approve Shipment Payment Order minus five days).
The two invoked functions return the number of tasks started on the resources
that completed task Approve Shipment Payment Order, and the number of tasks
in the execution queue of the resources that have been offered this task, and did
not complete it for customer c in the last five days.
After the definition of the variables, defined in Table 4.1, the risk condition is
2Time is measured in milliseconds as logging systems save timestamps in this unit, and this
facilitates the comparison of timings.
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sfo1 = case(current).Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(allocateResource)
c = case(current).Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company
d = 5
ASPO = case(current).Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(OfferTimeInMillis)
ASPOST = case(current).Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(StartTimeInMillis)
ASPO# = case(Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(completeResource)=sfo1 ∧
Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company=c ∧
Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(CompleteTimeInMillis)>
(ASPO-(d*24*60*60*1000)) ∧ (ID)!=[IDCurr])
.Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(CountElements)
sfo2 = case(Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company=c ∧
Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(isCompleted)=“true” ∧
Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(CompleteTimeInMillis)>
(ASPOST-(d*24*60*60*1000)) ∧ (ID)!=[IDCurr])
.Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(completeResource)
sfo = case(current).Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(offerDistribution)
Table 4.1: Variable definition for approval fraud risk.
specified as follows:
(ASPO# > 0) ∨ ((sfo2.startMinNumber = 0)∧
(sfo.startMinNumberExcept.sfo2 >= 1)).
(4.2)
An order unfulfillment occurs whenever an order is updated more than five
times (see Section 4.1). Accordingly, the respective risk can be detected if: i)
task Update Shipment Payment Order is currently being performed for a given
order; and ii) it is likely that this order will be updated again (i.e. task Update
Shipment Payment Order will be repeated within the same process instance).
The probability that the number of times a task will be repeated within the
same instance of the Payment subprocess is computed by dividing the number
of instances, where five executions for task Update Shipment Payment Order
has been reached, over the number of instances that have executed this task
at least as many times as it has been executed by the current instance, and
have completed. This condition can be checked by using variable USPO#US to
retrieve the amount of orders that have been updated at least as much as this
order, and variable USPO#U5 to retrieve the amount of orders that have been
updated at least five times.
The variables described can be defined via the sensor definition language as
in Table 4.2. Assuming a tolerance value of 60%, the risk condition is specified
as follows:
(USPO#U5/USPO#US ) > 0.6. (4.3)
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USPO#UC = case(current).Update Shipment Payment Order 604(Count)
USPO#U5 = case(Update Shipment Payment Order 604(Count)>=5).
Update Shipment Payment Order 604(CountElements)
USPO#US = case(Update Shipment Payment Order 604(Count)>=USPO#UC ∧
Process Shipment Payment 603(isOffered)=“true”).
Update Shipment Payment Order 604(CountElements)
Table 4.2: Variable definition for order unfulfillment risk.
An underpayment fraud occurs whenever a customer underpays more than
three times in a five-day time frame (see Section 4.1). Accordingly, the respective
risk can be detected if: i) task Issue Debit Adjustment is being performed for a
given customer and order (this is the trigger for this risk); and ii) the probability
that the maximum number of allowable executions for this task will be reached in
a five-day time frame, is above the fixed tolerance value for this risk, (this is the
risk condition itself). This condition can be checked by using variable Probability
to retrieve the probability that an attempted fraud will take place. This variable
use the Action “FraudProbabilityFunc” to compute the specific probability
(see B), and takes as input, among other information, variable IDA#Issue which
retrieves the number of times task Issue Debit Adjustment has been completed
for this customer.
IDAStartTime = case(current).Issue Debit Adjustment 605(StartTimeInMillis)
c = case(current).Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company
d = 5
IDA#Issue = case(Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company=c ∧
Issue Debit Adjustment 605(Count)>0 ∧ Issue Debit Adjustment 605
(CompleteTimeInMillis)>(IDAStartTime-d*24*60*60*1000))
.Issue Debit Adjustment 605(CountElements)
GroupingElement = Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company
WindowElement = Issue Debit Adjustment 605(CompleteTimeInMillis)
Threshold = 0.6
Probability = case(Issue Debit Adjustment 605(Count)>0 ∧ (ID)!=[IDcurr]).
Issue Debit Adjustment 605(FraudProbabilityFunc, IDA#Issue, 3,
GroupingElement, WindowElement, (d*24*60*60*1000))
Table 4.3: Variable definition for underpayment fraud risk.
The defined variables are implemented through the sensor language as follows
as in Table 4.3. These variables are used to compose the following risk condition,
assuming a tolerance value of 60%:
Probability > 0.6. (4.4)
The definition of actions and functions used in the above variables is provided
in appendix. In particular, the complete list of all actions is provided in Ap-
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pendix B, the complete lists of the nested loops and of the functions are provided
in Appendix C and Appendix D.
4.5 Risk Templates
In this thesis we do not propose techniques for the identification of risk conditions
and for mapping such conditions to specific process attributes. These aspects are
left to business/risk analysts and can be supported by the use of established
methods such as Fault Tree Analysis or Root Cause Analysis. On the other
hand, to facilitate the definition of concrete risk conditions for process models,
we define the notion of risk template. A risk template is an “abstract” risk
condition defined using generic tasks and generic variables associated with these
tasks, which are not linked to any real process model. These generic tasks and
variables will then be bound to real tasks and variables when the template is used
to define a concrete risk condition for a specific process model. These templates
are thus used as “shortcuts” to simplify the definition of risk conditions.
Several studies address different types of risks [RM05, CLB04, Meu00, Sch00,
Sim99, Sma96]. After an analysis of these studies we decided to subdivide our
risk templates into categories reflecting these types of risks. We expect that this
division into categories also reduces the effort required by a user to select a suit-
able template. These categories were defined using the risk taxonomy proposed
by Rosemann and zur Muehlen [RM05] and other types of risks proposed in the
literature [HBW03]. Our organization of templates based on the above taxonomy
is not intended to be an exhaustive coverage of all possible process-related risks.
Instead, we provide an extensible structure that can easily be extended based on
specific requirements or further taxonomies.
We organized risk templates in two levels. The first level is obtained using
the risk taxonomy, obtaining five categories of risks. These categories are: i)
Structural, capturing risks deriving from wrong decisions taken at design-time;
ii) Data, capturing risks of damaging data integrity; iii) Technology, capturing
risks of impacting on the availability of IT systems; iv) Organizational, capturing
risks of process faults that may impact on the employees or be caused by them;
and i) Goal, capturing risks of not achieving the process objectives that cannot be
categorized in any of the previous categories. For each of these risk categories we
defined eleven subcategories. These subcategories are based on the type of risks
proposed in the literature [HBW03]. Specifically, we have: i) Strategic, risks of
affecting the implementation of business strategies; ii) Operations, risks of affect-
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ing the capability of supplying and producing services or goods; iii) Supply, risks
that prevent a resource from executing an operation; iv) Customer, risks related
to customers; v) Asset, risks deriving from the use of an asset; vi) Competitive,
risks deriving from faults related to competitiveness; vii) Reputation, risks of loss
of reputation; viii) Financial, risks of financial loss; ix) Fiscal, risks caused by
changes in taxation; x) Regulatory, risks related to changes in regulations; xi)
Legal, risks of faults that may lead to legal actions. Figure 4.5 shows a mind map
illustrating how risk templates are categorized and subcategorized. This subdivi-
sion in categories is not absolute. Thus, a situation in which a risk could belong
to more subcategories at the same time is possible. In this case the user should
choose the template from the subcategory considered to be the most appropriate,
i.e. the one that would generate the risk condition that is the closest to the user
requirements.
We defined 14 risk templates as a starting point for a larger risk template
repository. For example, one template of type Data/Operations, aims to detect a
possible inconsistency in the value of a critical variable. The template requires a
as the critical variable, b the identifier variable, and two set of instances s1 and s2,
where s1 is composed of the instances in which the values of a and b are equal to
the value of a and b for the current instance, and s2 is composed of the instances
in which the value of a is equals to the value of a for the current instance. If the
number of instances in s1 divided by the number of instances in s2 is greater than
a certain threshold the template triggers a notification. This risk template can
be used to represent a case in which the critical variable is a credit card number,
or a bank account, while the identifier variable is the customer identifier.
Another risk template, of type Goal/Financial, detects the possibility that
a particular process may exceed the budget assigned for its execution. This
risk is detected looking at all the completed instances of the process and at all
the completed instances with an execution cost at least equal to the execution
cost of the current instance. The condition calculates the probability that the
current instance will exceed the budget. This risk can be associated with any
process where the cost is a relevant element. An example is an insurance process
where opinions from different assessors may be required but the total cost of their
involvement should not exceed the premium.
Considering the category Organizational, subcategory Reputation, we have
risks that affect the reputation of the company due to “employees’ mistakes”.
For example, a delivery company may incur in a reputational risk if a delivery
needs to be rescheduled due to an employee’ mistake. In this case the customer
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Figure 4.5: Template structure with categories and subcategories.
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may think that the company is not professional enough with a consequent impact
on the credibility of the company.
In the category Organizational, subcategory Supply, we defined a template
that addresses possible delays with the execution of tasks. It detects the pos-
sibility that a critical task would not be started as soon as it is offered. This
risk is detected looking at all the resources which have been offered a work item
of the critical task. If the ratio between the number of resources that are busy
versus the total number of resources is greater than a certain threshold the risk is
detected. This type of risk is relevant for processes in healthcare such as a process
for transferring organs from one hospital to another, where the unavailability of
a resource may cause the organ deterioration. Finally, taking in consideration
the process described in Section 4.1, let’s say that the company wants to avoid
that processing a shipment payment may be subjected to delays, what we have
to do is: i) import the template; ii) create a mapping of our generic critical task
to the task “Process Shipment Payment”; and iii) modify the specified threshold
if required.
Table 4.4 provides a brief overview of the templates currently available in the
YAWL system (see Section 4.6). Besides the three templates described above,
we have, among others, templates for the following risks: underpayment fraud,
approval fraud, overtime for activity, sequence of activities and process, and vio-
lation of the four-eyes principle within and across cases.
4.6 Software Implementation
In order to prove the feasibility of our technique, we implemented the sensor-based
architecture3 in the YAWL system.
As part of this implementation, we extended the YAWL Editor version 2.2beta
with a new component, namely the Sensor Editor, for the specification of sensors
within YAWL process models. Such graphical component, shown in Figure 4.6,
fully supports the specification of sensor conditions as defined in Section 4.2, and
the specification of risk templates.
A wizard (see Figure 4.7) was developed as part of the YAWL Editor to
facilitate the use of risk templates and in particular the mapping required for
their use. This wizard using an user friendly interface guides the user during each
step of the mapping, providing a description of each generic task and variable.
The wizard also provides the possibility of customizing a risk, since it is possible
3Available at https://risk-aware-bpm.googlecode.com/
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Category SubCategory Template Name Risk Description
Data
Financial Underpayment Fraud Underpayment fraud
Operational
Data Inconsistency Across Cases
Wrong information provided,
detected using multiple cases
Data Inconsistency Parallel Activity
Wrong information provided
to parallel tasks
Goal
Financial Process Cost Exceeded
Exceeding the budget during
the execution of the process
Strategic
Activity Time Exceeded
Exceeding the time limit
within which the activity
needs to be completed
Multi-Activity Time Exceeded
Exceeding the time limit
within which a sequence of ac-
tivities needs to be completed
Process Time Exceeded
Exceeding the time limit
within which the process
needs to be completed
Organizational
Financial Approval Fraud Approval fraud
Operational
Four-Eyes Principle Four-Eyes Principle violation
Four-Eyes Principle Across Cases
Four-Eyes Principle violation
for activities across different
cases
Inadequate Preparation
The activity is executed by a
novice resource
Supply
Delay In Start
The activity start will be de-
layed
Task Priority Unfulfilled
Activity with high prior-
ity cannot start because re-
sources are busy
Structural Operational Loop
A loop is executed too many
times
Table 4.4: Risk Templates and descriptions
Figure 4.6: The Sensor Editor within the YAWL Editor.
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 89
CHAPTER 4. RISK DEFINITION AND MONITORING
Figure 4.7: Template Wizard: a) Tasks mapping, b) Variables mapping.
to modify a risk condition during the creation of a risk using templates.
Moreover, we implemented the Sensor Manager as a generic component which
exposes three interfaces (engine, database and monitor) as described in Sec-
tion 4.2. We then wrapped this component into a Web service which implements
the three interfaces for the YAWL system, allowing the component to interact
with the YAWL Engine, the Monitor service and the YAWL database. While
there is a straightforward mapping between the YAWL Engine and our engine
interface, and between the YAWL Monitor service and our monitor interface, we
had to join several YAWL tables to implement our database interface. This is
because in the YAWL system, event logs are scattered across different database
tables. For example, to retrieve all identifiers of the process instances for a spe-
cific process model, given the model identifier, we need to perform a join among
the following YAWL tables: logspecification, lognetinstance, lognet and
logevent.
The complete mapping is illustrated in Table 4.5. As an example, this table
also shows the mapping between our database interface and the relational schema
used by Oracle BPEL 10g [BZ09] to store BPEL process logs. Also in this case,
the database can be fully mapped by joining several tables.
Finally, we implemented a separate service to estimate the remaining cy-
cle time Te for a process or task instance. This service uses ProM’s prediction
miner [ASS11] to compute the estimations, and provides the results to the Sensor
Manager on demand. While the estimation of Te could be done on-line, i.e. while
evaluating a particular sensor condition at run-time, parsing the full logset each
time would be inefficient. Rather, we compute this estimation off-line, when-
ever a new process model is deployed to the YAWL Engine, by using the logset
available at that time. Periodically, we update the logset with the new instances
being executed meantime, and invoke this service to refresh the estimations for
each process model currently deployed.
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Database table
Tables that need to be joined
YAWL Oracle BPEL 10g
WorkFlowDefinition logspecification, lognet, lognetinstance, logevent cube instance, cube scope
SubProcess logspecification, lognet, lognetinstance, logevent cube instance, cube scope
Activity
lognetinstance, logtask, logtaskinstance, lognet,
wftask, work item
logevent, logspecification, rs eventlog
Variables
logtask, lognet, lognetinstance, logtaskinstance, audit trail, audit detail,
logevent, logdataitem, logspecification xml document
Role rs participant wftask
ActivityRole rs eventlog, logtaskinstance wftask
Table 4.5: Database interface mapping for YAWL 2.2beta and Oracle BPEL 10g.
4.7 Evaluation
In this section we discuss two evaluations of the sensor-based architecture. In
Section 4.7.1, we discuss a performance analysis of the implementation of the
architecture in the YAWL system, and in Section 4.7.2, we report on a usability
evaluation of the architecture on basis of an online focus-group with 21 BPM
practitioners that gained experience in using the system for risk sensor condition
analysis and definition tasks.
4.7.1 Performance Analysis
We used our implementation to evaluate the scalability of the approach. First,
we measured the time needed to evaluate the basic functions (e.g. counting the
number of instances of a task or retrieving the resource allocated to a task).
Next, we measured the time needed to evaluate the sensor conditions for the
risks defined in the Payment subprocess. The tests were run on an Intel Core
I5 M560 2.67GHz processor with 4GB RAM running Linux Ubuntu 11.4. The
YAWL logs were stored on the PostGres 9.0 DBMS. These logs contained 318
completed process instances from 36 difference process models, accounting for a
total of 9,399 process events (e.g. task instance started and completed, variable’s
value change). Specifically, there were 100 instances from the Payment subprocess
yielding a total of 5,904 process events. The results were averaged over 10 runs.
Table 4.6 shows the results of the evaluation of the basic functions provided
by our language. In particular, in this table we compare the evaluation times
obtained by accessing the YAWL logs via our database interface, with those ob-
tained by accessing a serialization of the logs, e.g. in the OpenXES format. While
OpenXES provides a simple and unique representation of a generic set of pro-
cess logs, accessing an OpenXES file in real-time, i.e. during the execution of a
process instance, is not feasible, due to the long access times (e.g. 6.5 sec. on
average for evaluating a net variable). On the other hand, accessing the logs via
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Basic function Description
OpenXES Database Reduction
time [ms] time [ms] rate [%]
net status
functions checking if a net status has
been reached (isStarted, isCompleted)
6,535 18.9 99.71
net time
functions returning the time when a
net status has been reached (start-
Time, completeTime, startTimeInMil-
lis, completeTimeInMillis)
6,781 18.8 99.72
net variable returns the value of a net variable 6,489 432.6 93.33
task count
number of times a task has been com-
pleted
803 19.8 97.53
task resource
functions that return the resources as-
sociated with a task (offerResource,
allocateResource, startResource, com-
pleteResource)
850 20.9 97.54
task status
functions checking if a task status has
been reached (isOffered, isAllocated,
isStarted isCompleted)
792 30.5 96.14
task time
functions returning the time when a
task status has been reached (offer-
Time, allocateTime, startTime, com-
pleteTime, offerTimeInMillis, allocate-
TimeInMillis, startTimeInMillis, com-
pleteTimeInMillis)
824 22.3 97.29
task variable returns the value of a task variable 787 96.7 87.71
task distribution
functions returning the resources asso-
ciated with a task by default (offerDis-
tribution, allocateDistribution, start-
Distribution, completeDistribution)
243 -
task initiator
functions returning the allocation
strategy for a resource association (of-
ferInitiator, allocateInitiator, startIni-
tiator, completeInitiator)
249.6 -
Table 4.6: Performance of basic functions.
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Sensor Min [ms] Max [ms] Ave [ms] St.Dev.
Overtime process 121 137 131.8 4.66
Approval fraud 6,483 7,036 6,766.4 183.06
Order unfulfillment 69 91 77.4 7.18
Underpayment fraud 3,385 3,678 3,523 89.98
Table 4.7: Performance of sensors.
our database interface, despite it requires the creation of a specific implementa-
tion for each BPMS database, provides considerably faster times than accessing
OpenXES files (at least 87% gain w.r.t. OpenXES access). In fact, as we can
see from Table 4.6, the evaluation times for all the basic functions are below 30
ms, apart from function task variable, which takes almost 100 ms and function
net variable, which takes about 430 ms.
The last two basic functions reported in Table 4.6, namely task distribution
and task initiator, are evaluated in less than 250 milliseconds. These func-
tions are not computed by accessing the logs, but rather by accessing information
that is contained directly in an executable process model, e.g. the resources that
are associated with a specific task. However, in our implementation we still use
the database interface to access this information, in order to provide the developer
with a single access point to all process-related data.
Table 4.7 reports the results of the evaluation of the sensor conditions defined
for our running example. While the sensor conditions for the overtime process and
order unfulfillment faults are very low (below 150 ms), longer times are obtained
for evaluating the conditions for the two faults related to fraud (few minut. This
is because both these conditions require to evaluate “complex queries”, i.e. queries
over the entire process logs: in the approval fraud, we need to retrieve all resources
that approved an order for a specific customer, while in the underpayment fraud
we need to retrieve all process instances where a debit adjustment was issued and
aggregate these instances per customer. These queries are different than those
needed to evaluate the basic functions, as the latter are performed on the events
in the logs that are relative to a single known process instance, e.g. the instance
for which the sensor condition is being evaluated.
The worst-case complexity of evaluating one such a complex query is still
linear on the number of parameters that need be evaluated in the query (corre-
sponding to the language element CondExprSet in Section 4.2) multiplied by the
total number of instances present in the logs (corresponding to the size of table
WorkflowDefinition addressed by our database interface).
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In conclusion, the performances of evaluating sensor conditions should always
be considered w.r.t. the specific process for which the risks are defined, and the
type of trigger used. For example, let us assume an average duration of 24 hours
for the Payment subprocess, with a new task being executed every 30 minutes.
This means we have up to 30 minutes to detect an overtime process risk before
a new task is executed, and we need to compute this sensor condition again. If
we choose a rate of 5 minutes to sample this condition, we are well below the 6
minute-threshold, so we can check this sensor condition up to 6 times during the
execution of a task. Since we do this in less than 150 ms, this time is acceptable.
For an event-driven risk we also need to consider the frequency of the specific
event used as trigger. For example, the approval fraud risk is triggered every
time an instance of task Approve Shipment Payment Order is offered to a Senior
Financial Officer for execution. Since we take up to 7 seconds to compute this
sensor condition, we are able to cope with a system where there is a request
for approval every 7 seconds. So also for this sensor, the performance is quite
acceptable.
4.7.2 Usability Analysis
For the evaluation of the usability of the sensor-based architecture we followed the
example from related studies [LHW+11, LWM+11] and conducted focus group-
like online sessions with BPM practitioners in which users had to perform two
tasks with the system, viz., analysis of risk conditions, and analysis of risk sen-
sor conditions, and then report on their usage experiences using a structured
questionnaire.
Appendix E provides the description of the usability test. The test consisted
of five parts:
• In part one, participants had to provide relevant demographic information
about their process modeling experience.
• In part two, they were asked to provide details about their experience in
using workflow management systems in general.
• In part three, they were asked to provide details about their experience
in using YAWL in particular. The questions for parts one to three were,
where possible, adapted from prior surveys on process modeling [LHW+11,
LWM+11] and usage of the YAWL system [RL12].
• In part four, users were provided with two tasks:
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1. analysis of the risk sensor conditions for two YAWL models using
the developed risk definition language (risk scenarios 1 and 3 in Ap-
pendix E), and
2. definitions of risk sensor conditions for a YAWL model based on the
risk definition using fault tree analysis (risk scenario 2 in Appendix E).
We administered these tasks by presenting three risk scenarios on the basis
of the developed sensor-based architecture to the users. Risk scenarios 1
and 3 describe risks using the developed risk definition language. Here we
asked users to analyze the risk proposed. Risk scenario 2 describes a risk
using a fault tree. Here we asked users how such a risk can be defined using
the proposed language.
For each of these application tasks, we assessed how well participants were
able to assess risks, in terms of accuracy of understanding the risks and
the difficulty of understanding the meaning of the risks. Accuracy and dif-
ficulty are widely used measures [BJWW09, MSR12] of the effectiveness
and the efficiency of the sensor-based approach in terms of how well users
of the approach can understand the risk information provided through the
approach, and how much cognitive effort is required to develop this under-
standing. We used a 5-point scale to measure the difficulty of understanding
the risk from very simple to very difficult, and we defined five true/false/do
not know questions to measure accuracy of comprehension of the risk infor-
mation provided.
• In part five, we captured participants’ perceptions about the usage experi-
ence of the approach as implemented in the YAWL environment through a
structured questionnaire. The questionnaire contained measurement items
that were adapted from [RL12] and measured satisfaction (SAT), usefulness
(PU), ease of use (PEOU) and intentions to use (ITU). Similar to previous
uses of these items [Rec10a, Rec10b, RL12], the measures were of appro-
priate reliability, with Cronbach’s Alphas ranging from 0.64 (ITU) to 0.81
(PU).
The usability evaluation test was administered through 21 online sessions be-
tween January and September 2012. Each online session consisted of a tutorial
about the functions and use of the sensor-based architecture, which that consisted
of an introduction, the creation of risk sensors in the YAWL editor and detailed
instructions for defining sensors from scratch or on the basis of the templates.
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Additional documentation provided descriptions and explanations of actions, re-
source functions and loops relevant to risk sensors. After completing the tutorial,
each participant was asked to conduct the usability evaluation by completing the
tasks above administered through a structured online questionnaire. The sessions
were not timed and no time limits were imposed on the users. Since these sessions
were not timed no information about their duration were collected.
For the usability evaluation, we recruited participants by contacting individ-
uals that had previously completed a university under-graduate or post-graduate
course on business process automation. The cohorts were from the Universita´
della Calabria, Cosenza, Italy and the Queensland University of Technology, Bris-
bane, Australia, and we perused the course email lists for contact. We recruited
participants from these cohorts because principles of process modeling and au-
tomation in general as well as the YAWL system specifically were featured in the
courses, thus allowing us to select participants with sufficient levels of background
experience and expertise, in turn minimizing the risk of confounding the usability
results due to lack of experience with workflow systems or process modeling in
general.
Overall twenty-one participants participated, where 10 of them were from
Italy and 11 from Australia. Participants, on average, had about 2.6 years of ex-
perience with process modeling and had read and created, on average, 71 and 15
process models, respectively, over the last twelve months. Participants’ experience
with different process modeling languages varied, with most having experience,
at least, with UML Activity Diagrams, Petri Nets, EPCs and/or BPMN. These
characteristics describe our participants as proxies for novice to average BPM
professionals, with one of our participants representative of an expert practition-
ers (more than 5 years experience, more than 250 models created, more than
1000 models read). Overall, our study population might not be representative of
experts but is roughly equivalent to the range of expertise found in actual BPM
practitioners as reported in other surveys [Rec10c].
The box-plots in Figure 4.8a and Figure 4.8b show the accuracy of the com-
prehension of the risks in the three scenarios as well as the perceived difficulty of
understanding these risks. The data shows that scenarios 1 and 3 were reasonably
well understood (averages for the comprehension questions were 2.9 for scenario
1 and 3.1 for scenario 3, both exceeding 50% accuracy), while comprehension of
scenario 2 was significantly lower (average score 1.7). Similarly, perceived diffi-
culty was highest for scenario 2 (average of 3.7), while the perceived difficulty for
scenario 1 and 3 was similar in range (averages 3.4 and 3.3, respectively).
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(a) Accuracy of risk comprehension, on
a scale from 0 (low) to 5 (high).
(b) Difficulty of risk comprehension, on
a scale from 1 (“very simple”) to 5
(“very difficult”).
Figure 4.8: Accuracy and difficulty of risk comprehension.
Next we were interested in understanding under which circumstances partic-
ipants were able to obtain higher levels of accuracy in understanding the risk
information provided. To that, we built a regression model in which we regressed
relevant demographic data and perceived difficulty onto the total comprehension
score across all three risk scenarios. Specifically, we included as coefficients:
• PMExp(Years): Process modeling experience in years
• PMExp(Training): Extent of formal training in process modeling in days
over the last twelve months
• PMExp(SelfEducation): Extent of self-education in process modeling in
days over the last twelve months
• PMExp(processModelsCreated): Number of process models created over
the last twelve months
• BPMSFAM: Self-perceived familiarity with BPMSs [Rec10a]
• YAWLUse(time): length of use of the YAWL system
• YAWLUse(features): Number of YAWL features used
• YAWLUse(models): Number of YAWL models created, read or edited over
the last twelve months
• RISKPerDif: Average perceived comprehension difficulty across the three
presented scenarios.
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 97
CHAPTER 4. RISK DEFINITION AND MONITORING
Standardized
Coefficients
Variable Beta t Sig.
PMExp(Years) -0.80 -2.79 0.02
PMExp(Training) -0.03 -0.16 0.88
PMExp (processModelsCreated) 1.28 4.31 0.00
BPMSFAM 0.38 1.15 0.28
YAWLUse(time) 0.80 3.07 0.01
YAWLUse(features) -0.30 -1.40 0.20
YAWLUse(models) -1.20 -3.86 0.00
RISKPerDif -0.19 -1.05 0.32
Table 4.8: Regression analysis of risk comprehension across all three scenarios
The regression model was significant (F = 3.54, p = 0.04) and explained 77.9
percent of the variance in total comprehension score, thus attesting to very good
explanatory power. Table 4.8 gives the results from the regression model analysis.
Table 4.8 shows that four factors were significant predictors for explaining
comprehension accuracy, these being process modeling experience in years, num-
ber of process models created, use of the YAWL system and number of YAWL
models created, edited or read over the last twelve months. Several interesting
findings are noteworthy. First, PMExp(Years) and YAWLUse(models) are nega-
tive predictors, which may suggest that novice users with little process modeling
experience and little experience with YAWL models benefited more from the risk
sensor approach. Second, the difficulty of understanding the risk information
provided is not related to how well users understand the risks. Third, training
in process modeling or more varied use of the YAWL system, likewise, are irrel-
evant in terms of understanding risk information provided by the sensor-based
architecture.
Finally, we were interested in the participants’ evaluation of the sensor-based
architecture. Following the theory of technology acceptance [Dav89] and its ex-
tended application in the process modeling context [Rec10b], we understand that
satisfaction, ease of use and perceived usefulness are key criteria for explaining
intentions to use a process modeling artifact. Figure 4.9 shows the box-plots for
the average total factor scores for these four criteria.
The data displayed in Figure 4.9 suggests that participants rated the useful-
ness of the approach high (mean score > 5.3) and were in general inclined to use
the system (mean score > 4.4). Satisfaction with the approach was reported as
average (mean score = 4.0) and ease of use, notably, was reported as low (mean
score < 3.5), indicating potential to improve interface and user interaction of the
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Figure 4.9: Perceptual evaluations of the sensor-based architecture on a scale
from 1 (low) to 7 (high).
system. This is not surprising, since we did not explicitly consider the principle
of “clarity” when designing the concrete syntax of our language.
In a post-hoc analysis, we compared evaluations of SAT, PU, PEOU, and ITU
across users that scored low or high on risk comprehension, based on a median
split, and across users that rated the perceived difficulty of understanding risks
as low or high, again based on a median split. MANOVA tests in both cases
showed that evaluations of the approach were independent from comprehension
accuracy or difficulty, with p-values ranging from 0.30 to 0.49 and 0.18 to 0.58,
respectively. The results indicate that the evaluations of satisfaction, usefulness,
ease of use and intentions to use were robust against variances in the performance
in using the system.
In summary, our evaluation showed that the sensor-based risk identification
and modeling approach provided value in allowing participants to develop an
understanding of process risks. We found the approach to be useful particularly
for users with limited experience in process modeling or BPMSs. The evaluation
further revealed that ease of use of the system should be improved to warrant
better user acceptance.
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4.8 Related Work
From the architectural point of view, our technique, specifically our sensor-based
architecture, shares commonalities with Oracle Business Activity Monitoring
(BAM), that we presented in Chapter 2. Oracle BAM relies on sensors to monitor
the execution of BPEL processes. Three types of sensors can be defined: activity
sensors, to grab timings and variable contents of a specific activity; variable sen-
sors, to grab the content of the variables defined for whole BPEL process (e.g.
the inputs to the process); and fault sensors, to monitor BPEL faults. These
sensors can be triggered by a predefined set of events (e.g. task activation, task
completion). For each sensor, one can specify the endpoints where the sensor will
publish its data at run-time (e.g. a database or a JMSQueue). Compared to this
approach we allow the specification of more sophisticated sensor (and fault) con-
ditions, where different process-related aspects can be incorporated such as data,
resource allocation strategies, order dependencies, as well as historical data and
information from other running process instances. Moreover, our sensors can be
triggered by process events or sampled at a given rate. Nonetheless, our sensor-
based architecture is exposed as a service and as such it could be integrated with
other process monitoring systems, such as Oracle BAM.
A Sensor, as defined in this work, may be categorized as a specialization of
the more general rules framework known as Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rules,
which originally came to prominence through their use with Active Database
Management Systems [DBM88]. A Sensor extends the ECA notion by including
two conditions, one which describes a potential fault, and the other the pos-
sibility of risk. A Sensor also delivers a consequence when a triggered condi-
tion evaluates to true, rather than an action per se. ECA rules have also been
used as the basis for several well-known exception handling strategies in work-
flow systems [Cas99, CIJ+00, CLK99]. For example, a definition language for
exception rules called Chimera-Exec was developed for the WIDE prototype
[CFM99]. An extended ECA framework can be found in the defeasable work-
flow approach [LSKA03], which has an added justification condition to support
context-dependent reasoning of actions to be taken. The RUMBA project com-
bines ECA rules with an Aspect-Oriented framework to provide a modular ap-
proach to the integration of rules and active processes [CAS06]. The Worklet
approach incorporates an extended rules-based framework, which embeds excep-
tions directly into the evaluation tree [AHAE07].
Real-time monitoring of process models can also be achieved via Complex
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Event Processing (CEP) systems. In this context, CEP systems have been
integrated into commercial BPMSs, e.g. webMethods Business Events4, ARIS
Process Event Monitor [DB07] and SAP Sybase [Syb11], as well as explored in
academia [GPL+10, HSD10]. A CEP system allows the analysis of aggregated
events from different sources (e.g. databases, email accounts as well as process
engines). Using predefined rules, generally defined with a specific SQLlike lan-
guage [WREW11], a CEP system can verify the presence of a specific pattern
among a stream of simple events processed in a given time window. Our tech-
nique differs from CEP systems in the following aspects: i) strong business process
orientation vs general purpose system; ii) ability to aggregate and analyze com-
plex XML-based events (e.g. process variables) vs simple events; iii) time-driven
and event-driven triggers vs event-driven trigger only. Moreover, CEP systems
typically suffer from performance overheads [HSD10, WREW11] which limit their
applicability to real-time risk detection [WREW11].
4.9 Summary
In this chapter we contributed a technique for real-time monitoring of risks in
executable business process models. The technique embeds elements of risk into
each phase of the BPM lifecycle: from process design, where high-level risks
defined via a risk analysis method are mapped down to specific process model
elements such as activities, resources and data, through to process diagnosis,
where risks are detected during process execution, and those no longer tolerable
are notified to process administrators.
As a second contribution, we provided an operationalization of the proposed
technique on top of BPMSs. This is achieved via a distributed, sensor-based
architecture that communicates with a BPMS via a set of tool-independent in-
terfaces. Each risk is associated with a sensor condition and refers to a fault,
which is an undesired state of the process. Conditions can relate to any process
aspect, such as control-flow dependencies, resource allocations, the content of
data elements, both from the current process instance and from instances of any
process that have already been completed. At design-time, these conditions are
expressed within a process model via a simple query language, for which we pro-
vide an abstract syntax. At run-time, each sensor independently alerts a sensor
manager when the associated risk condition evaluates to true during the execu-
tion of a specific process instance. When this occurs, the sensor manager notifies
4http://www.softwareag.com/au/products/wm/events/overview
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a process administrator about the given risk by interfacing with the monitoring
service of the BPMS. This allows early risk detection which in turn enables proper
remedial actions to be taken in order to avoid potentially costly process faults.
We designed a set of risk templates to allow process designers to easily specify
new risk conditions into a process model. Each template captures an abstract
risk. To use these templates, one has to bind the template variables to concrete
elements of the process model for which the risk condition needs to be monitored.
We contend that by using such templates the effort of defining risks in executable
process models can be reduced.
As a proof-of-concept, we implemented the sensor-based architecture on top of
the YAWL system along with 14 representative templates. We then used the tool
to evaluate the feasibility of the approach in practice. This was carried out in two
directions. First, we evaluated the performance of the implementation; second,
we evaluated the usability and ease of use of the approach with users of the YAWL
system. The performance measurements showed that the sensor conditions can be
computed efficiently and that no performance overhead is induced to the BPMS
engine. The results of the empirical evaluation with users showed that the sensor-
based risk identification and modeling approach provided value to develop an
understanding of process risks. We found the approach to be useful particularly
for users with limited experience in process modeling or BPMSs. The evaluation
further revealed that ease of use of the language for defining sensors should be
improved to warrant better user acceptance.
The technique presented in this chapter and its operationalization serve as
the cornerstone for our risk-aware business process management approach. In the
next chapter we will present a technique which builds on the approach presented
in this chapter to allow process participants to make risk-informed decisions. This
is achieved by predicting the risk that the current process instance will end up
with one or more faults based on the input provided by the participant, e.g. when
filling out a user form based on the conditions specified for each fault.
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 102
Chapter 5
Risk Prediction
In the previous chapter as part of our approach for risk-aware business pro-
cess management we presented a technique to model risks in executable business
process models and detect them as early as possible during process execution.
However, the limitation of these efforts is that risks are not predicted, but only
detected when their likelihood exceeds a tolerance threshold, hence faults cannot
be prevented.
To address these limitations here we present a recommendation system that
supports process participants in taking risk-informed decisions, with the aim of
reducing process risks preemptively. A process participant takes a decision when-
ever they have to choose the next task to execute out of those assigned to them
at a given process state, or via the data they enter in a user form. This input
from the participant may influence the risk of a process fault to occur. For each
such input, the technique returns a risk prediction in terms of the likelihood
and severity that a fault will occur if the process instance is carried out using
that input. This prediction is obtained via decision trees which are trained using
historical process data such as process variables, resources, task durations and
frequencies. The historical data of a process is observed using decision trees which
are built from the execution logs of the process, as recorded by the IT systems of
an organization.
This way, the participant can take a risk-informed decision as to which task to
execute next, or can learn the predicted risk of submitting a form with particular
data. If the instance is subjected to multiple potential faults, the predictor can
return the weighted sum of all fault likelihoods and severities, as well as the
individual figures for each fault. The weight of each fault can be determined
based on the severity of the fault’s impact on the process objectives.
The above technique only provides “local” risk predictions, i.e. predictions
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relative to a specific process instance. In reality, however, multiple instances
of (different) business processes may be executed at any time. Thus, we need
to find a risk prediction for a specific process instance that does not affect the
prediction for other instances. The interplay between risks relative to different
instances can be caused by the sharing of the same pool of process participants:
two instances may require the same scarce resource. In this setting, a sub-optimal
distribution of process participants to the set of tasks to be executed, may result
in a risk increase (e.g. overtime or cost overrun risk). To solve this problem, we
equipped our recommendation system with a second technique, based on integer
linear programming, which takes input from the risk prediction technique, to find
an optimal distribution of process participants to tasks. By optimal distribution
we mean one that minimizes the overall execution time (i.e. the time taken to
complete all running instances) while minimizing the overall level of risk. This
distribution is used by the system to suggest process participants the next task
to perform.
We operationalized our recommendation system on top of the YAWL system
by extending an existing YAWL plug-in and by implementing two new custom
YAWL services. This implementation prompts process participants with risk
predictions upon filling out a form or for each task that can be executed. We
then evaluated the effectiveness of our system by conducting experiments using
a claims handling process in use at a large insurance company. With input from
a team of risk analysts from the company, this process has been extensively
simulated on the basis of a log recording one year of completed instances of this
process. The recommendations provided by our system significantly reduced the
number and severity of faults in a simulation of a real life scenario, compared to
the process executed by the company as reflected by the event data. Further, the
results show that it is feasible to predict risks across multiple process instances
without impacting on the execution performance of the BPM system.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents
the running example. Next, Section 5.2 defines the notions of event logs and
faults which are required to explain our techniques. Section 5.3 describes the
technique for predicting risks in a single process instance while Section 5.4 extends
this technique to the realm of multiple process instances running concurrently.
Section 5.5 and Section 5.6 discuss the implementation and evaluation of the
overall technique, respectively. Finally, Section 5.7 discusses related work before
Section 5.8 concludes the chapter.
The research presented in this chapter has been the subject of several publi-
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Figure 5.1: The YAWL model of the Carrier Appointment subprocess of the
Order Fulfillment process mentioned in Chapter 4.
cations [CLLA13, CLH+13, CLL+14].
5.1 Running Example
We developed our technique on top of the YAWL language (see Chapter 3). In this
section, we present the Carrier Appointment subprocess of the Order Fulfillment
process mentioned in Chapter 4. The model of this process, using the YAWL
language, is shown in Figure 5.1. In the Order Fulfillment process, the Payment
subprocess proceeds the Payment subprocess and it is as the latter subjected to
several risks.
The Carrier Appointment subprocess (see Figure 5.1) starts when a Purchase
Order Confirmation is received. A Shipment Planner then estimates the trailer
usage and prepares a route guide. Once ready, a Supply Officer prepares a quote
for the transportation indicating the cost of the shipment, the number of packages
and the total freight volume.
If the total volume is over 10,000 lbs a full trackload is required. In this case
two different Client Liaisons will try to arrange a pickup appointment and a deliv-
ery appointment. Before these two tasks are performed, a Senior Supply Officer
may create a Shipment Information document. In case the Shipment Information
document is prepared before the appointments are arranged, a Warehouse Officer
will arrange a pickup appointment and a Supply Officer will arrange a delivery
appointment, with the possibility of modifying these appointments until a Ware-
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 105
CHAPTER 5. RISK PREDICTION
house Admin Officer produces a Shipment Notice, after which the freight will be
picked up from the Warehouse.
If the total volume is up to 10,000 lbs and there is more than one package, a
Warehouse Officer arranges the pickup appointment while a Client Liaison may
arrange the delivery appointment. Afterwards, a Senior Supply Officer creates
a Bill of Lading, a document similar to the Shipment Information. If a delivery
appointment is missing a Supply Officer takes care of it, after which the rest of
the process is the same as for the full trackload option.
Finally, if a single package is to be shipped, a Supply Officer has to arrange a
pickup appointment, a delivery appointment, and create a Carrier Manifest, after
which a Warehouse Admin Officer can produce a Shipment Notice.
5.2 Fault Severity
Each completed trace of the event log is assigned a fault’s severity between 0 and
1, where 0 identifies an execution with no fault and 1 identifies a fault with the
highest severity. To model this, a risk analyst needs to provide a fault function
f . The set of all such functions is:
F = (T ×R× N× Φ)∗ → [0, 1]
In many settings, processes are associated with different faults. These faults can
be combined together by assigning different weights. Let us suppose to have n
faults {f1, . . . , fn} ⊂ F , we can have a composite fault :
f̂(σ) =
∑
1≤i≤nwifi(σ)∑
1≤i≤nwi
∈ F
where wi is the weight of the fault fi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
A complete trace σ of our Carrier Appointment process, can be affected by
three faults:
Over-time fault. This fault is linked to a Service Level Agreement (SLA) which
establishes that the process must terminate within a predefined Maximum
Cycle Time dmct (e.g. 21 hours), in order to avoid pecuniary penalties that
will incur as consequence of a violation of the SLA. The severity of the
fault grows with the amount of time that the process execution exceeds
dmct. Let dσ be the duration of the process instance, i.e. difference between
the timestamps of the last and first event of σ. Let dmax be the maximum
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duration among all process instances already completed (including σ). The
severity of an overtime fault is measured as follows:
ftime(σ) = max
(
dσ − dmct
max(dmax − dmct, 1) , 0
)
Reputation-loss fault. During the execution of the process when a “pickup
appointment” or a “delivery appointment” is arranged, errors with location
or time of the appointment may occur due to a misunderstanding between
the company’s employee and the customer. In order to keep the reputation
high, the company wants to avoid these misunderstandings and having to
call the customer again. The severity of this fault is:
frep(σ) =

0 if tasks Modify Delivery Appointment and Modify Pick-up
Appointment do not appear in σ
1 if both Modify Delivery Appointment and Modify Pick-up
Appointment appear in σ
0.5 otherwise
Cost Overrun fault. During the execution of this process, several activities
need to be executed, and each of these has an execution cost associated
with it. Since the profit of the company decreases with a higher shipping
cost of a good (or goods), the company wants to reduce them. Of course,
there is a profit cost beyond which the company will not make any profit.
The severity increases as the cost goes beyond the profit cost. Let cmax be
the greatest cost associated with any process instance that has already been
completed (including σ). Let cσ be the cost of σ and cmin be the profit cost.
The severity of a cost fault is:
fcost(σ) = min
(
max(cσ − cmin, 0)
max(cmax − cmin, 1) , 1
)
Moreover, we assume that the company considers Reputation-loss Fault to be less
significant than the other faults. The company could decide to define a composite
fault where the reputation weights half:
fcar(σ) =
(
fcost(σ) + ftime(σ) + 0.5 · frep(σ)
)
/2.5
The risk is the product of the estimation of the fault’s severity at the end of the
process-instance execution and the accuracy of such an estimation.
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When a process instance is being executed, many factors may influence the
risk and, ultimately, the severity of a possible fault. For instance, a specific order
in which a certain set of tasks is performed may increase or decrease the risk,
compared to any other. Nonetheless, it is opportune to leave freedom to resources
to decide the order of their preference. Indeed, there may be factors outside
the system that let resources opt for a specific order. For similar reasons, when
there are alternative tasks that are all enabled for execution, a risk-aware decision
support may highlight those tasks whose execution yields less risk, anyway leaving
the final decision up to the resource.
5.3 Risk Estimation
We aim to provide work-items’ recommendation to minimize the risk correspond-
ing to the highest product of fault severity and likelihood. For this purpose, it is
necessary to predict the most likely fault severity associated with continuing the
execution of a process instance for each enabled task. The problem of providing
such a prediction can be translated into the problem of finding the best estimator
of a function.
Definition 7 (Function estimator). Let X1, . . . , Xn be n finite or infinite do-
mains. Let Y be a finite domain. Let f : X1 × X2 × . . . × Xn → Y . An
estimator of function f is a function ψf : Y → 2X1×X2×...×Xn×[0,1], such that,
for each y ∈ Y , ψf (y) returns a set of tuples (x1, . . . , xn, l) where (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
(X1 × X2 × . . . × Xn) is an input domain tuple for which the expected output
is y and l is the accuracy of such an estimation. Moreover, (x1, . . . , xn, l1) ∈
ψf (y1) ∧ (x1, . . . , xn, l2) ∈ ψf (y2)⇒ l1 = l2 ∧ y1 = y2.
The function estimator is trained through a set of observation instances. An
observation instance is a pair (−→x , y) where −→x ∈ X1×X2×. . .×Xn is the observed
input and y ∈ Y is the observed output.
The function estimator can easily be built using a number of machine learning
techniques. In this paper, we employ the C4.5 algorithm to build decision trees.
We decided to use decision tree classification, and specifically the C4.5 algorithm,
for the following reasons: i) it can handle both continuous and discrete (categor-
ical) attributes; ii) it can handle training data with missing attribute values; iii)
it can build models that can be easily interpreted; iv) it can deal with noise;
and v) it automatically finds a subset of the features that are relevant to the
classification (i.e. no need for feature selection).
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Resource
Var GoodCost Task
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Figure 5.2: An example of decision tree used to build a function estimator.
Decision trees classify instances by sorting them down in a tree from the root
to some leaf node. Each non-leaf node specifies a test of some attribute x1, . . . , xn
and each branch descending from that node corresponds to a range of possible
values for this attribute. In general, a decision tree represents a disjunction of
conjunctions of expressions: each path from the tree root to a leaf corresponds to
an expression that is, in fact, a conjunction of attribute tests. Each leaf node is
assigned one of the possible output values: if an expression e is associated with a
path to a leaf node y, every tuple −→x ∈ X1×X2× . . .×Xn satisfying e is expected
to return y as output.
We link the accuracy of a prediction for ψf (y) to the quality of e as classifying
expression. Let I be the set of observation instances used to construct the decision
tree. Let Ie = {(−→x , y) ∈ I | −→x satisfies e} and Ie,y = {(−→x , y) ∈ Ie | y = y}. The
accuracy is l = |Ie,y|/|Ie|; therefore, for all ((x1, . . . , xn), y) ∈ Ie, (x1, . . . , xn, l) ∈
ψf (y). Figure 5.2 shows an example of a possible decision tree. It is the estimator
ψfcˆ of a function that returns a value belonging to the set H containing the num-
bers between 0 and 1 with no more than 2 decimals. It is obtained through a set
of observation instances based on all data attributes generated during the execu-
tion of the process. For example, having as data attributes a resource, a task, the
cost of a good, and a process instance’s elapsed time, we obtained the following
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 109
CHAPTER 5. RISK PREDICTION
function fcˆ : Resource×Task ×GoodCost ×TimeElapsed → H. For instance, let
us consider the value y = 0.6. Analyzing the tree, the value is associated with
two expressions: e1 is (R = MichaelBrown ∧ T = ArrangePickupAppointment)
and e2 is (R 6= MichaelBrown ∧ GoodCost < 3157 ∧ TimeElapsed < 30 ∧ T =
CreateShipmentInformationDocument). Let us suppose that, among observation
instances (Resource,Task ,GoodCost ,TimeElapsed , y) s.t. e1 or e2 evaluates to
true, y = 0.6 occurs 60% or 80% of times, respectively. Therefore, ψfcˆ(0.6)
contains the tuples (R, T,GoodCost ,TimeElapsed , 0.6) satisfying e1, along with
tuples(R, T,GoodCost ,TimeElapsed , 0.8) satisfying e2. Regarding computational
complexity, if decision trees are used, training ψf with m observation instances
is computed in quadratic time with respect to the dimension n (i.e. the number
of attributes) of the input tuple, specifically O(n2 ·m) [Qui93].
As mentioned before, it is necessary to predict the most likely fault severity
associated with continuing the execution of a process instance with each task
enabled for execution. Function estimators are used for such a prediction.
Let N = (TN , CN , i, o, FN , RN , VN , UN , canN , Split , Join, UserTaskPriv) be
a YAWL net. In order to provide accurate risks associated with performing work
items of a certain process instance, it is important to incorporate the execution
history of that process instance into the analysis. In order to avoid overfitting
predictive functions the history needs to be abstracted. Specifically, we abstract
the execution history as two functions: Cr : TN → R denoting the last executor
of each task and Ct : TN → N denoting the number of times that each task
has been performed in the past. Pairs (cr, ct) ∈ Cr × Ct are called contextual
information. Given the execution trace of a (running) instance σ′ ∈ (TN ×
RN × N × Φ), we introduce function getContextInformation(σ′) that returns the
contextual information (cr, ct) that can be constructed from σ
′.
Let Φ be the set of all possible assignments of values to variables, i.e. the set
of all partial functions VN 6→ UN . Each condition c ∈ CN can be associated with
a function fc : Φ× c• ×RN ×N× Cr × Ct → H. If fc(φ, t, r, n, cr, ct) = y, at the
end of the execution of the process instance, the fault’s severity is going to be y
if the instance continues with resource r ∈ RN that performs task t ∈ c• at time
n with contextual information (cr, ct) when variables are assigned values as for
function φ. Of course, this function is not known but it needs to be estimated,
based on the behavior observed in an event log L. Therefore, we need to build
am estimator ψfc for fc. Let us consider condition cFTL (see Figure 5.1), and the
associated function estimator ψfcFTL . Let us suppose that the accuracy is 1, i.e.
for each t ∈ cFTL•, ψfcFTL (t) always returns 1.
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Algorithm 1: generateFunctionEstimatorsForRiskPrediction
Data: N = (TN , CN , i, o, FN , RN , VN , UN , canN ) – A YAWL net, L – An event log,
f ∈ F – A fault function
Result: A Function Ψ that associates each condition c ∈ CN with a function estimator
ψc
Let I be a function whose domain is the set of conditions c ∈ CN , and initially for all
c ∈ CN , I(c) = ∅.
foreach trace σ = 〈(t1, r1, d1, φ1), . . . , (tn, r1, dn, φn)〉 ∈ L do
Set function A such that dom(A) = ∅
for i← 1 to n do
(cr, ct)← getContextInformation(〈(t1, r1, d1, φ1), . . . , (ti, ri, di, φi)〉)
Time elapsed d← (di − d1)
J ← (A (ti, ri, d) cr  ct), f(σ))
foreach c ∈ •ti do
I(c)← I(c) ∪ {J}
end
foreach variable v ∈ dom(φi) do
A(v)← φi(v)
end
end
end
Set function Ψ such that dom(Ψ) = ∅
foreach condition c ∈ CN do
Ψ(c)← buildFunctionEstimator(I(c))
end
return Ψ
If the execution is such that there is a token in FTL, GoodCost < 3157, ex-
ecuting tasks Arrange Pickup Appointment, Arrange Delivery Appointment are
associated with a risk of 0.2 and 0.45, respectively. Conversely, executing task
Create Shipment Information Document is given a risk of either 0.6 or 0.7, de-
pending on the moment in which task Create Shipment Information Document is
started. Therefore, it is evident that it is less “risky” to execute Arrange Pickup
Appointment.
Algorithm 1 details how function estimators ψfc can be constructed. In the
algorithm, we use  to concatenate tuples: given two tuples −→x = (x1, . . . , xn)
and −→y = (y1, . . . , ym), −→x  −→y = (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym). Operator  can also
be overloaded to deal with functions defined on a finite and ordered domain. Let
f : W → Z be a function defined on an ordered domain W = {w1, . . . , wo}. If we
denote zi = f(wi) with 1 ≤ i ≤ o, f −→x = (z1, . . . , zo, x1, . . . , xn).
Algorithm 1 is periodically executed, e.g., every week or after every k process
instances are completed. In this way, the predictions are updated according to the
recent process executions. The input parameters of the algorithm are a YAWL
net N , an event log with traces referring to past executions of instances of the
process modelled by N , and a fault function. The output is a function Ψ that
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associates each condition c with function estimator ψfc . Initially, in line 1, we
initialize function I which is going to associate each condition c with the set of
observation instances associated with the executions of tasks in the postset of p.
From line 2 to line 12, we iteratively replay all traces σ to build the observation
instances. While replaying, a function A keeps the current value’s assignment
to variables (line 3). For each trace’s event (ti, ri, di, φi), first we build the tuple
(cr, ct) of the contextual information (line 5) and compute the elapsed time d (line
6). Then, we build an observation instance J where tuple (A (ti, ri, d) cr ct)
is the observed input and the fault severity f(σ) is the observed output. This
observation instance is put into the set of observation instances relative to each
condition c ∈ •ti. In lines 11-13, we update the current value’s assignment during
the replay, i.e. we rewrite function A. Finally, in lines 16-19, we build each
function estimator ψfc for condition fc by the relative observation instances and
rewrite Ψ s.t. Ψ(c) = ψc.
In this section, we presented a technique to generate prediction functions. It
is important to observe that the number of risks that may eventuate during the
execution of a process does not affect the prediction algorithm, since we consider
the combined risk level of all risks. Specifically, we do so by assigning a relative
weight to each risk. This weight system allows process administrators to fine tune
the predictive function on the basis of the relative importance of each risk.
5.4 Multi-Instance Work-Item Distribution
With the technique presented so far, each resource is given local risk advice as
to what work item to perform next, i.e. a resource is suggested to perform the
work item with the lowest overall risk for that combination of process instance
and resource, without looking at other resources that may be assigned work items
within the same instance or in other instances running concurrently. Clearly, such
a local work-item distribution is not optimal, since work items have to compete
for resources and this may not guarantee the best allocation from a risk viewpoint.
For example, let us consider two resources r1 and r2 and two work items wa and
wb such that the risk of r1 performing wa is 0.2, and the risk of r1 performing
wb is 0.6, while the risk of r2 performing wa is 0.1 and the risk of r2 performing
wa is 0.4. Moreover for the company executing these work items, it is equally
important to minimize the eventuation of risks as well as the overall execution
time. If wa is assigned to r2 because locally this resource has the lowest risk, r1
will be forced to perform wb leading to an overall risk of 0.7. Another option is to
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assign both work items to r2, yielding an overall risk of 0.5. Both these solutions
are non-optimal distributions: the former because the overall risk is too high, the
latter, despite the lower risk, because the workload between the two resources is
unbalanced, with the result of increasing the overall execution time.
In this section we combine our technique for risk prediction with a tech-
nique for computing an optimal distribution of work items to resources (available
or busy). By optimal distribution we mean a distribution that minimizes the
weighted sum of overall execution time and overall risk across all running in-
stances. In other words, the algorithm aims to balance the distribution of work
items across resources while keeping the risk low. This distribution can then be
used to provide work item recommendations to resources, such that these can
be aided in selecting the best work item to perform. In the example above, the
optimal distribution is r1-wa and r2-wb with an overall risk of 0.6. While this is
higher than 0.5 obtained with the second solution, r1 and r2 will work in parallel
thus reducing the overall execution time.
5.4.1 Optimal Work-Item Distribution
Let f be a certain (composite) fault function and assuming we at time τ . Let
I = {id1, . . . , idn} be the set of running instances of N . Given an instance
id ∈ I, timeElapsedτ (id) ∈ N denotes the time elapsed since instance id has
started and varAssignτ (id) ∈ (VN → UN) is the current assignment of values to
variables. Moreover, let us denote a function useN : RN → 2TN×I that associates
each resource with the work items that he/she is executing within the set I of
running process instances. Let WE be the set of work items being executed,
i.e. WE =
∑
r∈RN useN(r). Let W ⊆ TN × I be the set of work items that are
enabled but not started yet. Section 6.1 has discussed the concept of deferred
choice, highlighting that some of the enabled work items are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, we introduce an equivalence relation ∼ between elements of W , such
that wa ∼ wb if, picking wa ∈ W for execution disables wb ∈ W or vice versa.
Let W∼ be the partition of W according to relation ∼.
For each enabled work item w ∈ W , we perform an estimation timew of the
expected duration of work item w. For each started work item w ∈WE , we also
perform an estimation timew of the amount of time needed by w to be completed.
To compute such estimations, we employ the technique proposed by Van der Aalst
et al. [ASS11] using event log L as input.
Let Ψ be the set of function estimators that are computed through Algorithm
1, using net N , event log L and given fault function f as input.
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Algorithm 2: calcRisk
Data: N = (TN , CN , i, o, FN , RN , VN , UN , canN ) – A YAWL net, f ∈ F – A fault
function, r – resource, t – time, (ta, id) – work item
Result: A risk value
risk ← 0
φ← varAssign(id)
d← timeElapsed(id)
(cr, ct)← getContextInformation(history(id))
foreach condition c ∈ •t do
ψ ← Ψ(c)
Pick (severity, l) such that (φ, ta, r, d, cr, ct, l) ∈ ψ(severity)
risk ← max(severity · l, risk)
end
For each work item w ∈ W , let us denote with riskr,w,t the risk of starting a
work item w at time t. This can be computed by invoking Algorithm 2: riskr,w,t =
calcRisk(N, f, r, t, w,Ψ).
Let maxTime =
∑
w∈W∪WE timew be the maximum duration of executing
all work items that are currently enabled and started. This corresponds to the
situation in which work items are just executed sequentially, i.e. a new work item
starts only when no other work item is being executed. Given a resource r ∈ RN
and a work item (ta, id) ∈ W such that ta ∈ canN(r), we compute the set of
moments in time in which the risk of r performing (ta, id):
initr,w = {t ∈ [τ, τ +maxTime] | riskr,w,t 6= riskr,w,t−1} ∪ {τ}
Certainly, this can be naively computed by computing the risk for all moments in
time between τ and τ + maxTime. Nonetheless, it can be done more efficiently
by observing the occurrences of splits on the time variable that are present in
the decision trees. For instance, let us consider the decision tree in Figure 5.2:
the only time reference is 30. This reference occurs in a root-to-leaf path in
which resource r 6= Michael Brown and Task = Create Shipment Information.
Therefore, for each resource r ∈ R \ {Michael Brown} and work-item w =
(Create Shipment Information, id) ∈ W , initr,w = {τ, elapsed(id) + 30}. More-
over, for each work item w = (ta, id) ∈ W with ta 6= Create Shipment Information
and for each resource r ∈ R, initr,w = {τ}. Similarly, for each work item
w = (ta, id) ∈ W , initr′,w = {τ} with r′ = Michael Brown.
Given a work item w, a resource r and a time t, ∆r,w(t) denotes the first
moment t′ in time after t in which the risk changes, i.e. t′ > t, t′ ∈ initr,w and
there exists no t′′ ∈ initr,w such that t′ > t′′ > t. If such a moment t′ does not
exist, ∆r,w(t) = τ +maxTime.
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We formulate the problem of distributing work items as a Mixed-Integer Lin-
ear Programming (MILP) problem. The following two sets of variables are intro-
duced:
• For each resource r ∈ RN and work-item w = (ta, id) ∈ W such that
ta ∈ canN(r), there exists a variable xr,w,t. If the solution of the MILP
problem is such that xr,w,t = 1, r is expected to start performing w in
interval between t and ∆r,w(t), xr,w,t = 1; otherwise, xr,w,t = 0;
• For each work item w ∈ W ∪WE (i.e., running or enabled), we introduce
a variable ar,w. If work item w is not being executed at time τ and is
eventually distributed to resource r, the MILP solution assigns to ar,w a
value that is equal to the moment in time when resource r is expected to
start work item w. If w is not expected to be started by r, ar,w = 0; if w
is already being executed by r at time τ (i.e. w ∈ WE ), ar,w is statically
assigned value τ .
The MILP problem aims to minimize the weighted sum of the expected total
execution time and the overall risk:
min
 α
maxTime
∑
r∈RN
∑
w∈W∪WE
ar,w + (1− α)
∑
r∈RN
∑
w∈W∩canN (r)
∑
t∈initr,w
risk r,w,t · xr,w,t

where α ∈ [0, 1] is the weight of the expected total execution time w.r.t. the
overall risk.
This MILP problem is subject to a number of constraints:
• For each r ∈ RN and w = (ta, id) ∈ W such that ta ∈ canN(r), if r starts
performing w in the interval between t and ∆r,w(t), xr,w,t must be equal to
1 (and vice versa):
xr,w,t = 1⇔ ∆r,w(t) > ar,w ∧ ar,w ≥ t; (5.1)
• For each partition D ∈ W∼, only one work item in D can be executed and it
can only be executed by one resource and can only start within one interval:
∑
r∈RN
∑
w∈D∩canN (r)
∑
t∈initr,w
xr,w,t = 1 (5.2)
• Every resource r ∈ RN cannot execute more than one work item at any time.
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Therefore, for each r ∈ RN and for each pairs of partitions D1, D2 ∈ W∼:( ∑
wa∈D1
ar,wa −
∑
wb∈D2
ar,wb ≥
∑
wb∈D2
∑
t∈initr,wb
timewb · xr,wb,t
)
∨( ∑
wb∈D2
ar,wb −
∑
wa∈D1
ar,wa ≥
∑
wa∈D1
∑
t∈initr,wa
timewa · xr,wa,t
) (5.3)
The constraints in Equations 5.1 can be translated into an equivalent set of
linear constraints as follows:
−ar,w −M · (1− xr,w,t) ≤ −t
ar,w −M · (1− xr,w,t) < ∆r,w(t)
ar,w −M · xr,w,t −M · o′r,w,t < t
−ar,w −M · xr,w,t −M · (1− o′r,w,t) ≤ −∆r,w(t)
(5.4)
where M is a sufficiently large number (e.g., the largest machine-representable
number) and or,w,t is a boolean variable that needs to be introduced in the MILP
problem.
Lemma 1. Constraints of the form as in Equations 5.1 can be rewritten into sets
of equivalent constraints of the form as in Equations 5.4.
Proof.
Let us consider xr,w,t and its possible values 1 and 0. If xr,w,t = 1 then the
last two constraints will be satisfied by −M · xr,w,t  t− ar,w and −M · xr,w,t 
−∆r,w(t)−ar,w. In order to satisfy the first two constraints, since M ·(1−xr,w,t) =
0, ar,w must be ar,w ≥ t ∧ ar,w < ∆r,w(t), that is exactly the second part of the
constraint defined in Equations 5.1.
If xr,w,t = 0 then M · (1− xr,w,t) = M . This satisfies the first two constraints
since −M · (1 − xr,w,t)  −t + ar,w and −M · (1 − xr,w,t)  ∆r,w(t) − ar,w. The
third constraint can be satisfied only if ar,w < t or if o
′
r,w,t = 1, similar thing can
be said for the fourth constraint that will be satisfied only if ar,w ≥ ∆r,w(t) or
if o′r,w,t = 0. We can derive that in order to satisfy the last two constraints we
either have ar,w < t and o
′
r,w,t = 0, or we have ar,w ≥ ∆r,w(t) and o′r,w,t = 1. As
we can see for xr,w,t = 0 the only way to satisfy the constraints of Equations 5.4
is to violate the second part of the constraint defined in Equations 5.1.
Similarly, the constraints in Equation 5.3 can be transformed into a set of
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linear constraints as follows:∑
wb∈D2
ar,wb −
∑
wa∈D1
ar,wa +
∑
wb∈D2
∑
t∈initr,wb
timewb · xr,wb,t −M · or,D1,D2,t ≤ 0∑
wa∈D1
ar,wa −
∑
wb∈D2
ar,wb +
∑
wa∈D1
∑
t∈initr,wa
timewa · xr,wa,t −M · (1− or,D1,D2,t) ≤ 0
(5.5)
where M is a sufficiently large number and or,D1,D2,t is a boolean variable that
needs to be introduced in the MILP problem.
Lemma 2. Constraints of the form as in Equations 5.3 can be rewritten into sets
of equivalent constraints of the form as in Equations 5.5.
Proof. Let us consider the constraints in Equations 5.5, and let introduce for
readability purposes the following equality:∑
wb∈D2
ar,wb −
∑
wa∈D1
ar,wa +
∑
wb∈D2
∑
t∈initrwb
timewb · xr,wb,t = a∑
wa∈D1
ar,wa −
∑
wb∈D2
ar,wb +
∑
wa∈D1
∑
t∈initrwa
timewa · xr,wa,t = b.
(5.6)
we can then rewrite Equations 5.5 as:
a−M · or,D1,D2,t ≤ 0
b−M · (1− or,D1,D2,t) ≤ 0
(5.7)
The first constraint in Equations 5.5 can only be satisfied if either a ≤ 0 or if
−M · or,D1,D2,t ≤ 0. Similarly, the second constraint can only be satisfied if either
b ≤ 0 or if −M · (1− or,D1,D2,t) ≤ 0. Since or,D1,D2,t can only be 0 or 1, we can see
that in order to satisfy both constraints either a ≤ 0 or b ≤ 0 must be satisfied
that is exactly the constraint defined in Equations 5.3.
As an example of an instance of the class of MILP problems, let us consider
a case where at time τ we want to schedule three work items wa, wb and wc, and
we have two resources, r1 and r2, who can perform them. We know that wa and
wb are mutually exclusive generating the following partitions D1 = {wa, wb}, and
D2 = {wc}. Moreover, we know that the expected duration of each work item
is timewa = 30 mins, timewb = 10 mins, and timewc = 40 mins. We also know
that the risk associated with each work item does not change over time. Finally,
we know that when performed by resource r1 the work items have the following
expected risk levels: riskr1,wa,τ = 0.2, riskr1,wb,τ = 0.7, and riskr1,wc,τ = 0.6 while
when performed by resource r2 the work items have the following expected risk
levels: riskr2,wa,τ = 0.1, riskr2,wb,τ = 0.7, and riskr2,wc,τ = 0.4.
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The MILP problem for distributing work items will take the following form
(assuming α = 0.5):
minimize
0.5
τ + 80
· (ar1,wa + ar1,wb + ar1,wc + ar2,wa + ar2,wb + ar2,wc)
+ 0.5 · (0.2 · xr1,wa,τ + 0.7 · xr1,wb,τ + 0.6 · xr1,wc,τ + 0.1 · xr2,wa,τ
+ 0.7 · xr2,wb,τ + 0.4 · xr2,wc,τ )
subject to the following constraints:
either work item wa or wb is executed, whereas wc has to
(instantiation of Equation 5.2):
xr1,wa,τ + xr1,wb,τ + xr2,wa,τ + xr2,wb,τ = 1
xr1,wc,τ + xr2,wc,τ = 1
at any time, all resources, i.e. r1 and r2, can only perform one work item
(instantiation of Equation 5.3):(
ar1,wc,−ar1,wa − ar1,wb ≥ 30 · xr1,wa,τ + 10 · xr1,wb,τ
) ∨(
ar1,wa + ar1,wb − ar1,wc ≥ 40 · xr1,wc,τ
)(
ar2,wc − ar2,wa − ar2,wb ≤ 30 · xr2,wa,τ + 10 · xr2,wb,τ
) ∨(
ar2,wa + ar2,wb − ar2,wc ≤ 40 · xr2,wc,τ
)
instantiation of Equation 5.1 for resources r1, r2 and work items wa, wb, wc:
xr1,wa,τ = 1⇔ ar1,wa ≥ τ ∧ ar1,wa < τ + 80
xr1,wa,τ = 1⇔ ar2,wa ≥ τ ∧ ar2,wa < τ + 80
xr1,wb,τ = 1⇔ ar1,wb,≥τ ∧ ar1,wb,<τ + 80
xr1,wb,τ = 1⇔ ar2,wb ≥ τ ∧ ar2,wb < τ + 80
xr1,wc,τ = 1⇔ ar1,wc,≥τ ∧ ar1,wc,<τ + 80
xr1,wc,τ = 1⇔ ar2,wc ≥ τ ∧ ar2,wc < τ + 80
The optimal solution to this problem is ar1,wa = 1, ar1,wb = 0, ar1,wc = 0,
ar2,wa = 0, ar2,wb = 0, ar2,wc = 1, xr1,wa,τ = 1, xr1,wb,τ = 0, xr1,wc,τ = 0, xr2,wa,τ = 0,
xr2,wb,τ = 0, xr2,wc,τ = 1, that is a schedule where resource r1 performs work item
wa and resource r2 performs work item wc.
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5.4.2 Recommendations for Work Items Execution
After the optimal distribution is computed, we need to provide a recommendation
to r for executing any w ∈ W ∩ canN(r). For any work item w, the recommen-
dation rec(w, r) is a value between 0 and 1, where 0 is assigned to the work item
with the highest recommendation and 1 to the work item with the least one. Let
us consider an optimal solution s of the MILP problem to distribute work items
while minimizing risks. The work-item recommendations for each resource r are
given as follows:
• If there exists a work item w ∈ W ∩canN(r) such that xr,w,τ = 1 for solution
s, the optimal distribution suggests w to be performed by r at the current
time. Therefore, rec(w, r) = 0. For any other work item w′, the value
rec(w′, r) is strictly greater than 0 and lower than or equal to 1:
rec(w′, r) =
riskr,w′,τ + riskr,w,τ
riskr,w,τ + 1
rec(w′, r) grows proportionally to riskr,w′,τ , with rec(w′, r) = 1 if riskr,w′,τ =
1.
• Otherwise, r is supposed to start no work item at the current time. However,
since recommendations need to be provided also to resources that are not
supposed to execute any work item, for each w ∈ W ∩ canN(r), we set
rec(w, r) = riskr,w,τ .
It is possible that the optimal distribution assigns no work item to a resource r at
the current time. This is the case when r is already performing a work item (i.e.,
no additional work item should suggested) or there are more resources available
than work items to assign.
Let us consider the problem illustrated at the end of Section 5.4.1. In this
problem we have two resources r1 and r2 and three work items wa, wb, and wc.
We recall that the expected risk levels associated with a resource performing a
given work item were: riskr1,wa,τ = 0.2, riskr1,wb,τ = 0.7, and riskr1,wc,τ = 0.6
for resource r1, and riskr2,wa,τ = 0.1, riskr2,wb,τ = 0.7, and riskr2,wc,τ = 0.4 for
resource r2. We can then derive that the best allocation requires that resource
r1 performs work item wa and resource r2 performs work item wc. Finally, when
recommendations about which work item should be performed and by whom will
they be required, the system will return the following values: rec(r1, wa) = 0,
rec(r1, wb) = 0.75 and rec(r1, wc) = 0.67 for resource r1, and rec(r2, wa) = 0.36,
rec(r2, wb) = 0.79 and rec(r2, wc) = 0 for resource r2.
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5.4.3 Recommendations for Filling Out Forms
In addition to providing risk-informed decision support when picking work items
for execution, we provide support during the execution of the work items them-
selves. Human resources usually perform work items by filling out a form with
the required data. The data that are provided may also influence a process risk.
Therefore, we want to highlight the expected risk whenever a piece of data is
inserted by the resource into the form.
The risk associated with filling a form with particular data is also computed
using Algorithm 2. When used to compute the risk associated with filling a form
to perform a work item (ta, id), varAssign(id) is the variable assignment that
would result by submitting a form using the data the resource has inserted so far.
5.5 Software Implementation
We operationalized our recommendation system1 on top of the YAWL BPM sys-
tem, by extending an existing YAWL plug-in and by implementing two new cus-
tom YAWL services. This way we realized a risk-aware BPM system supporting
multi-instance work distribution and forms filling-out.
The intent of our recommendation system is to “drive” participants during
the execution of process instances. This goal can be achieved if participants can
easily understand the suggestions proposed by our tool. For this we decided to
extend a previous plug-in for the YAWL Worklist Handler, named Map Visualizer
[LAAH12]. This plug-in provides a graphical user interface to suggest process
participants the work items to execute, along with assisting them during the
execution of such work items. The tool is based on two orthogonal concepts:
maps and metrics. A map can be a geographical map, a process model, an
organizational diagram, etc. For each map, work items can be visualized by dots
which are located in a meaningful position (e.g., for a geographic map, work
items are projected onto the locations where they need to be executed, or for a
process-model map onto the boxes of the corresponding tasks in the model). Dots
can also be colored according to certain metrics, which determine the suggested
level of priority of a work item. This approach offers advantages over traditional
BPM systems, which are only equipped with basic client applications where work
items available for execution are simply enlisted, and sorted according to given
criteria. When users are confronted with hundreds of items, this visualization
1Available at https://risk-aware-bpm.googlecode.com/
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(a) The UI to support participants in
choosing the next work item to perform
based on risks.
(b) The UI to support participants in fill-
ing out a form based on risks.
Figure 5.3: Screenshots of the Map Visualizer extension for risk-aware prediction
in YAWL.
does not scale well. The validity of the metaphors of maps and metrics used for
decision support in process execution was confirmed through a set of experiments
reported by de Leoni et al. [LAAH12]. They only define very basic metrics. We
have extended the repertoire of these metrics with a new metric that is computed
by employing the technique described in Section 5.4.
Figure 5.3a shows a screenshot of the Map Visualizer where a risk-based met-
ric is employed. The map shows the process model using the YAWL notation
and dots are projected onto the corresponding elements of the model. Each dot
corresponds to a different work item and is colored according to the risks for
the three faults defined before. When multiple dots are positioned on the same
coordinates, they are merged into a single larger dot whose diameter grows with
the number of dots being amalgamated. Colors go from white to black, passing
through intermediate shades of yellow, orange, red, purple and brown. The white
and black colors identify work items associated with a risk of 0 and 1, respectively.
The screenshot in Figure 5.3a refers to a configuration where multiple process in-
stances are being carried out at the same time and, hence, the work items refer
to different process instances. The configuration of dots highlights that the risk
is lower if the process participant performs a work item of task Estimate Trailer
Usage, Arrange Pickup Appointment or Arrange Delivery Appointment for a cer-
tain instance. When clicking on the dot, the participant is shown the process
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Figure 5.4: The integration of the risk predictor tool with the YAWL system.
instance of the relative work item(s).
As discussed in Section 5.4.3, the activity of compiling a form is also sup-
ported. Figure 5.3b shows a screenshot where, while filling in a form, partici-
pants are shown the risk associated with that specific input for that form via a
vertical bar (showing a value of 45% in the example, which means a risk of 0.45).
While a participant changes the data in the form, the risk value is recomputed
accordingly.
Besides the extension to the Map Visualizer, we implemented two new custom
services for YAWL, namely the Prediction Service and Multi Instance Prediction
Service. The Prediction Service provides risk prediction and recommendation. It
implements the technique described in Section 5.3 and constructs decision trees
through the implementation of the C4.5 algorithm of the Weka toolkit for data
mining.2 Since the algorithm is not capable of predicting continuous values, in
order to provide a risk prediction we grouped risk levels that are close to each
other in intervals of 0.05 (e.g. all risk likelihoods from 0 to 0.04 are considered
as 0, from 0.05 to 0.09 as 0.1 and so on).
The Prediction Service communicates with the Log Abstraction Layer de-
scribed in Chapter 4, to be able to retrieve event logs from textual files, such
as from OpenXES event logs, or directly from the YAWL database, which stores
both historical information and the current system’s state. Moreover it com-
municates with the Monitoring Service in order to figured out which instances
completed with a fault and which one did not.
2The Weka toolkit is available at http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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The Multi Instance Prediction Service, similarly to the Prediction Service,
provides risk prediction and recommendation. The difference between these two
services is that in the former a recommendation takes into account all process
instances currently running in the system. The Multi Instance Prediction Service
interacts with the Prediction Service to obtain “local” predictions that, in combi-
nation with other information derived from the log (e.g. expected task duration,
other running instances), are used to find the optimal resource allocation using
the technique described in Section 5.4. To this purpose, the Multi Instance Pre-
diction Service also interacts with the MILP Solver. The MILP Solver provides
an interface for the interaction with different integer linear programming solvers.
So far we support Gurobi3, SCIP4 and LPSolve5. Finally, the Multi Instance
Prediction Service is invoked by the Map Visualizer to obtain the risk predic-
tions and recommendations and show these to process participants in the form
of maps. The map visualizer works with the standard Worklist Handler provided
by YAWL to obtain the up-to-date distribution of work to resources. Figure 6.2
shows the diagram of these connections.
5.6 Evaluation
We evaluated our technique using the claims handling process and related event
data, of a large insurance company kept under condition of anonymity. The event
data recording about one year of completed instances (total: 1, 065 traces) was
used as a benchmark for our evaluation. The claims handling process, modeled in
Figure 5.5, starts when a new claim is received from a customer. Upon receipt of
a claim, a file review is conducted in order to assess the claim, then the customer
is contacted and informed about the result of the assessment. The customer may
provide additional documents (“Receive Incoming Correspondence”), which need
to be processed (“Process Additional Information”) and the claim may need to be
reassessed. After the customer has been contacted, a payment order is generated
and authorized in order to process the payment. During the execution of the
process model, several updates about the status of the claim may need to be
provided to the customer as follow-ups. The claim is closed once the payment
has been authorized.
As one can see from the model, this process contains several loops, each of
which is executed multiple times, in general.
3Available at http://www.gurobi.com.
4Available at http://scip.zib.de.
5Available at http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net.
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Figure 5.5: The Claims Handling process used for the evaluation.
Four risk analysts working in this insurance company were consulted through
an iterative interview process, to identify the risks this process is exposed to.6
They reported about three equally-important faults related to complete traces σ
of the claim handling process:
Over-time fault. This fault is the same as the over-time fault described in Sec-
tion 5.2. For this risk we set the Maximum Cycle Time dmct = 30 (i.e. 30
days) and the maximum duration dmax = 300 (i.e. 300 days). The severity
of an overtime fault is measured as follows:
ftime(σ) = max
(
dσ − dmct
max(dmax − dmct, 1) , 0
)
Customer-dissatisfaction fault. During the execution of the process, if a cus-
tomer is not updated regularly on their claim, they may feel “unheeded”. A
customer dissatisfied may generate negative consequences such as negative
publicity for the insurance company, leading to bad reputation. In order
to avoid this kind of situations, the company’s policy is to contact their
customers at least once every 15 days. Given the set Λ = {(t, r, d, φ) ∈
σ|t = Request Follow Up ∨ t = Receive New Claim ∨ t = Close Claim} of
events belonging to task Request Follow Up, to task Receive New Claim, or
to task Close Claim, ordered by timestamp, the severity of this fault is:
fdissatisfaction(σ) =
∑
1≤i≤‖Λ‖
max(0, di+1 − di − 15days)
where di is the time stamp of i
th event ∈ Λ.
Cost Overrun fault. Each task has an execution cost associated with it, e.g.
6Three interviews were conducted for a total of four hours of audio recording.
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the cost of utilizing a resource to perform a task. Since the profit of the
company decreases with a higher number of tasks executed, the company
clearly aims to minimize the number of tasks required to process a claim,
for example by reducing the number of follow-ups with the claimant or the
need for processing additional documents, and reassessing the claim, once
the process has started. The severity of the cost overrun fault increases
as the cost goes beyond the minimum. Let cσ be the number of work
items executed in σ, cmax be the maximum number of work items (e.g.
30) that should be executed in any process instance that has already been
completed (including σ), and cmin be the number of work items with unique
label executed in σ. The severity of a cost overrun fault is:
fcost(σ) = min
(
cσ − cmin
max(cmax − cmin, 1) , 1
)
The occurrence of these three faults in the logs is checked using the tech-
nique that we proposed in [CLF+13b], which was originally designed for run-time
detection of process-related risks.
Trialling our technique within the company was not possible, as the claims
handling process concerns thousands of dollars, which cannot be put in danger
with experiments. So we had to simulate the execution of this process and the
resource behavior using CPN Tools.7 We mined the control-flow of our simulation
model from the original log and refined it with the help of business analysts of
the company, and added the data, resource utilization (i.e. who does what), and
tasks duration, which we also obtained from the log. We then add the frequency
of occurrence of each of these elements, on the basis on that observed from the
log. This log was also used to train the function estimators.
The CPN Tools model we created is a hierarchical model composed of ten nets
that all together count 65 transitions and 62 places. The main net is based on
the model showed in Figure 5.5, with additional places and transitions in order
to guarantee the interaction with our system. The remaining nine nets define the
behaviour of each one of the nine tasks showed in Figure 5.5.
We used this model to simulate a constant workload of 50 active instances,
in order to maintain a similar ratio to the original log (in the original log we had
271 active instances on average). In order to maintain the ratio between active
instances and resources, we reduced the number of resources utilized to one-
sixth of the original number observed in the log. Finally, we analyzed the fault
7Available at www.cpntools.org.
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 125
CHAPTER 5. RISK PREDICTION
Faults
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
%
 F
au
lt
y 
In
st
an
ce
s
Fault severity
Original
Simulated
Simulated α = 0.0
Simulated α = 0.25
Simulated α = 0.5
Simulated α = 0.75
Simulated α = 1
(a) Results following 100% of the suggestions provided.
0.02
Original SimulatedSimulated 
α = 0.0
Simulated 
α = 0.25
Simulated 
α = 0.5
Simulated 
α = 0.75
Sim at d 
α = 1
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
%
 F
au
lt
 In
st
an
ce
s
Fault Severity
Original
Simulated
Simulated 66% α = 0.0
Simulated 66% α = 0.25
Simulated 66% α = 0.5
Simulated 66% α = 0.75
Simulated 66% α = 1
(b) Results following 66% of the suggestions provided.
145 100 42
160 122 50
183 134 61
166 132 48
126 109 52
780 0.268 597 0.439 253 0.762
0.018591549 0.02559 0.0708451
0 0 0.05
0.00 0.00 0.00Original Simulated Simulated 
α = 0.0
Simulated 
α = 0.25
Simulated 
α = 0.5
Simulated 
α = 0.75
Simulated 
α = 1
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
%
 F
au
lt
y 
In
st
an
ce
s
Fault Severity
Original
Simulated
Simulated 33% α = 0.0
Simulated 33% α = 0.25
Simulated 33% α = 0.5
Simulated 33% α = 0.75
Simulated 33% α = 1
(c) Results following 33% of the suggestions provided.
Figure 5.6: Comparison of the fault severity when recommendations are and are
not followed, with 0 denoting absence of faults. The x-axis represents the severity
of the composite fault and the y-axis represents the percentage of instances that
completed with a certain severity.
distribution of the generated log using the technique presented in [CLF+13b].
The model created with CPN Tools was able to reproduce the behavior of the
original log. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z two-samples test (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Z = 0.763, p = 0.605 > 0.05) shows no significant difference between the distri-
bution of the composite fault in the original log and that in the simulated log.
This result is confirmed by the Mann-Whitney test (U = 109, 163.0, z = −0.875,
p = 0.381 > 0.05).
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Reference
#Traces % Faulty Instances Average Median
Logs
Original 1065 89.4% 0.22 0.10
Simulation
1065 92.5% 0.22 0.15
model
Suggestions 100% Suggestions 66% Suggestions 33%
Test Logs #Traces
% Faulty
Avg Mdn
% Faulty
Avg Mdn
% Faulty
Avg Mdn
Instances Instances Instances
Aggregated 1065 26.8% 0.02 0.00 43.9% 0.03 0.00 76.3% 0.07 0.05
- α = 0.0 213 31.9% 0.02 0.00 53.1% 0.03 0.05 80.3% 0.08 0.05
- α = 0.25 213 24.9% 0.02 0.00 42.7% 0.02 0.05 76.5% 0.07 0.05
- α = 0.5 213 14.1% 0.01 0.00 37.1% 0.02 0.05 71.4% 0.07 0.05
- α = 0.75 213 22.1% 0.01 0.00 38.0% 0.02 0.05 77.5% 0.07 0.05
- α = 1.0 213 40.8% 0.03 0.00 48.8% 0.03 0.05 75.6% 0.08 0.05
Table 5.1: Percentage of faulty instances, mean and median fault severity occur-
ring in the reference logs, i.e. original log and simulation model log. Percentage
of faulty instances, mean and median fault severity occurring in the test logs
aggregated into a unique log, i.e. simulated aggregated, and for each value of α,
reported for each of the three sets of experiments (33%, 66% and 100% sugges-
tions used).
We performed three sets of experiments. In the first set, all the suggestions
provided by the system were followed. In the second set, only 66% of the times the
suggestions were followed, and executing the process as the company would have
done for the remaining 33% of the times. Finally, in the third set of experiments,
only 33% of the times the suggestions provided by our system were followed.
Moreover, for each set of experiments we tested several values of α (i.e. 0.0, 0.25,
0.5, 0.75 and 1.0), where α equal to 0 will shift focus on reducing risks, while α
equal to 1 on reducing the overall execution time (see Section 5.4).
All experiments were executed simulating the execution of the process by
means of the CPN Tools model. For each experiment we generated a new log
containing 213 fresh log traces (a fifth of the traces contained in the original log).
We used a computer with an Intel Core i7 CPU (2.2 GHz), 4GB of RAM, running
Lubuntu v13.10 (64bit). We used Gurobi 5.6 as MILP solver as this is the most
efficient solver among the three that we support [KAA+11]8 and imposed a time
limit of 60 seconds, within which a solution needs to be provided for each problem.
For mission-critical processes, the time limit can also be reduced. If a time limit
is set and Gurobi cannot find a solution within the limit, a sub-optimal solution
is returned, i.e. the best solution found so far. The experiments have shown that,
practically, the returned solution is always so close to the optimal that it does
not influence the final fault’s magnitude.
Figure 5.6 shows the results of each of the three sets of experiments, comparing
the fault severity of the original log with that obtained when recommendations
are followed. It is worth highlighting how the results are given in terms of severity
8Gurobi is free of use for academic purposes but is not open-source. This is the reason why
we also support other two implementations: SCIP and LPSolve.
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measured for completed instances. Risks are relative to running instances and
estimate the expected fault severity and likelihood when such instances complete.
Table 5.1 shows the results of the experiments. In this table we show per-
centage of faulty instances, mean and median fault severity obtained during our
tests. The values are shown for the original log and the log obtained by our
simulation model without using our recommendation system (Simulation model).
Same values are also reported for each log obtained using our recommendation
system, both in an aggregated log (Simulated aggregated) and for each value of
α, over the three sets of experiments (33%, 66% and 100% suggestions used).
In the best case (Simulated log with α = 0.5), our technique was able to re-
duce the percentage of instances terminating with a fault from 89.4% to 14.1%
and the average fault severity from 0.216 to 0.01. In particular, the use of our
system significantly reduced the number of instances terminating with faults, as
evidenced by the result of the Person’s χ2 test (χ2(1) = 857.848, p < 0.001 for
the first set of experiments, χ2(1) = 494.907, p < 0.001 for the second set, and
χ2(1) = 64.663, p < 0.001 for the third one, computed over the original log and
the simulated aggregated log). Based on the odds ratio, the odds of an instance
completing without a fault are respectively 23.06, 10.75, and 2.62 times higher if
our suggestions are followed. Moreover, we tested if the number of suggestions
followed influences the effectiveness of our technique. The Kruskal-Wallis test
(H(3) = 1, 603.61, p < 0.001) shows that the overall fault severity among the
three sets of experiments (using the Simulated overall dataset, i.e. independently
of the value of the parameter α) and the original log is significantly different,
and as revealed by Jonkheere’s test (J = 1, 658, 630.5, z = −41.034, r = −0.63,
p < 0.001), the median fault severity decreases as more suggestions are followed
(see Figure 5.7). These two tests indicate that our technique is capable of pre-
venting the occurrence of faults and of reducing their severity. Clearly, it is
preferable to follow as many suggestions as possible in order to obtain the best
results though this may not always be possible.
We tested how the value of the parameter α influences the effectiveness our
technique. We compared the performances obtained with each value of α for each
set of experiment. The Kruskal-Wallis test (H(4) = 46.176, p < 0.001 for the first
set of experiments, H(4) = 17.191, p = 0.002 < 0.05 for the second one, H(4) =
5.558, p = 0.235 > 0.05 for the third one) shows how the value of the parameter
α significantly influences the median fault severity if the suggestions proposed
are followed in at least 66% of the instances. Jonkheere’s test (J = 251, 305,
z = 5.577, r = 0.17, p < 0.001 for the first set of experiments, J = 246, 322.5,
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Figure 5.7: BoxPlot showing the fault severity occurring in instances of each of
the three experiments and of the original log.
z = 3.918, r = 0.12, p < 0.001 for the second one) revealed that the median fault
severity increases when the value of α diverges from 0.5 moving either toward 0
or 1.
In the case study taken in exam, the duration of an instance has an influence
over the over-time fault and the cost overrun fault. A short execution time will
directly minimize the duration of an instance (thus preventing the over-time fault)
but also reduce the number of activities that are executed inside such an instance
(thus preventing the cost overrun fault). In light of so, it is not strange that
the best results are obtained with α = 0.5 which strikes a good balance between
minimizing risks and overall execution time.
Finally, we performed a sensitivity test over the time limit granted to the
ILP solver. We tested our recommendation system with five different time limits,
while keeping the value of α equal to 0.5 and following all suggestions (best
configuration for risk prevention). The time limits used were: 5, 10, 20, 40
and 60 seconds. Figure 5.8 shows the distribution of fault severities obtained
using these different time limits. We can observe that changing the time limit
yields statistically different distributions, as revealed by the Kruskal-Wallis test
(H(4) = 74.738, p < 0.001). Moreover, the Jonkheere’s test (J = 186, 238,
z = −8.631, r = −0.264, p < 0.001) reveals that the median fault severity
decreases when more time is granted to the ILP solver. From a practical point of
view though, it is interesting to observe that even with a time limit of 5 seconds
the approach can still notably reduce the faults severity, with 90% of the instances
terminating with a fault severity up to 0.05 out of 1. This suggests that users
may set the time limit to be granted to the ILP solver on the basis of the number
of process activities that are critical, i.e. using a low time limit if the number of
critical activities is low and a high time limit if that number is high.
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Figure 5.8: Fault severity distribution using different time limits.
Based on the results of our experiments we can conclude that the approach
produces a significant reduction in the number of faults and their severity. Specif-
ically, for the case study in question we achieved the best results with α equal
to 0.5, with a time limits of 60 seconds. We observe that this parameter can
be customized based on the priorities of the company where our approach would
be deployed, e.g. an organization may use lower values of α if risk reduction is
prioritized over reduction of process duration. The value of α may, for example,
be derived from previous process instances. This can be achieved by analysing
the logs and measuring the average process duration and its standard deviation.
Processes with a high standard deviation will probably indicate that the com-
pany is more concerned about the quality of its processes (risk prevention) than
its processes’ total execution time.
5.7 Related Work
The technique developed in this work can be compared to work in the following
areas: job scheduling and work-item distribution.
5.7.1 Job Scheduling
The problem of distributing work items to resources in business process execution
shares several similarities with the job-shop scheduling [Ven07, Elm93, Bak74,
ZD95]. Job-shop scheduling concerns M jobs that needs to be assigned to a N
machines, with N < M , while trying to minimize the make-span, i.e. the total
length of the schedule. Jobs may have constraints, e.g. job i needs to finish before
job j can be started, certain jobs can only be performed by given machines.
Unfortunately, these approaches are intended for different settings and can-
not be specialized for risk-informed work-item assignment. To our knowledge,
techniques of job-shop scheduling are unaware of the concept of cases or process
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instances, since typically jobs are not associated with a case.
The concept of case is crucial when dealing with process-aware information
systems. Work items are executed within process instances and many process
instances can be running at the same, so like many work items may be enabled
for execution. Different instances may be worked on by the same resources and,
hence, the allocation within a instances may affect the performance of other in-
stances. Without considering the instances in which work items are executed,
an important aspect is not considered and, hence, the overall allocation is not
really optimized. Moreover, applying job-scheduling for work-item distribution,
such work items will be distributed with a push strategy, i.e. a work item is
pushed to a single qualifying resource. This is also related to the fact the jobs
are usually assumed to be executed by machines, whereas, in process-aware in-
formation systems, work items are normally being executed by human resources.
Work items may also be executed by automatic software services, but this is not
the situation in the majority of setting. Kumar et al. [KAV02] show that push
strategies already perform very poorly when the resource work-load is moderately
high. Therefore, work items ought to be distributed with a pull mechanism, i.e.
enabled work items are put in a common pool and offered to qualifying resources,
which can freely pick any of them. As a matter of fact, a pull strategy is far the
most common used in current-day process-aware information systems.
5.7.2 Operational Support
The work proposed in this thesis is also related to body of work that is con-
cerned with devising frameworks and architectures to provide operational sup-
port for business processes as a service. For instance, Nakatumba et al. [NWA12]
propose a service for operational support which generalizes what is proposed
in [SWDA08]. This service is implemented in ProM, a pluggable framework
to implement process-aware techniques in a standardized environment. On its
own, the service does not implement recommendation algorithms but provides
an architecture where such algorithms can be easily plugged in. For instance,
the prediction technique in [MDDG14] is an example of algorithm plugged into
this architecture (more details on this work are provided in the next subsection).
Another example is the work in [MMC+13], which concerns a recommendation
algorithm based on monitoring the satisfaction of business constraints. This work
does not make any form of prediction nor automatic optimal work-items’ distri-
bution.
As a matter of fact, there is no conceptual or technical limitation that would
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Table 5.2: Comparison of different approaches for operational support in Process-
aware Information Systems
Approach Weight Process Perspectives Optimal Objective Assignment
Computation Distribution Method
Kim et al. [KOJ14] Dynamic Control-flow, Resource - Time, Cost -
Yang [Yan08] Static - Instance level Customizable PUSH
Kumar et al. [KDS13] Dynamic Control-flow, Resource Instance level Cooperationa PUSH
Kumar et al. [KAV02] Static - Instance level Suitability,
Urgency,
Workload
PUSH/PULLb
Huang et al. [HLD12] Dynamic Control-flow, Resource, Instance level Customizable PUSH
Data, Time
Van der Aalst et al. [ASS11] Dynamic Control-flow - Time -
Folino et al. [FGP12] Dynamic Control-flow, Resource, - Time -
Data, Time
Van der Spoel et al. [SKA12] Dynamic Control-flow - Cost -
Cabanillas et al. [CGR+13] Static Control-flow, Resource Process level User
preferencec
PUSH
Barba et al. [BWV12] Static Control-flow, Resource Instance level Time PULL
Maggi et al. [MDDG14] Dynamic Control-flow, Resource, - Customizable
LTL d
-
Data formulas
Our technique Dynamic Control-flow, Resource, Process Level Customizable PULL
Data, Time
a Work items are distributed to maximize the quality of the cooperation among resources. This approach assumes that some
resources can cooperate better than others when working on a process instance.
b Resources declare their interest in picking some work items for performance. The approach assigns each work item to the
interested resource that guarantees the better distribution.
c At design-time, users provide preferences for work items. At run time, the system allocates work items to resources to
maximize such preferences.
d The expressiveness power of business goals in the form of a single LTL formula is lower than what our technique allows
for. In principle, multiple LTL formulas can be provided though one has to balance contrasting recommendations for the
satisfiability of such formulas.
prevent our approach from being implemented as a plug-in for an operational-
support service.
5.7.3 Work-item distribution
Our work on work-item distribution to minimize risks shares commonalities with
Operational support and Decision Support Systems (DSSs). We aim to provide
recommendations to process participants to take risk-informed decisions. Our
work fully embraces the aim of these systems to improve decision making within
work systems [Alt04], by providing an extension to existing process-aware infor-
mation systems.
Mainstream commercial and open-source BPM systems do not feature work-
item prioritization. They only allow one to indicate a static priority for tasks (e.g.
low, medium or high priority), independently of the characteristics of the process
instance and of the qualified resources. Similarly, the YAWL system, which is the
one we extended, does not provide means for operational support, besides the
extension proposed by de Leoni et al. [LAAH12], which, however, defines very
basic metrics only.
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature. Table 5.2 summarizes
and compares the most significant ones, using different criteria:
Weight Computation. In order to perform an optimal distribution, every work
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item needs to be assigned a weight, which may also depend on the resources
that is going to perform it or on the moment in time when such work item
is performed. These weights can be defined either statically by analysts or
dynamically computed on the basis of the past history recorded in an event
log.
Process Perspective. When weights are dynamically defined, they may be
computed considering different perspectives: control-flow, resources, data
and time.
Optimal Assignment. The optimization of work-item distribution can be com-
puted by considering single instances in isolation or trying to optimize the
overall performances of all running instances.
Objective. The work-item distribution can be optimized with respect to several
factors, such as minimizing the cost, time or maximizing the cooperation.
Only few approaches allow one to customize the objective function to min-
imize/maximize.
Assignment Method. Once an optimal distribution is computed, each work
item can be pushed to single qualified resource or, conversely, can be put
in a common pool and simply recommended to a single resource.
Among the available approaches only the one by Cabanillas et al. [CGR+13]
computes the optimal allocation of resources at the process level. Specifically, this
work proposes a priority-based resource allocation, where resources are ranked
according to preferences defined using the Semantic Ontology of User Prefer-
ences [GRRC10]. Once a work item needs to be executed it is pushed to the
resource ranking the highest on the basis of the expressed preferences.
Among the approaches providing optimal distribution only two approaches
support a pull assignment. The approach of Barba et al. [BWV12] optimizes
process performances, using constraint programming (planning and scheduling
problem) where constrains are defined considering control-flow and resources only.
On the other hand, the approach of Kumar et al. [KAV02] aims to obtain the right
balance between execution time and quality. This approach uses work allocation
metrics and various quality attributes to find the optimal allocation strategy
keeping into consideration the preference of resources for certain work items.
The approach of Yang [Yan08], similar to all the approaches discussed so far,
assigns a static weight to each work item. This approach optimizes process execu-
tion time and total execution cost according to user preferences. Preferences are
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defined using a multi-attribute utility function that is optimized using the particle
swarm optimization algorithm. A second approach by Kumar et al. [KDS13], and
the approach of Huang et al. [HLD12], conclude the list of approaches providing
optimal distribution of work items. Kumar et al. [KDS13] propose an approach
for optimal resource cooperation using integer linear programming to identify the
group of resources with the best synergy to perform a process instance while
Huang et al. [HLD12] propose to use task operation models.
There are also approaches that focus on prediction only. Van der Aalst et
al. [ASS11] propose an approach to predict total execution time and remaining
execution time. The approach uses logs to generate transition systems annotated
with timing information. Transition systems are employed to provide predictions
using similarly completed executions as a reference. Folino et al. [FGP12] use
a combination of clustering techniques and transition systems. Using cluster-
ing they identify process variants in a log and for each cluster they generate a
transition system. When a prediction is required, using decision trees the authors
identify which cluster the current instance belongs to, and then use the associated
transition system to provide a prediction.
Van der Spoel et al. [SKA12] propose an approach to predict the cash flow of a
process. This approach uses a combination of process flow prediction, i.e. predict-
ing how the process execution will proceed, and cost prediction, i.e. predicting
how much the execution of a predicted activity will cost. Kim et al. [KOJ14]
propose the use of decision trees to minimize completion time or total labor cost,
where the resource with the lowest predicted completion time or total labor cost
is suggested.
Finally, Maggi et al. [MDDG14] propose a predictive approach to prevent
process constraints violation. Users can define linear temporal logic constraints
at any point in time during the execution of a process. Then, when a prediction
is required, the approach retrieves all traces having a similar prefix of the current
instance. These instances are then used to generate a decision tree that is used
to predict how the process execution should proceed to satisfy the predefined
constraints.
There are also approaches (e.g.,[RMA07, HLD11, LWYS08]) that mine asso-
ciation rules from event logs to define the preferable distribution of work items.
However, in the end a resource manager needs to manually assign work items
to resources. Manual distributions are clearly inefficient because they are both
unlikely to be optimal and some work items probably remain unassigned for a
certain amount of time until the manager takes charge of their assignment. More-
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over, the mined rules consider process instances in isolation. strongest emphasis
is associated with the resource that would minimize the fault’s risk).
The last row refers to our technique. This is the only one that performs
predictions based on various perspectives and uses such predictions to compute
an optimal distribution that is not local to instances but is global at process level.
Moreover, we use customizable faults as objective functions. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the only approach where each work item is recommended to
qualifying resources with different emphasis (the strongest emphasis is associated
with the resource that would minimize the fault’s risk).
5.8 Summary
This chapter present a recommendation system that allows users to take risk-
informed decisions when partaking in multiple process instances running concur-
rently. Using historical information extracted from process execution logs, for
each state of a process instance where input is required from a process partici-
pant, the system determines the risk that a fault (or set of faults) will occur if
the participant’s input is going to be used to carry on the process instance. This
input can be in the form of data used to fill out a user form, or in terms of the
next work item chosen to be executed.
The system relies on two techniques: one for predicting risks, the other for
identifying the best assignment of participants to the work items currently on
offer. The objective is to minimize both the overall risk of each process instance
(i.e. the combined risk for all faults) and the execution time of all running process
instances.
We designed the system in a language-independent manner, using common
notions of executable process models such as tasks and work items borrowed from
the YAWL language. We then implemented the system as a set of components for
the YAWL system. For each user decision, the system provides recommendations
to participants in the form of visual aids on top of YAWL models. We also
extended the YAWL user form visualizer, to show a risk profile based on the data
inserted by the participant for a given form. Although we implemented our ideas
in the context of the YAWL system, our recommendation system can easily be
integrated with other BPM systems by implementing an interface that allows the
communication through the log abstraction layer (see Chapter 4 we showed how
it can be integrated with the Oracle BPEL 10g database), and by extending the
Map-Based Worklist Handler in order to list work items belonging to a different
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BPM system than the YAWL system.
We simulated a real-life process model based on one year of execution logs
extracted from a large insurance company, and in collaboration with risk analysts
from the company we identified the risks affecting this process. We used these logs
to train our system. Then we performed various statistical tests while simulating
new process instances following the recommendations provided by our system,
and measured the number and severity of the faults upon instance completion.
Since in reality it might not always be feasible to follow the recommendations
provided, we varied the percentage of recommendations to be followed by the
simulated instances. Even when following one recommendation out of three, the
system was able to significantly reduce the number and severity of faults. Further,
results show that risks can be predicted online, i.e. while business processes are
being executed, without impacting on execution performance.
In the next chapter we present the last component of our risk-aware frame-
work. It is a technique for mitigating risk occurring in running business processes
through the use of the simulated annealing algorithm, and can be triggered as
result of a notification received from the risk monitoring technique presented in
Chapter 4.
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Risk Mitigation
The two techniques presented so far, i.e. a technique to model risks in executable
business process models and detect them as early as possible during process exe-
cution, and a technique to provide suggestions during process execution with the
intent of preventing the eventuation of risks, leave a final shortcoming affecting
approaches for risk-aware business process management. It is the lack of support
for automated risk mitigation.
Preventing the eventuation of a risk, or detecting it in time is often not enough
to avoid the negative outcome associated with it. A prompt risk mitigation
should be taken to restore the process instance to a safe state, before the instance
progresses any further. Moreover, taking the right mitigation at the right time
may make the difference between success and failure. In fact, the number of
possible ways a process-related risk may be mitigated is potentially very large that
it is difficult for a process administrator to take the right decision at the right time,
without any support. One has to consider all mitigations that are possible, given
the current state of the process instance (including a snapshot of the associated
data and resources), and the context in which the instance is running, i.e. the
state of other running instances, to make such a decision. For example, in order
to mitigate the risk of a process instance A to run overtime, a mitigation may
entail to reallocate resources from a process instance B (potentially of another
process) to A.
In light of the above, in this chapter we present a technique for automatically
mitigating process-related risks, that will complete our risk-aware framework.
Since a process instance may be affected by multiple risks at the same time, we
treat this problem as a multi-objective optimization problem. A solution to this
problem is a variant of the risky process instance obtained by applying a sequence
of mitigation actions, in order to reduce the risks’ probability down to a tolerable
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level, or in the best case, to annul the risks altogether. Mitigation actions include
control-flow aspects (e.g. skipping a task to be executed), process resources (e.g.
reallocating a resource to a different task), and data (e.g. rolling back an executed
task to restore its input data). To explore the potentially large solution space, we
use dominance-based Multi-Objective Simulated Annealing (MOSA) [SEF+08].
At each run, the algorithm generates a small set of solutions similar to the original
process instance but with less risks. It stops when either a maximum number of
non-redundant solutions (i.e. solutions proposing different mitigations) is found
or a given time-frame elapses. This approach is not meant to replace human
judgment. Instead, it aims to support process administrators in deciding what
mitigations to take, by reducing the number of feasible options, and consequently
the time needed to take a decision.
We defined the mitigation actions in collaboration with an Australian risk con-
sultant. To prove the feasibility of this approach, we implemented these actions
and the MOSA algorithm on top of the YAWL system. We instantiated a set of
process models from the logistics [Vol11] and screen business [OLH+08] domains
that are affected by one or more risks, and executed a series of tests to mitigate
such risks. The tests show that the technique can find a set of possible solutions
within a few minutes of computation, and that in all cases the associated risks
are mitigated.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 introduces the
running example. Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 introduce preliminary concepts
while Section 6.4 describes the proposed technique to mitigate process risks. Sec-
tion 6.5 illustrates the implementation of the technique, which is then evaluated
in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 covers related work and Section 6.8 concludes the
chapter.
The research presented in this chapter has been the subject of two publica-
tions [CHLA12, CLH+13].
6.1 Running example
Let us now consider an example process for which we have defined several risks,
to understand how risk conditions can be formulated in terms of process model
elements. These conditions will provide input for the risk mitigation technique
presented in the next section. The example process, shown in Figure 6.1, describes
the Payment subprocess of an order fulfillment process, that we already described
in Chapter 4.
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Figure 6.1: Order Fulfillment: Payment subprocess.
In this process, as already illustrated in Chapter 4, we can identify various
faults that may occur during execution. For example, a Service Level Agreement
(SLA) may establish that the process (or one of its tasks) may not last longer
than a Maximum Cycle Time MCT (e.g. 5 days), otherwise a pecuniary penalty
may be incurred. To detect the risk of overtime fault at run-time, we should check
the likelihood that the running instance does not exceed the MCT based on the
amount of time Tc expired to that point. Let us consider Te as the remaining cycle
time, i.e. the amount of time estimated to complete the current instance given Tc
based on past executions, which can be computed using the approach in [ASS11].
Then the probability of exceeding MCT can be computed as 1−MCT/(Te +Tc)
if Te + Tc > MCT and is equal to 0 if Te + Tc ≤ MCT . If this probability is
greater than a tolerance value (e.g. 60%), we notify the risk to the user.
A second fault is related to the resources participating in the process. The
Senior Finance Officer who has approved a Shipment Payment Order for a given
customer must have not approved another order by the same customer in the last
d days, otherwise there is a potential for approval fraud, a violation of a four-eyes
principle across different instances of the Payment subprocess. To detect this risk
we first have to check that there is an order, say order o of customer c, to be ap-
proved. Moreover, we need to check that either of the following conditions holds:
i) o has been allocated to a Senior Finance Officer who has already approved
another order for customer c in the last d days; or ii) at least one Senior Finance
Officer is available who approved an order for customer c in the last d days and
all other Senior Finance Officers who did not approve an order for c during the
last d days are unavailable.
Finally, a third fault relates to a situation where a process instance executes
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a given task too many times, typically via a loop. Not only could this lead to
a process slowdown, but also to a “livelock” if the task is in a loop whose exit
condition is deliberately never met. In general, given a task t, a maximum number
of allowable executions of t per process instance, MAE (t), can be fixed as part
of the service-level agreement for t. In our example, this fault may occur if task
“Update Shipment Payment Order” is re-executed five times within the same
process instance. We call this an order unfulfillment fault. To detect the risk at
run-time, we need to check if: i) the Update task is currently being performed
for order o; and ii) it is likely that the task will be repeated within the same
process instance. The probability that the number of times a task will be repeated
within the same instance is computed by dividing the number of instances where
the MAE for the task has been reached by the number of instances that have
executed this task at least as many times as it has been executed by the current
instance, and have completed. If the probability to exceed MAE (t) is greater
than a tolerance value for t, e.g. 60%, we notify the risk to the user.
In the next section we present a set of mitigation actions that can be performed
“on-the-fly” on a running process instance in order to mitigate its risks.
6.2 Preliminaries
Before presenting our technique for automated risk mitigation we introduce a
number of preliminary concepts and notations. We will not repeat the definition
of a YAWL specification presented in Chapter 3, but we will link some additional
concepts to it. During execution, each task belonging to a YAWL specification
that needs to be executed produce the instantiation of a work item. These work
items may go through various statuses. The set StatusType contains the various
statuses that a work item may go through during its lifecycle. These are: offered ,
allocated , started , completed , forceCompleted , cancelled , failed , deadlocked used
by the YAWL system and additionally deoffered , deallocated , destarted , rollback ,
skipped used for mitigation purposes. Many of these statuses are self-explanatory.
The status rollback is the status of a work item which was completed but then
enabled again though not offered . The status skipped is the status of a work
item that was skipped, which is similar to the status completed but the work
item was not actually performed. For convenience, we provide certain groupings
of event types. In particular, Rel , StatusType\ {cancelled , failed , rollback}
is the set of event types that identify a work item as subject to mitigation.
Active , {offered , allocated , started} is the set of event types that mark a work
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item as in progress, Completed , {completed , forceCompleted} is the set of event
types that mark a work item as completed, and ActiveC : Active ∪ Completed is
their union.
Given set ActiveC we define a partial order 4 ⊆ ActiveC × ActiveC such
that it preserves the partial ordering deoffered < offered < allocated < started <
completed = forceCompleted .
6.3 Event and Work Item Comparison
When we consider a YAWL Log, i.e. a log resulting from the execution of a YAWL
specification, temporal ordering relations between events associated to work items
are not immediately visible. In order to cope with so we are introducing some
concepts that will simplify the temporal comparison between events.
Definition 8 (Event Comparison). Let L = (E , W , C, Model , WI , Case, Task ,
EvType, Time, Res , Inp, Outp) be a log, given E ′ ⊆ E, E ′ 6= ∅, we define the
operators e1 < e2 iff Time(e1) < Time(e2) and e1 6 e2 iff Time(e1) ≤ Time(e2),
which reflect the temporal ordering on events, and the operators min E ′ = e1 iff
e1 ∈ E ′ and for all e2 ∈ E ′, e1 6 e2, which determines the earliest event of an event
set, and max E ′ = e1 iff e1 ∈ E ′ and for all e2 ∈ E ′, e2 6 e1, which determines the
latest event of an event set.
Useful is the possibility of identifying events belonging to the same work item.
Definition 9 (Work Item Event Grouping). Let L be a log, e an event in this
log, e ∈ E, and w a work item in this log, w ∈ W, we define the set of events that
belong to work item w as WI(w) , {e ∈ E | WI (e) = w}. Similarly, we define
the set of events that belong to the same work item of e as WI(e) , WI(WI (e)).
Finally, the latest event for work item w is defined as ωw , max WI(w).
As for events we are interested in being able to compare work items.
Definition 10 (Work Item Comparison). Let L be a log, with w1, w2 ∈ W, we
define w1 < w2 as max WI(w1) < min WI(w2). This operator reflects the partial
temporal order between work items, i.e. work item w1 precedes work item w2 if its
latest event is earlier than the earliest event of w2.
6.4 Process Risk Simulated Annealing
In this chapter we deal with the problem of automatically mitigating one or more
business process risks for a specific running process instance (case for short),
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 141
CHAPTER 6. RISK MITIGATION
Algorithm 3: PRSA Algorithm
Data: Case C, MitigationGraph G, Mitigation M, InitialTemperature
initemp, NumberIterations n, NumberTemperatureDrops k
Result: Set of Mitigations F
begin
F ⇐ {(G,M)};
for i⇐ 1 to n do
t⇐ initemp;
(G,M)⇐ Any(F );
for j ⇐ 1 to k do
(G1,M1)⇐ applyRandomMitigation(C,G,M);
F˜ ⇐ F ∪ {(G,M)} ∪ {(G1,M1)};
F˜1 ⇐ {(Gx,Mx) ∈ F˜ |(Gx,Mx) ≺ (G1,M1)};
F˜2 ⇐ {(Gx,Mx) ∈ F˜ |(Gx,Mx) ≺ (G,M)};
δE ⇐ 1|F˜ |
(∣∣∣F˜1∣∣∣− ∣∣∣F˜2∣∣∣);
u⇐ rand(0, 1);
if u < min(1, exp(−δE/t)) then
(G,M)⇐ (G1,M1);
if (Gx,Mx) ⊀ (G,M) ∀(Gx,Mx) ∈ F then
F ⇐ {(Gx,Mx) ∈ F |(G,M) ⊀ (Gx,Mx)} ∪ {(G,M)};
end
end
t⇐ updateTemperature(t);
end
end
return F
end
without raising other business process risks for the same case. This problem be-
longs to the family of multi-objective optimization problems, and we propose the
use of simulated annealing for finding a Pareto-optimal solution, or a set of such
solutions. The advantage of using simulated annealing compared to other opti-
mization techniques, such as integer linear programming or genetic algorithms,
is that it can provide a sufficiently good solution in a limited amount of time
starting with a single element, i.e. the instance that needs to be mitigated.
The Process Risk Simulated Annealing (PRSA) algorithm (see Algorithm 3) is
an application of the DBMOSA [SEF+08] algorithm where at each iteration a new
solution is discovered through the use of one or more random mitigation actions.
The algorithm proposes a solution, or mitigation, as a sequence of elementary
mitigation actions. A “behavioral cost” (cost for short) is associated with each
mitigation action, and measures how deeply an action affects the process instance
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to which it is applied. For example, allocating a different resource to a work item
has a lower cost than skipping a task that has to be executed. The total cost of
a solution is the sum of the costs of each mitigation action used in that solution.
A good solution to the PRSA algorithm is one that reduces the likelihood of a
risk under its threshold, keeping the total cost as low as possible.
When comparing solutions that have the same cost, a solution that fully mit-
igates a risk is better than one that mitigates that risk because its risk condition
is no longer evaluable. And in turn, this solution is better than one that does
not mitigate the risk at all. Finally, if two solutions mitigate the same risk, we
privilege the one that yields the lowest risk probability. Given two solutions a, b
we say that a dominates b if it mitigates the same risks mitigated by b with a
lower total cost. As result, we define them as mutually non-dominating if neither
one dominates the other.
Below we describe the more elementary mitigation actions that can be used to
create a solution, and how they affect a process case. We use the YAWL language
as a reference language to define the mitigation actions, since this language has a
formal foundation on which we can build our definitions and algorithms. However,
the notions presented in this section can easily be generalized to other languages.
6.4.1 Execution and Mitigation Graph
The concepts previously defined allows us to organize work items in a logical
structure. This structure is unable to represent logical relations like parallelism,
for this reason we will introduce the concept of execution graph. An execution
graph for a process case provides a view of its execution and is defined on the
basis of a log and its corresponding process model.
Definition 11 (Execution Graph). Let L be a process log with case c, Y its
YAWL specification, and UserID the set of resources, we define the execution
graph of c as G(c) = (Node, TaskN , Status ,  , ResN , TimeN , VarN ) where:
• Node = {w ∈ W | EvType(ωw) ∈ Rel ∧ Case(w) = c} is the set of nodes,
where each node represents a work item that is not modifiable,
• TaskN = Task |Node is the restriction of the function Task to the set of
nodes,
• Status = {(ωw, s) ∈ Node × Rel | s = EvType(ωw)} is a function relating a
node with its status of execution,
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•  = {(w1, w2) ∈ Node×Node | Status(w1) ∈ {completed , skip}∧TaskN (w1) ∈
◦TaskN (w2) ∧ @w3 ∈ Node[(TaskN (w1) = TaskN (w3) ∨ TaskN (w2) =
TaskN (w3)) ∧ w1 < w3 ∧ w3 < w2])} is the flow relation between work
items. Its reflexive transitive closure is defined as  ∗,
• ResN = {((w, s), r) ∈ (Node×Active)×2UserID | ∃e1 ∈ WI(w)[EvType(e1) =
s ∧ r = Res(e1) ∧ @e2 ∈ WI(w)[e1 < e2 ∧ EvType(e2 ) 4 s ]]} is a function
that yields the resources that are involved in the latest changing w to status
s,
• TimeN = {((w, s), t) ∈ (Node×ActiveC )×T ) | ∃e1 ∈ WI(w)[EvType(e1) =
s ∧ t = Time(e1) ∧ @e2 ∈ WI(w)[e1 < e2 ∧ EvType(e2 ) 4 s ]]} is a partial
function that yields the timestamp when w latest moved to status s,
• VarN = {((w, x), v) ∈ (Node×Var)×Ω | EvType(ωw) /∈ {skip, deoffered}∧
v = Inp(max {e2 ∈ WI(w) | EvType(e2) = offered}, x)} ⊕ {((w, x), v) ∈
(Node×Var)×Ω | EvType(ωw) ∈ Completed∧v = Outp(ωw, x)} is a partial
function relating nodes and variables to values.
As we explore mitigation options the execution graph should evolve along
with it, and the initial execution graph becomes a dynamic data structure from
which we can modify nodes. We will refer to this modified execution graph as
mitigation graph.
The concept of border identifies work items that can be modified. Such work
items are currently in execution, or they are completed work items for which
there are no successor work items that are completed or being executed.
Definition 12 (Border). Let G be a mitigation graph. We define the border of G,
G , as {n1 ∈ Node | ∀n2 ∈ Node[n1  ∗ n2 ⇒ Status(n2) ∈ {deoffered , skipped ,
rollback}]}.
Discovering which work items are related to a specific resource can be relevant.
For this reason we introduce the function ~ which takes as argument an active
event type and a resource, and yields the active border work items associated
with that resource.
Definition 13 (Resource Involvement). Let L be a log, r a resource, r ∈ UserID,
and s an active event type, s ∈ Active, then ~(r, s) , {w ∈ W | ∃e ∈ E [e =
ωw ∧ EvType(e) = s ∧ r ∈ Res(e)]} We will abbreviate active event types to their
first letter, e.g. we will write ~(r, o) instead of ~(r, offered).
To reassign a resource we need to know if the resource is associated with
process cases which risks could be eventuate. To obtain an answer to this question
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we define the concept of safe resource collection. Note that in practice we need to
know the process model and the resource model in order to obtain this collection.
Definition 14 (Safe Resource Collection). Let L be a log, UserID the set of
resources, and C the set of cases, the safe resource collection is defined as SRC =
(PI ,Risk) where:
• PI : UserID → 2C is a function relating resources to sets of active cases, in
particular given a resource r returns the set of active cases for which there
is a task associated to a role, which resource r belongs to,
• Risk : C → {risky , norisky} is a function that tells us whether a certain
case is considered risky or not.
Definition 15 (Mitigations). Let Y be a set of YAWL specifications, with asso-
ciated set of tasks TY , a set of resources UserID, and a log L. A mitigation is
represented as M = (A,TypeA,TaskA,ResA,CaseA,) where:
• A is a set of mitigation actions,
• TypeA : A → {deoffer , deallocate, destart , offer , allocate, start , rollback , skip},
is a function relating actions to types of mitigation,
• TaskA : A → TY is a function relating actions to tasks,
• ResA : A UserID is a partial function relating actions to resources,
• CaseA : A → C is a function relating actions to cases,
• ⊆ A × A is a total ordering on mitigation actions indicating the order
in which they need to be performed. We refer to this total ordering as the
mitigation sequence.
The insertion of a new mitigation action a /∈ A into mitigation M , can be
expressed as:
addMit(M,a, et, t, r, c),(A ∪ {a},TypeA ∪ {(a, et)},TaskA ∪ {(a, t)},
ResA ∪ {(a, r)},CaseA ∪ {(a, c)}, ∪{(x, a) | x ∈ A})
6.4.2 Mitigation Actions
Now we are in a position to introduce the mitigation actions. For each action
we will provide a short description of its behavior; we will quantify its cost and
specify the precondition(s) required for its application. All these actions are
executed in the context of a mitigation M . As soon as a risk is detected we
collect the log L containing all process cases. This log is used to generate an
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execution graph G′, that we refer to as the original execution graph. It is used
as a reference for comparison with the original status of the system. The effects
of mitigations actions are explored, though not yet applied, during execution of
the mitigation algorithm, and hence they are performed on a clone of the original
execution graph which we will refer to as G.
Throughout the remainder of this section G′ is the original execution graph,
G the mitigation graph in use, and c ∈ C is a case. Moreover, whenever a node
is modified, we need to store the time this modification occurred. In order to
capture the time, we use function curr().
A mitigation is a sequence of mitigation actions. Below we describe the miti-
gation actions supported by the PRSA algorithm, and the effects that each action
yields.
Algorithm 4: Deoffer Task
function deOff (Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M);
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
n⇐ Any({x ∈ G | Status(x) = offered});
if n 6=⊥ then
r ⇐ Any(ResN (n, offered));
if |ResN (n, offered)| > 1 then
et⇐ offered ;
TimeN ⇐ TimeN ⊕ {((n, offered), curr())};
ResN ⇐ ResN ⊕ {((n, offered),ResN (n, offered) \ {r})};
else
et⇐ deoffered ;
TimeN ⇐ {(n, offered)} –/ TimeN ;
ResN ⇐ ResN (n, offered) –/ ResN ;
VarN ⇐ {(n, v) | VarN (n, v) ∈ Ω} –/ TimeN ;
Status ⇐ Status ⊕ {(n, et)};
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), deoffer ,TaskN (n), r, c);
return (G,M)
Deoffer This action deoffers a task from a resource to whom the task was
offered. We can execute deOff (c,G,M) as described in Algorithm 4 if there is
a work item x ∈ G such that x is an offered work item. The cost of this
action was set to 1 and this action serves as a reference for the cost of the other
actions. With reference to our working example, let us assume that for certain
process instances an order cannot be updated (e.g. when an order’s line items
have already gone into production their quantity can no longer be reduced). To
prevent such update, we can set a risk condition that is satisfied as soon as a
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Algorithm 5: Deallocate Task
function deAll(Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M);
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
n⇐ Any({x ∈ G | Status(x) = allocated});
if n 6=⊥ then
r ⇐ Any(ResNG(n, allocated));
TimeNG ⇐ {(n, allocated)} –/ TimeNG;
StatusG ⇐ StatusG ⊕ {(n, offered)};
ResNG ⇐ ResNG ⊕ {((n, allocated),∅)};
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), deallocate,TaskNG(n), r, c);
return (G,M)
work item of task “Update Shipment Payment Order” is offered to a resource in
a specific instance. This risk can be annulled by deoffering this work item and
then skipping the work item altogether to prevent it from being reoffered.
Deallocate This action deallocates a task from the resource to whom the
task was allocated. If there is a work item x ∈ G such that x is an allocated
work item, we can execute deAll(c,G,M) (see Algorithm 5). We set the cost of
this action to 2, since considering the progress status of a work item, deallocating
a work item should be more “expensive” than deoffering it. In the Payment
subprocess this action could be used to mitigate the approval fraud risk. The
work item of “Approve Shipment Payment Order” can be deallocated from the
resource to whom this work item is allocated when the risk is detected, since this
resource approved another order for the same customer in the past.
Destart This action brings an already started work item back to the state
allocated and allocates it to the resource who started it. We can execute the action
deSta(c,G,M), as described in Algorithm 6, if there is a work item x ∈ G such
Algorithm 6: Destart Task
function deSta(Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M);
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
n⇐ Any({x ∈ G | Status(x) = started});
if n 6=⊥ then
r ⇐ Any(ResNG(n, started));
TimeNG ⇐ {(n, started)} –/ TimeNG;
StatusG ⇐ StatusG ⊕ {(n, allocated)};
ResNG ⇐ ResNG ⊕ {((n, started),∅)};
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), destart ,TaskNG(n), r, c);
return (G,M)
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Algorithm 7: Offer Task
function off (Distribution Set D, Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation
Graph G′, Mitigation M);
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
n⇐ Any({x ∈ G | StatusG(x) ∈ {offered , deoffered} ∧ StatusG′(x) ∈
Active});
if n 6=⊥ then
r ⇐ Any(D(TaskN (n)) \ ResNG(n, offered) ∪ ResNG′(n, offered));
if r 6=⊥ then
TimeNG ⇐ TimeNG ⊕ {((n, offered), curr())};
VarNG ⇐ TimeNG ⊕ {VarNG′(n)};
StatusG ⇐ StatusG ⊕ {(n, offered)};
ResNG ⇐ ResNG ⊕ {((n, offered),ResNG(n, offered) ∪ {r})};
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), offer ,TaskNG(n), r, c);
return (G,M)
that x is a started work item. For this action we set the cost to 3 as destarting
a work item requires more effort than deallocating a work item. The destart
action may also be used to mitigate an approval fraud risk. For example, it
may be used to “free up” a resource who has never approved an order for the
current customer, reducing this way the probability of allocating the work item
of “Approve Shipment Payment Order” to a resource who has approved another
order for the same customer in the past.
Offer This action (see Algorithm 7) offers a work item to a resource to whom
the task is not currently offered, either because it is not yet part of the set of
resources to whom the task is currently offered, or because the task is currently
deoffered . Given a function D that relates tasks to the set of resources to whom
their work items can be offered, we can execute off (D, c,G,G′,M) if there is a
work item x ∈ G such that x is an offered or deoffered work item, and this
work item is an offered , allocated or started work item in the execution graph G′.
This action has a cost of 1, the same as deoffer . Since this action can only be
executed if we previously executed a deoffer , these two actions can be combined
to “reoffer” a work item to another resource (with a total cost of 2). For example,
to reduce the risk of approval fraud in the Payment subprocess, we can deoffer
the work item of “Approve Shipment Payment Order” from all Senior Financial
Officers that have already approved another order for the same customer in the
past, and offer that work item to a Senior Financial Officer that did not.
Allocate This action reallocates a work item that was deallocated before (and
still has not been allocated) to a resource to whom the task was not allocated when
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Algorithm 8: Allocate Task
function all(Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation Graph G′,
Mitigation M);
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
n⇐ Any({x ∈ G | StatusG(x) = offered ∧ StatusG′(x) ∈
{allocated , started}});
if n 6=⊥ then
r ⇐ Any(ResNG(n, offered) \ {ResNG′(n, allocated)});
if r 6=⊥ then
TimeNG ⇐ TimeNG ⊕ {((n, allocated), curr())};
StatusG ⇐ StatusG ⊕ {(n, allocated)};
ResNG ⇐ ResNG ⊕ {((n, allocated), r)};
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), allocate,TaskNG(n), r, c);
return (G,M)
the deallocation took place (see Algorithm 8). We can execute all(c,G,G′,M)
if there is a work item x ∈ G such that x is an offered work item, and x is
originally an allocated or started work item. This action has a cost of −1. This
action can only be executed if we previously executed a deallocate, with the result
of changing the resource involved in a work item (so the total cost is 2− 1 = 1).
We can use the combination deallocate + allocate as an alternative to mitigate
the risk of approval fraud. With a total cost of 1, this combination would be
preferred to using deoffer + offer .
Algorithm 9: Start Task
function sta(Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation Graph G′,
Mitigation M);
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
n⇐ Any({x ∈ G | StatusG(x) = allocated ∧ StatusG′(x) = started});
if n 6=⊥ then
r ⇐ {ResNG(n, allocated)} \ {ResNG′(n, started)};
if r 6=⊥ then
TimeNG ⇐ TimeNG ⊕ {((n, started), curr())};
StatusG ⇐ StatusG ⊕ {(n, started)};
ResNG ⇐ ResNG ⊕ {((n, started), r)};
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), start ,TaskNG(n), r, c);
return (G,M)
Start This action (see Algorithm 9) restarts a work item that was previously
destarted (and has not yet been restarted) and associates it with a different
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Algorithm 10: Rollback Task
function rollbackTask(Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M);
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
n1 ⇐ Any({x ∈ G | StatusG(x) ∈ Completed});
if n1 6=⊥ then
foreach n2 ∈ NodeG do
if n1  ∗G n2 then StatusG ⇐ StatusG ⊕ {(n2, rollback)} ;
StatusG ⇐ StatusG ⊕ {(n1, rollback)};
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), rollback ,TaskNG(n1),⊥, c);
return (G,M)
resource from the one who started the task. We can execute sta(c,G,G′,M) if
there is a work item x ∈ G such that x is an allocated work item, and x is
originally a started work item. The cost of this action is −1, and the reasoning
is similar to that used for the allocate action. This mitigation action can be used
to reduce the negative impact of a deoffer or deallocate previously performed on
a process instance.
Algorithm 11: Skip Task
function skip(Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M , YAWL
Specification Y );
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
D ⇐ {t ∈ TModel(c) | ∃x ∈ G [StatusG(x) = deoffered∧TaskNG(x) = t]};
R ⇐ {t ∈ TModel(c) | ∃x ∈ G [StatusG(x) = rollback ∧ TaskNG(x) = t]};
U ⇐ {t ∈ TModel(c) | ∃x ∈ G [t ∈ TaskNG(x)◦∗]};
t⇐ Any((D ∪R) ∩ U);
a⇐ ∃a ∈ A | TypeA(a) = skip ∧ TaskA(a) = t ∧ CaseA(a) = c;
if t 6=⊥ ∧skippable(t) = yes ∧ ¬a then
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), skip, t,⊥, c);
return (G,M)
Rollback This action returns a completed work item to the status of unof-
fered. We can execute rollbackTask(c,G) if there is a work item x ∈ G such that
x is a completed work item. Its operationalization is described in Algorithm 10.
The rollback action restores the case to a consistent status where the execution
of a given work item never happened. A compensation routine can be associated
with a task, so that it is triggered when the task is rolled back. The idea of this
compensation routine is to deal with elements outside the control of the workflow
engine (e.g. returning the money to a client after their payment has been rolled
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 150
6.4. PROCESS RISK SIMULATED ANNEALING
Algorithm 12: Relocate Resource
function relRes(Case c, Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M , Safe
Resource Collection SRC );
Output: Mitigation Graph G, Mitigation M
begin
n⇐ Any({x ∈ G | Status(x) = started});
r1 ⇐ ResNG(n, started);
t⇐⊥;
foreach r2 ∈ ResNG(n, offered) do
if t =⊥ ∧ |PI (r)| = 1 ∧ Risk(Any(PI (r))) =
norisky ∧ (|~(r, s)|+ |~(r, a)|) = 1 then
if |~(r, s)| = 1 then
c2 ⇐ Case(Any(~(r2, s));
t⇐ Task(Any(~(r2, s));
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), destart , t, r2, c2);
else
c2 ⇐ Case(Any(~(r2, a));
t⇐ Task(Any(~(r2, a));
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), deallocate, t, r2, c2);
TimeNG ⇐ TimeNG ⊕ {((n, allocated), curr())};
TimeNG ⇐ TimeNG ⊕ {((n, started), curr())};
ResNG ⇐ ResNG ⊕ {((n, allocated), r)};
ResNG ⇐ ResNG ⊕ {((n, started), r)};
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), destart ,TaskN (n), r1, c);
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), deallocate,TaskN (n), r1, c);
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), allocate,TaskN (n), r, c);
M ⇐ addMit(M,NewAction(), start ,TaskN (n), r, c);
return (G,M)
back). The rollback action is our most powerful action and has a cost of 9, ob-
tained by adding the absolute values of all the actions introduced until now. In
our Payment subprocess, we can use this action when we execute a large number
of updates on the same Payment Order.
Skip This action (see Algorithm 11) marks an unoffered and skippable task
as ‘to be skipped’. If there exists a task t ∈ skippable which does not have any
work item active or completed, and there not exists a mitigation action a ∈ A
which skipped task t for case c, then we define skipTask(c,G). To limit the use of
this action, since this action may produce inconsistency in the data, we decided
to assign a cost of 9. The utility of this action can be seen in two situations when
we consider our running example. The first situation is the order unfulfillment.
In this case, to prevent the reiterated execution of an update, we may decide to
skip the “Update Shipment Payment Order” task. The second situation is the
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overtime process risk. In this case we may decide to skip some tasks in order to
complete the process in time.
Relocate Resource This action (see Algorithm 12) looks for a resource that
is only involved in the execution of a work item belonging to a case for which no
risk was defined. If once such a resource is found, it deallocates (and destarts if
necessary) the work item associated with this resource and allocates the resource
to a work item of the process case that we want to mitigate. The cost of this
action is 7 since this action performs a (partial) sequence of destart and deallocate
on two work items, and another allocate and a start action on one work item.
Let x be an active border work item x ∈ G in case c, r be a resource involved
only in case c2, and c2 be process which is not risky. If resource r only started
or allocated one work item (of any active border events), then we can execute
relRes(c,G,M, SRC ).
6.5 Software Implementation
We implemented the PRSA algorithm1 as a custom service in the YAWL system.
The risk mitigation service interacts with the Monitoring Service that we
discussed in Chapter 4, for the sake of identifying risks and computing their
probabilities. It uses as input a reference to the process instance whose risks
need to be mitigated, the complete YAWL specification for this instance, a log of
the process (as extracted from the YAWL system), and a copy of the risk sensors
associated with the process instance, as provided by the risk detection service.
Modifications that a mitigation may introduce are communicated to the risk
detection service, which recomputes the risk probabilities. The final solutions
are returned to the user as recommendations. The one chosen by the user is
then applied to the process instance under exam using the APIs provided by
the YAWL engine. We implemented compensation actions associated with rolled
back work items via the YAWL Worklet mechanism [HAAR10]. Accordingly,
we equipped the YAWL Editor with an interface to allow users to associate a
Worklet containing a compensation action to a task. When an instance of this
task is rolled back, the associated Worklet is run as a separate process instance
in the YAWL engine, so that from an engine perspective, the Worklet and its
invoking processes are two distinct cases.
1Available at https://risk-aware-bpm.googlecode.com/
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Figure 6.2: The integration of the risk mitigation tool with the YAWL system.
6.6 Evaluation
To prove the feasibility of our technique, we ran three experiments. First, we
tested the required time to mitigate the same set of risks on different process
models. Second, we checked the dependency of the mitigation time on different
variables. Third, we checked the quality of the mitigations proposed on a specific
process model.
For the first experiment, we used four real-life process models available to the
research team, for which we could identify risk conditions. The sizes of these
models range from 5 to 20 tasks. The first model (Process A) describes a film
production process, carried out on a daily basis. This process is taken from a
case study we conducted in collaboration with the Australian Film, Television
and Radio School [OLH+08]. The other three models are subprocesses of an
order fulfillment process. The first one (Process B) deals with the ordering, the
second (Process C) deals with the payment for the goods and is the process we
showed in Section 6.1, the third model (Process D) deals with the delivery of the
goods.
Next, we defined seven generic risk conditions that are applicable to all these
processes, where with “generic” we mean risks that are not linked to a specific
context, such as a financial frauds, but that are linked to control-flow aspects.
These conditions represent possible undesirable situations that may arise in a
process, and relate to different process aspects such as data, resources and control-
flow elements. They are domain-independent so that we could define them on all
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Process Size Variants
Risks
avg/max
Process A 20 127 3.53 / 7
Process B 5 7 1.71 / 3
Process C 15 31 3.05 / 5
Process D 5 15 2.13 / 4
Total 45 180 3.18 / 7
Table 6.1: Size, Variants, and Number of risks present in the processes used for
the experiment.
four process models. The first condition detects a situation where two concurrent
work items may not complete in a desired order. The second one is used to
detect a violation of the four-eyes principle between parallel work items. The
third one detects whether a time limit is exceed when executing a loop. The
fourth condition detects a possible delay with the execution of a work item. The
fifth one detects the possibility that two concurrent work items that should be
executed by the same resource are actually allocated to two different resources
(a situation that is not possible to enforce with many workflow management
systems). The sixth one detects a delay with the execution of a portion of the
process while the seventh one detects a data error, specifically if the data values
produced by two concurrent work items are not the same.
For each process model we generated a variant with a specific combination
of the above risk conditions (see Table 6.1). This led to a total of 180 process
models (not every risk identified could be applied to every process model, since
some of these risk conditions require parallelism and/or loops that are not present
in every process model). These process models are as follows: 19 models with
1 risk condition, 40 models with 2 risk conditions, 50 with 3 risk conditions, 41
models with 4 risk conditions, 22 process models with five risk conditions, seven
process models with six risk conditions, and one process model with all seven risk
conditions.
For each process model we ran ten tests and averaged the results. Each test
was executed on the first state of a process instance where all the risk conditions
evaluated to true. For each group of tests on the same process model we measured
the time required to obtain the first solution that mitigates all risks, and the
number of candidate solutions generated by the algorithm in order to obtain this
solution. We performed the tests on an Intel Core I5 M560 2.67GHz processor
with 4GB RAM, running Linux Lubuntu v11.10.
Table 6.2 shows the results of this experiment. The second, third and fourth
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Process
Mitigation time [sec] Candidates Variants
min max avg min max avg Mitigated
Process A 0.003 178.891 26.415 2 20,181 3,456 127/127
Process B 0.001 0.033 0.015 3 54 32 7/7
Process C 0.001 0.117 0.030 2 256 60.93 31/31
Process D 0.004 0.929 0.170 2 553 78.2 15/15
Total 0.001 178.891 18.657 2 20,181 2,457 180/180
Table 6.2: Times, number of candidate solutions explored to find the first solution,
and number of variants mitigated (over the total number of variants) using the
PRSA algorithm.
Process
Mitigation time [sec] Variants
min max avg Mitigated
Process A 0.059 0.235 0.113 24/127
Process B 0.043 0.065 0.054 2/7
Process C 0.023 0.052 0.035 13/31
Process D 0.028 0.101 0.061 8/15
Total 0.023 0.235 0.080 47/180
Table 6.3: Times and number of variants mitigated (over the total number of
variants) using the greedy algorithm.
columns show the size (as number of tasks), the number of variants and the
number of risk conditions for each of the four process models. The fifth and sixth
columns show the mitigation time required to find the first solution, and the
number of candidate solutions explored to find such a solution. From this table
we can observe that the algorithm takes at most 3 mins (179 secs) to mitigate
multiple risks in a variant of Process A (this timing refers to a combination of 5
risks for this process), though the average time is much lower (19 secs across all
models). It seems reasonable to assume that in most business scenarios mitigation
times in the order of a few minutes are acceptable, compared to the average time
required to perform a task, and thus the average duration of a process instance.
For example, let us assume an average duration of 24 hours for the Payment
subprocess, with a new task being executed every 30 mins. Let us also assume
that we sample the risk conditions every 5 mins. This means we have up to 6 mins
to mitigate all identified risks before a new task is executed which may change
the risk conditions.
Table 6.2 also shows that the algorithm needs to explore a very large number
of candidate solutions to find the first solution (2,456 solutions on average across
all models). While it is not fair to compare the computation power of a machine
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Figure 6.3: Correlations between time and risks/tasks ratio and between time
and tasks in risk conditions.
to that of humans, this result highlights the complexity of finding a solution. It
is reasonable to think that many of these candidate solutions explored by the
algorithm would also need be evaluated by a human in order to find the right
solution.
We also compared the results obtained using the PRSA algorithm with the
results obtained using the greedy algorithm. In order to select the best mitigation,
the greedy algorithm starts from the current state and selects the mitigation
action that reduces the risk level the most. Once the mitigation action has been
applied, it searches for another mitigation action until the combined process risk
cannot be reduced further. Table 6.3 shows the results obtained using the greedy
algorithm. We can notice that this algorithm, despite being on average faster
than the PRSA algorithm, could not mitigate over 70% of the variants (47 over
180 variants). This result is not unexpected since a mitigation may require several
mitigation actions that taken individually may not necessarily provide the best
mitigation, but that may do so when combined. No differences can be detected
among instances mitigated by the greedy algorithm and by the PRSA algorithm,
this is due to the simplicity of the mitigations required.
In the second experiment, we investigated the factors affecting the perfor-
mance of the algorithm. One would think that the mitigation time is proportional
to the number of risks defined in a process model, and to the model size itself.
The larger the number of risks and/or the model size, the longer it should take
to mitigate such risks. However the data we extrapolated from Table 6.2 does
not confirm this hypothesis. For example, the 21 variants of Process A with 5
risks have mitigation times ranging from 3.3 to 179 secs, despite their sizes and
number of risks being the same. To verify that the mitigation time is not sen-
sitive to the number of risks, nor to the process size, we plotted the correlation
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Solutions [at 1 min] 1 2 3 4 5
Overtime Process + + + + +
Approval Fraud + + + + +
Order Unfulfillment + + ± ± −
Cost 50 50 40 40 19
Table 6.4: Mitigations for the Payment subprocess.
between the mitigation time and the ratio risks/process size in Figure 6.3a (the
solid line is the linear regression of the points). The low value of the coefficient of
determination R2 (0.07) confirms this intuition. We then checked the correlation
between the mitigation time and the number of tasks used in risk conditions. The
intuition is that the more work items of these tasks are pending in a given state
of the process instance, the larger the number of possible mitigation actions. The
corresponding scatter plot is shown in Figure 6.3b, which indeed confirms this
intuition (R2 = 0.74).
Finally, we checked the feasibility of the solutions proposed by the algorithm,
when mitigating the domain-specific risks associated with the Payment subpro-
cess (cf. Section 6.1). We recall that two of these risks (overtime process and
order unfulfillment) are detected when the associated probability, obtained by
analyzing historical data, exceeds a tolerance threshold, whereas the third risk
(approval fraud) involves a complex risk condition. We considered the first state
of an instance of the Payment subprocess when all three risks are active. This
occurs after executing “Update shipment payment order” for the third time, once
task “Approve shipment payment order” has been allocated to a resource who
has already executed this task in the past.
To obtain a small number of solutions, we stopped the algorithm after one min
of execution. In this time-frame, five solutions were retrieved. For each solution,
Table 6.4 reports whether the solution mitigates each of the three risks, and the
cost of the solution in terms of mitigation actions performed on the initial process
instance. In particular, a “−” indicates a risk not mitigated, a “+” indicates a risk
mitigated (with risk probability lower than the specific threshold if the condition
depends on the risk probability), and a “±” indicates a risk mitigated whose
condition cannot be computed for lack of information, i.e. some of the variables
used in the risk condition are null. We recall that the algorithm prioritizes a
solution whose risk is mitigated by computing the risk condition, than a solution
whose risk is mitigated because the respective condition cannot be computed.
The five solutions identified are pairwise mutually non-dominating. Solutions
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1 and 2 are dominated by solutions 3, 4 and 5 cost-wise, but dominate these so-
lutions w.r.t. the mitigation of the order unfulfillment risk. Solution 5 dominates
solutions 3 and 4 cost-wise but is dominated by these two solutions w.r.t. the
mitigation of the order unfulfillment risk.
Let us briefly examine the mitigations performed by the five solutions. The
first four solutions mitigate the approval fraud by deallocating the resource that
was allocated “Approve shipment payment order”, while solution 5 additionally
allocates the work item to a resource who did not execute this task for the same
customer in the past. All these mitigations are feasible, though the one provided
by solution 5 is more robust, since there is no risk that the task gets allocated to a
resource who has already executed it. The order unfulfillment risk is mitigated by
solutions 1 and 2 through rolling back the work item of task “Update shipment
payment order” (which leads to a deoffer of the work item of task “Approve
shipment payment order” that comes afterwards). Solutions 3 and 4 do this too
but also mark this task ‘to be skipped’ preventing a possible re-execution of it.
This action sets to null the risk variables associated with this task that retrieve the
number of executions and its estimated remaining time making the risk mitigated
but not computable. Thus, while all four solutions are feasible, we would prioritise
the first two since these ensure that the risk probability has actually dropped
below the threshold. Finally, all solutions differ in the way they mitigate the
overtime process risk. Each of them skips a different task among those not yet
executed (for simplicity, all of them have the same estimated duration). Despite
the fact that all these solutions are feasible, only the mitigation proposed by
solution 3 is interesting since it proposes to skip tasks “Update Shipment Payment
Order” and “Approve Shipment Payment Order” avoiding this way that the loop
is taken again. In other words, it prevents the order to undergo further updates,
and subsequent approvals.
6.7 Related Work
The mitigation actions proposed in this chapter share commonalities with the
workflow exception patterns [RAH06]. For example, the reoffer pattern at the
work item level can be obtained by combining our mitigation actions deoffer +
offer, which represent atomic operations in this respect. Another similarity is
between our rollback action and the recovery patterns rollback and compensate,
since our rollback can also trigger a compensation action if this is available for
the task being rolled back. Given that we need to operationalize these actions,
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we do provide a precise characterization of all actions and their effects, whereas
the work of Russell et al. [RAH06] limits itself to a textual description of these
exception patterns, as they are observed from an analysis of process modeling
languages and tools. That said, the main contribution of our work is not the
proposed set of mitigation actions per se (which could be replaced or modified)
but rather an automated mechanism for combining these actions in an optimal
way in order to mitigate a set of process-related risks as far as possible.
Risks like those we illustrated in this chapter can also be encoded as con-
straints on top of a process model. Approaches exist that can check whether there
exists at least an instance of a constrained process model that can be executed
without violating the constraints. For example, Combi and Posenato [CP09]
propose a general method for checking the satisfiability of temporal process con-
straints (like our overtime process risk) at design-time. Other approaches can also
enforce these constraints at run-time, so that any process instance will satisfy all
the constraints by construction. For example, Tan et al. [TCG04] propose a model
for constrained workflow execution that addresses cardinality constraints (e.g. to
control how many times a task can be executed), binding of duty constraints (i.e.
the ability of a resource to retain a familiar work item) and separation of duty con-
straints (i.e. different resources should execute different tasks). These constraints
can be enforced only within a given process instance. The approach proposed by
Warner and Atluri [WA06] overcomes this limitation by proposing a constraint
specification language for resource allocation that also addresses inter-instance
constraints. Compared to our work, constrained workflow execution provides a
rigid approach according to which if the constraints cannot be satisfied, a process
model will simply not be instantiated, or if instantiated, the instance violating
the constraints will throw an exception. Commercial systems such as IBM Web-
Sphere and AristaFlow also support constrained workflow execution, and handle
these violations (e.g. violations of temporal constraints) by escalating control to
a process administrator.2 Instead, our technique allows a process instance to
be automatically adapted on-the-fly in order to reduce the risk of violating such
constraints.
Various research frameworks have been proposed for the dynamic adaptation
of process instances. For example, ADEPT [DR09] supports adding, deleting
and changing the sequence of tasks at both the model and instance levels, how-
ever such changes must be achieved via manual intervention by an administrator.
2http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/dmndhelp/v6r1mx/index.jsp?topic=
/com.ibm.wbit.612.help.tel.ui.doc/topics/tescal8.html
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AgentWork [MGR04] provides the ability to modify process instances by dropping
and adding individual tasks based on events and rules. CBRFlow [WWB04] uses
case-based reasoning to support runtime adaptation by allowing users to annotate
rules during process execution. CEVICHE [HSD10] is a service-based framework
that uses the AO4BPEL (Aspect-Oriented for BPEL) language [CM07] to provide
an option for skipping or reallocating tasks to other services in an ad-hoc man-
ner. While these approaches could be used for risk mitigation purposes, they do
not provide any help for the identification of which particular mitigation actions
should be used. The YAWL Worklet Service [AHAE07] provides each task of a
process instance with the ability to be associated with an extensible repertoire
of actions (‘drop-in’ processes), one of which is contextually and dynamically
bound to the task at run-time. It also supports capabilities for dynamically de-
tecting and handling run-time exceptions. However the approach is generic and
not specifically designed for risk detection and mitigation. Also a new situa-
tion cannot automatically be dealt with but requires a workflow administrator to
intervene.
Our work is also related to operational support in process mining [Aal11].
Operational support deals with the analysis of current and historical execution
data, with the aim to predict future states of a running process instance, and pro-
vide recommendations to guide the user in selecting the next activity to execute
based on certain objectives. For example, the approach for cycle time prediction
presented by Van der Aalst et al. [ASS11] could be, with the opportune modi-
fications, adapted for risk prediction. Using this approach it would be possible
to estimate the probability of an overtime risk and suggest the next steps the
current instance should take in order to keep this risk under control. The appli-
cation of this approach unfortunately requires that the process model captures
all the possible mitigation actions as normal activities, i.e. as control-flow alter-
natives. For instance, if a task can be skipped, there should be a path without
that task that leads to the end node of the process model. This may drastically
increase the complexity of the process model. Moreover, this approach would not
be applicable to capture mitigation operations on resources (i.e. deallocating a
resource) or on task states (e.g. suspending a task). That said, more in general,
our technique could be seen as a possible provider for operation support, and
could thus be integrated in process mining environments like ProM.3
Our work provides recommendations to users as to which mitigation actions
can be applied to the specific context at hand. As such, it shares commonalities
3http://processmining.org
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with recommendation and decision support systems. Alter [Alt04] states that the
focus of such systems should be towards improving decision making within work
systems, rather than externalizing support. This view is shared by our technique,
which provides an extension to existing process-aware information systems, rather
than a separate standalone tool. As such, it may be considered a member of the
domain known as Group Decision Support Systems, which facilitate task support
in group environments.
Gambini et al. [GLMH11] explored the use of dominance-based MOSA for au-
tomatically fixing behavioral errors in process models, at design-time. Our work
on risk mitigation can thus be seen as an adaptation of that idea to run-time
aspects, since we aim to improve running process instances. Besides their dis-
tinct aims, the main difference between the two approaches is that for correcting
behavioral errors they defined three objective functions capturing the structural
and behavioral similarity of a solution to the incorrect model, whereas in risk
mitigation the number and type of objective functions depends on which risks
are active in a given state of a process instance.
6.8 Summary
This chapter contributes a concrete technique for the automatic mitigation of
process-related risks at run-time. The technique requires as input an executable
process model and a set of associated risk conditions. At run-time, when one
or more risk conditions evaluate to true, a process administrator can launch our
technique to mitigate the identified risks and bring the process instance back to
a safe state. This is achieved by generating a set of possible mitigations that
change the current instance in order to bring the likelihood of the identified risks
below a tolerance level. These mitigation actions are not performed directly on
the instance under consideration. Rather, their effects are simulated and those
solutions that mitigate the most risks in a given time-frame, are proposed as
recommendations to the process administrator.
The mitigation actions are determined via a dominance-based multi-objective
simulated annealing algorithm. This choice allows us to explore the solution space
as widely as possible, avoiding local optima. In essence, each risk is treated as an
objective function whose likelihood needs be minimized. The objective is reached
as soon as the likelihood goes below the tolerance value for that particular risk.
Mitigation actions affect various aspects of a process, such as task execution and
resources utilization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that
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process-related risks can be mitigated automatically.
The technique was implemented in the YAWL system and its performance
evaluated with real-life process models. The tests show that on the analyzed
process models a set of possible solutions can be found in a matter of seconds, or
within a few minutes in the worst case, and that in all cases the associated risks
are mitigated. We expect this technique to reduce the effort and time required by
process administrators to understand what mitigation actions are feasible based
on a particular state of the system.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis presented a risk-aware business process management framework to
address three shortcomings in the context of risk-aware business process man-
agement: (i) lack of adequate support for the detection of the eventuation of
process-related risks during process execution; (ii) lack of support for the pre-
diction of such risks and for their prevention; and (iii) lack of support for their
mitigation.
The first shortcoming was addressed through the realization of a technique
for real-time monitoring of risks in executable business process models. The
technique embeds elements of risk into the BPM lifecycle: from process design,
where high-level risks are mapped to specific process model elements, through to
process diagnosis, where risks are detected during process execution and process
administrators are notified of those risks that are no longer tolerable. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first solution that concretely embeds risks into
executable business processes and enables their automatic detection at run-time.
The proposed technique was operationalized through the use of a distributed
sensor-based architecture. Each risk is associated with a sensor condition, which is
an undesired state of the process. Conditions can relate to any process aspect both
from the current process instance and from completed instances. At design-time,
these conditions are expressed within a process model via a simple query language,
or through the use of predefined templates. At run-time, when a condition is
violated, a notification is sent to a process administrator about the given risk.
In order to prevent process risks, the second noted shortcoming, we developed
a recommendation system that allows process participants to take risk-informed
decisions. Using historical information extracted from process execution logs, for
each state of a process instance where input is required from a process participant,
the system determines the risk that a fault (or set of faults) will occur, if the
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participant’s input is going to be used to carry on the process instance. This
input can be in the form of data used to fill out a user form, or in terms of the
choice of which work item to execute next.
The system relies on two techniques: one for predicting risks, the other for
identifying the best assignment of participants to the work items currently on
offer. The objective is to minimize both the overall risk (i.e. the combined risk
for all faults) and the execution time of all running process instances.
We designed the system in a language-independent manner, using common
notions of executable process models such as tasks and work items. We then im-
plemented the system as a set of components for the YAWL system. Although we
implemented our ideas in the context of the YAWL system, our recommendation
system can easily be integrated with other BPM systems.
The third and last shortcoming was addressed through a technique for the
automatic mitigation of process-related risks at run-time. The technique requires
as input an executable process model and a set of associated risk conditions. At
run-time, when one or more risk conditions evaluate to true, a process adminis-
trator can use our technique to mitigate the identified risks and bring the process
instance back to a safe state. This is achieved by generating a set of possible
mitigations that change the current instance in order to bring the likelihood of
the identified risks below a given tolerance level. These mitigation actions are
not performed directly on the instance under consideration. Rather, their effects
are simulated and those solutions that mitigate the majority of risks in a given
time-frame, are proposed as recommendations to the process administrator.
The mitigation actions are determined via a dominance-based multi-objective
simulated annealing algorithm. This choice allows us to explore the solution space
as widely as possible, avoiding local optima. In essence, each risk likelihood is
treated as an objective function that needs to be minimized. The objective is
reached as soon as the likelihood goes below the tolerance value for that particular
risk. Mitigation actions affect various aspects of a process, such as task execution
and resource utilization.
In relation to our solution criteria discusses in the Introduction, the approach
presented in this thesis addresses all identified criteria for the management of
process-related risks in executable business processes, i.e. in those processes that
are directly executed by a BPMS or supported by an information system that
produces event logs. The approach is supported by formal foundations and each of
its components has been formally defined. Moreover, while it is realized on top of
a specific system, i.e. the YAWL BPMS, it does not depend on this system and can
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easily be adapted to different process modelling languages and systems. Finally,
each of the techniques here presented has been prototyped and evaluated with
real-life and artificial data. The response times of these techniques are between a
few milliseconds and a few minutes, which make them suitable for near real-time
applications [Wer78]. Further, the usability and easy of use evaluation of the risk
monitoring component, showed that the technique provided value to develop an
understanding of process risks, particularly for users with limited experience in
process modeling or BPMSs.
The work discussed in this thesis suffers from several limitations which offer
opportunities for future work. Firstly, to evaluate the perceived ease of use of
the sensor-based architecture we only checked if the users were able to interpret
a predefined risk condition; we did not ask them to model risks and this can be
an interesting avenue for future work. Secondly, to overcome the low perceived
ease of use of the sensor-based architecture resulting from the usability tests,
the concrete syntax of the sensor definition language can be improved taking
into account the design principle of clarity. Thirdly, manual work is currently
required to convert the results of a risk analysis techniques (e.g. fault trees) into
sensor conditions. This operation is error-prone, especially in the context of
complex risk definitions. In this respect, a mechanism for automatically deriving
skeletons of sensor conditions directly from a fault tree can be devised. This will
allow a smoother transition from high-level risk definitions to low-level sensor
conditions. Moreover, aiding features provided by common source code editors
such as autocomplete, syntax highlighting and bracket matching can be put in
place to reduce the human effort. Finally, the usefulness of templates with end
users needs to be evaluated. In doing so, it is important to consider the results
against their correlation with the user background in terms of exposure to YAWL
in particular, and to risk management in general.
The recommendation system we presented relies on a couple of assumptions.
While we deal with multiple process instances sharing the same pool of partici-
pants, we assume no sharing of data between instances. Further, we assume that
a participant can perform a single task at a time. These assumptions can be lifted.
For example, for the sharing of data between instances the ILP problem needs
to be reformulated in order to consider that the risk estimation of a work item
may change as a consequence of the modification of data by work items that have
been scheduled to be performed first. In order to allow participants to perform
multiple tasks at a time, it is required to assign a capacity to each resource as the
maximum number of work items that a resource can perform in parallel. Our ILP
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problem needs to be reformulated in order to take this capacity into account. In
future work, it will also be interesting to extend this technique such that it will
only provide suggestions in line with the business goals of a company. Achieving
this will require the definition of a language for the specification of business goals
that will then be integrated with the current recommendation system.
An other avenue for future work concerns the validation of the feasibility and
appropriateness of the proposed mitigation actions with domain experts. This can
be achieved by comparing the solutions obtained with our algorithm with those
proposed by such experts. The exploration of the solution space can be improved
by prioritizing the mitigation of those risks that have the highest impact on the
process objectives. In fact, currently all risks are treated alike whereas in reality
this might not be the case. Further, the algorithm could also be extended to
prioritize certain mitigation actions based on how these have been ranked by
users in previously mitigated instances.
Another avenue for future work is to investigate how identified risk mitigations
and prediction suggestions can be incorporated into the process design, in order
to create improved process specifications that are less prone to risk.
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Appendix A
Detailed Abstract Syntax
This appendix provides a detailed description of each element of the abstract
syntax of the sensor definition language.
Definition Description
Sensor , v : Variables; t : Trigger ; A sensor is composed of a set of variables, a trigger,
a risk condition, a fault condition, and a
consequence.
risk : RiskCon; fault : BoolCon;
consequence : MaCon;
Trigger , timer | event A trigger can either can be timer or event based
Variables , Assignment+ A set of variables is a several assignments.
Assignment , result : varName; i : Info A variable assigns a name to an information.
Info , VarFun | Definition | An information is a function invoked on a variable,
a definition, or an information collected from the
process instance (i.e. CaseExp or CaseEleExp).
CaseExp | CaseEleExp
VarFun , ResCon | ResSimFun | The three types of functions invoked on variables
are available: ResCon, ResSimFun or ResComFun.ResComFun
Definition , c : constant A definition is a constant.
CaseExp , cis : CaseIDStat ; a : Action An information related to the process instance.
CaseEleExp , ce : CaseExp; An of information related to an element (i.e. a task
or a net) of the process instance.ton : TaskOrNet
TaskOrNet , taskLabel | netName The identifier of a task or of a net.
CaseIDStat , absExp | relExp | CaseConSet Identifies an instance or a set of instances.
Action , predAct | taskOrNetVar | An action is either a predefined action, a task
variable, a net variable, a subvariable, or a
predefined action that requires an input.
SubVarExp | inputPredAct
SubVarExp , var+ A subvariable of a task variable or of a net variable.
CaseConSet , CaseCon | CaseParam | The three types of identifiers for a set of instances.
CaseConExp
CaseCon , ton : TaskOrNet ; a : Action; Identifies instances for which a specific piece of
information is compared with a RHExp.co : CompOp; rhe : RHExp
CaseParam , i : idFun; co : CompOp; Identifies instances for which the instance ID is
compared with a RHExp.rhe : RHExp
CaseConExp , ccs1 , ccs2 : CaseConSet ; Identifies instances for which several conditions are
satisfied.bo : BoolOp
CompOp , l | leq | g | geq | eq | Set of comparison operators.
contains | isContained
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Definition Description
RHExp , constant | function | Can be a constant, a function, a function invoked
on a variable, or a RHExpSet .varName | RHExpSet
RHExpSet , rhe1 , rhe2 : RHExp; o : Op An arithmetical expression built using RHExp.
RiskCon , likelihood , threshold : MaCon A risk condition is composed of two MaCon.
MaCon , MaITE | MaExp | MaFor | A arithmetical condition can be an if-then-else
expression, an expression, a loop, a function on a
variable, a variable name, or a constant.
FixMaFor | ResSimFun |
ResComFun | varName |
constant
MaITE , if : BoolCon; A arithmetical condition that varies based on the
result of a boolean condition.then, else : MaCon
MaExp , MaUnExp | MaBinExp The two types of arithmetical expression:
MaUnExp or MaBinExp.
MaUnExp , s : sub; me : MaCon A negative arithmetical expression.
MaBinExp , me1 ,me2 : MaCon; mo : MaOp A arithmetical operation between MaCons.
MaOp , add | sub | mul | div | exp | mod The set of arithmetical operators.
BoolCon , BoolITE | BoolExp | BoolFor | A boolean condition can be an if-then-else
expression, an expression, a loop, a comparison, a
function on a variable, a variable, or a constant.
FixBoolFor | Comp | ResCon |
varName | constant
BoolITE , if , then, else : BoolExp A boolean condition that varies based on the result
of another boolean condition.
BoolExp , BoolUnExp | BoolBinExp The two types of boolean expression:
BoolUnExp or BoolBinExp.
BoolUnExp , n : neg; e : BoolCon A negated boolean expression.
BoolBinExp , e1, e2 : BoolCon; bo : BoolOp A boolean operation between BoolCons.
BoolOp , and | or The set of boolean operators.
Comp , ce1 , ce2 : CompElem; A comparison between two CompElems.
co : CompOp
CompElem , MaCon | ResListFun | A comparison element can be a arithmetical
condition, a function invoked on a variable, a
variable, or a constant.
varName | constant
ResCon , res : varName; a : Activity A function invoked on a variable using an activity.
ResListFun , result : varName; A function invoked on a variable. It returns a list.
lrf : listResFun
ResSimFun , resource : varName; A function invoked on a variable which is a
resource.srf : simResFun
ResComFun , res1 , res2 : varName; A function invoked on two variables which are
resources.crf : comResFun
Activity , resource : varName; A function invoked on a variable which is a
resources.lrf : ResListFun
MaFor , t : TypeMF ; lr : ListResult ; A nested loop that cycles on each element of a
ListResult and aggregates the result of a
ForMaCon based on a TypeMF .
fme : ForMaCon
FixMaFor , fixEle : varName; A MaFor that loops on each element of a
ListResult using as index the element fixEle.mf : MaFor
TypeMF , add | mul Two forms of aggregations: adding and multiplying.
BoolFor , t : TypeBF ; lr : ListResult ; A nested loop that loops on each element of a
ListResult and aggregates the result of a
ForBoolCon based on a TypeBF .
fbe : ForBoolCon
FixBoolFor , fixEle : varName; bf : BoolFor A BoolFor that loops on each element of a
ListResult using as index the element fixEle.
TypeBF , and | or Two forms of aggregations: AND or OR.
ListResult , varName+ A list of variables.
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ForMaCon , ForMaITE | ForMaExp | A arithmetical condition can be an if-then-else
expression, an expression, a constant, or a variable.constant | varName
ForMaITE , if : ForBoolCon; A arithmetical condition that varies based on the
result of a boolean condition.then, else : ForMaCon
ForMaExp , ForMaUnExp | ForMaBinExp The two types of arithmetical expression:
ForMaUnExp or ForMaBinExp.
ForMaUnExp , s : sub; me : ForMaCon A negative arithmetical expression.
ForMaBinExp , me1 ,me2 : ForMaCon; A arithmetical operation between ForMaCon.
mo : MaOp
ForBoolCon , ForBoolITE | ForBoolExp | A boolean condition can be an if-then-else
expression, an expression, a comparison, a variable,
or a constant.
ForComp | varName |
constant
ForBoolITE , if , then, else : ForBoolExp A boolean condition that varies based on the result
of another boolean condition.
ForBoolExp , ForBoolUnExp | The two types of boolean expression:
ForBoolUnExp or ForBoolBinExp.ForBoolBinExp
ForBoolUnExp , n : neg; e : ForBoolCon A negated boolean expression.
ForBoolBinExp , e1, e2 : ForBoolCon; A boolean operation between ForBoolCons.
bo : BoolOp
ForComp , ce1 , ce2 : ForCompElem; A comparison between two ForCompElems.
co : CompOp
ForCompElem , ForMaCon | varName | A comparison element can be a arithmetical
condition, a variable, or a constant.constant
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Appendix B
Actions
This appendix describes all actions available in the sensor definition language.
Action Description
(ID) returns the ID of the generic instance that is being analyzed
[IDCurr] returns the ID of the instance that the sensor is monitoring
Count returns the number of times a task has been completed
offerResource returns the resources to which the task has been offered
allocateResource returns the resources to which the task has been allocated
startResource returns the resources that started the task
completeResource returns the resource that completed the task
isOfferd returns “true” if the task has been offered
isAllocated returns “true” if the task has been allocated
isStarted returns “true” if the task has been started
isCompleted returns “true” if the task has been completed
OfferTime returns the time when the task has been offered
AllocateTime returns the time when the task has been allocated
StartTime returns the time when the task has been started
CompleteTime returns the time when the task has been completed
OfferTimeInMillis returns the time (in millisecond) when the task has been offered
AllocateTimeInMillis returns the time (in millisecond) when the task has been allocated
StartTimeInMillis returns the time (in millisecond) when the task has been started
CompleteTimeInMillis returns the time (in millisecond) when the task has been completed
PassTimeInMillis returns the amount of time (in millisecond) that was needed to complete the
task
TimeEstimationInMillis returns an estimation of the time (in millisecond) needed to completed the
task/process
Variable returns the value of the variable or sub-variable required
offerDistribution returns the list of resources to which the task is offered by default
allocateDistribution returns the list of resources to which the task is allocated by default
startDistribution returns the list of resources to which the task is started by default
offerInitiator returns the offering policy of the task (user or system)
allocateInitiator returns the allocating policy of the task (user or system)
startInitiator returns the starting policy of the task (user or system)
CountElements returns the number of instances that satisfy the parameters required
FraudProbabilityFunc
returns the probability of a fraud using as parameters: the current number of
executions, the maximum number of executions allowed, the parameter used
to group these instances, the parameter used to identify a temporal window,
and the dimension of the temporal window
List of actions of the architecture
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Appendix C
Nested Loops
This appendix describes the four types of nested loops available in the sensor
definition language.
For Description
forAND[][] executes a nested loop for each list provided in input (among the first couple of brackets)
resolving the expression (defined among the second couple of brackets), then returns the
AND conjunction of the results obtained
forOR[][] executes a nested loop for each list provided in input (among the first couple of brackets)
resolving the expression (defined among the second couple of brackets), then returns the
OR conjunction of the results obtained
forADD[][] executes a nested loop for each list provided in input (among the first couple of brackets)
resolving the expression (defined among the second couple of brackets), then returns the
sum of the results obtained
forMUL[][] executes a nested loop for each list provided in input (among the first couple of brackets)
resolving the expression (defined among the second couple of brackets), then returns the
product of the results obtained
List of nested loops
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Appendix D
Functions
This appendix describes the functions available in the sensor definition language.
Function Description
offeredList returns the list of tasks currently offered to the resource/resources (re-
turns a list of list if used on resources)
allocatedList returns the list of task currently allocated to the resource/resources (re-
turns a list of list if used on resources)
startedList returns the list of task currently started by the resource/resources (re-
turns a list of list if used on resources)
offeredNumber returns the number of tasks currently offered to the resource/resources
(returns a list if used on resources)
allocatedNumber returns the number of tasks currently allocated to the resource/resources
(returns a list if used on resources)
startedNumber returns the number of tasks currently started by the resource/resources
(returns a list if used on resources)
offeredMinNumber returns the minimum number of tasks currently offered to the re-
source/resources
allocatedMinNumber returns the minimum number of tasks currently allocated to the re-
source/resources
startedMinNumber returns the minimum number of tasks currently started by the re-
source/resources
offeredMinNumberExcept returns the minimum number of tasks currently offered to the re-
source/resources excluding the resource/resources provided in input (the
input is provided using a dotted format after the name of the function)
allocatedMinNumberExcept returns the minimum number of tasks currently allocated to the re-
source/resources excluding the resource/resources provided in input (the
input is provided using a dotted format after the name of the function)
startedMinNumberExcept returns the minimum number of tasks currently started by the re-
source/resources excluding the resource/resources provided in input (the
input is provided using a dotted format after the name of the function)
offeredContain returns true if the task provided in input (using a dotted format after
the name of the function) is currently offered to the resource/resources.
allocatedContain returns true if the task provided in input (using a dotted format after the
name of the function) is currently allocated to the resource/resources.
startedContain returns true if the resource/resources started the task provided in input
(using a dotted format after the name of the function).
List of functions
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Appendix E
Questionnaire
Part 1) Background Questions
E1a: Which description matches best your current status?
• Student
• Academic
• Professional
E1b:Please specify your gender:
• Female
• Male
• Prefer not to tell.
E2: How many years ago did you start process modeling?
Years
E3a: How many process models have you analyzed or read within the last 12
months? (A year has about 250 work days. In case you read one model per day,
this would sum up to 250 models per year)
Models
177
APPENDIX E. QUESTIONNAIRE
E3b: How many process models have you created or edited within the last
12 months?
Models
E3c: How many activities did all these models have on average?
Activities
E4a: How many work days of formal training on process modeling have you
received within the last 12 months? (This includes e.g. university lectures, certi-
fication courses, training courses. 10 weeks of a 120 minute university lecture is
roughly 3 work days)
Days
E4b: How many work days of self-education have you made within the last
12 months? (This includes e.g. learning-by-doing, self-study of textbooks or
specifications)
Days
Part 2) Your experience with Workflow Management Systems
Q1: Which of the following (process) modelling techniques other than YAWL
have you used to describe a process or procedure? Tick all that apply.
• None. Please go to question 10.
• BPMN
• UML
• Activity Diagrams
• EPCs
• BPEL
• Petri Nets
• Protos
• Other:
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Q2: If you have used any technique other than YAWL, roughly, how many
conceptual process models do you think you have created?
process models
Q3: If you have used any technique other than YAWL, roughly, how many
workflow models (i.e. executable process models) do you think you have read?
workflow models
Q4: How long have you been using a Workflow Management System?
• I am evaluating to do so/I have just started
• Less than 1 month
• 1 - 6 months
• 7 - 12 months
• More than 1 year
Q6: Indicate your level of agreement to the following statements on the given
scale by circling the number that best describes your view on the statement.
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Overall, I am very familiar with Work flow
Management Systems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel very confident in my understanding of
Workflow Management Systems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel very competent in using Workflow
Management Systems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part3) Your experience with the YAWL system
Q1: How long have you been using YAWL?
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• I am evaluating to do so/I have just started
• Less than 1 month
• 1 - 6 months
• 7 - 12 months
• More than 1 year
Q2: Please indicate, roughly, the typical extent of usage of YAWL. This
includes any activity related to the YAWL system, e.g. development, reading
documentation, modelling, executing or simulating YAWL workflows, and using
a system that is based on some YAWL component. Keep in mind, a regular
working days has eight hours (480 minutes).
• Not applicable
• On average, I spend hours and minutes on YAWL every working
day.
Q3: Roughly, how many YAWL models do you think you have created or
read?
YAWL models
Q4: Which features of the YAWL system have you ever used? Tick all that
apply
• Not applicable
• Execution environment
• Syntax checker/verification
• Cancelation region
• OR-join
• Multiple instance task
• Deferred choice
• Milestone
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• Retain familiar/Separation of duties
• Deferred distribution
• Distribution set filter
• Allocation strategies
• Worklets/Exlets
• Custom services
• Configuration
Part 4) Risk Sensor Comprehension
In this part, you will be shown 3 risks related to a process described in YAWL.
You will be asked questions about each of them.
Risk 1: Consider the following YAWL model and associated risk condition
described below.
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Variables:
A = case(current).Update Shipment Payment Order(Count)
B = case(Update Shipment Payment Order(Count)>=E).Update
Shipment Payment Order(CountElements)
C = case(Update Shipment Payment Order(Count)>=A AND Process
Shipment Payment(isOffered)=“true”).Update Shipment Pay-
ment Order(CountElements)
D = 0.6
E = 5
Sensor Condition:(C/B)>D where“/” is the division operator
Q0. How difficult is it to understand the meaning of the above sensor condi-
tion:
• 1 – very simple
• 2 – rather simple
• 3 – neutral
• 4 – rather difficult
• 5 – very difficult
Q1. Does the sensor send a notification if the task Update Shipment Payment
Order may not be executed?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q2. Can the sensor notify a risk if the task Update Shipment Payment Order
has been executed only twice?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q3. Does A retrieve the value of a variable named Count of the task Update
Shipment Payment Order?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q4.Does C return the number of instances where the task Process Shipment
Payment has been offered?
PhD Thesis - © 2014 Raffaele Conforti - Page 182
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q5. Does D indicate a threshold that if exceeded produces a notification from
the sensor?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Risk 2: Using the YAWL model of page 6 above, an Approval fraud risk has
been identified using Fault Tree Analysis, as shown below.
To detect the risk of this fault, we first have to check whether there is an
order, say order o of customer c, to be approved. This means checking that an
instance of task Approve Shipment Payment Order is being executed. Moreover,
we need to check that either of the following conditions holds:
1. o has been allocated to a Senior Finance Officer who has already approved
another order for the same customer in the last d days; or
2. at least one Senior Finance Officer is available who approved an order for
customer c in the last d days and all other Senior Finance Officers who
never approved an order for c during the last d days are available
Q0. How difficult is it to understand the meaning of the above risk:
• 1 – very simple
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• 2 – rather simple
• 3 – neutral
• 4 – rather difficult
• 5 – very difficult
Q1. Could condition Abe used as trigger for the sensor?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q2. If condition B is expressed using a variable, would the following assign-
ment be correct?
B = case(current).Approve Shipment Payment Order(allocateResource)
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q3. Could condition D be expressed using only one variable in the risk
condition?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q4. Could condition E be expressed using only one variable in the risk con-
dition?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q5. Could the AND between conditions B and C be expressed using only one
variable in the risk condition?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Risk 3: Consider the following YAWL model and the associated risk condi-
tion described below.
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Variables:
A = case(current).Process Shipment Payment.Customer
B = case(Process Shipment Payment.Customer=A AND Issue
Debit Adjustment(isCompleted)=“true”).Issue Debit Adjust-
ment(CountElements)
C = case(Process Shipment Payment.Customer=A AND Issue
Credit Adjustment(isCompleted)=“true”).Issue Debit Adjust-
ment(CountElements)
D = case(Process Shipment Payment.Customer=A).Process Ship-
mentPayment(CountElements)
F = 0.4
Sensor Condition:
(B/D)>F|(C/D)>F where“/” is the division operator and “|” is the logical
OR operator
Q0. How difficult is it to understand the meaning of the above sensor condition:
• 1 – very simple
• 2 – rather simple
• 3 – neutral
• 4 – rather difficult
• 5 – very difficult
Q1. Does the sensor send a notification if the task Issue Debit Adjustment is
not executed?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q2. Will the sensor send a notification as soon as the task Issue Credit
Adjustment is completed?
• Yes / No / I do not know
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Q3. Does B return the number of instances where the customer is the same
of the current instance and the task Issue Debit Adjustment has been completed?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q4. Does C return the number of instances where the task Process Shipment
Payment has been offered?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Q5. Does B always return a value greater than the value return by C?
• Yes / No / I do not know
Part 5) Your views on the use of the Sensor-based component of
the YAWL system
This part of the survey captures some information about how you overall rate
the Sensor-based component of the YAWL system you have been using. Please
note again that all information you provide will be treated confidently. Thus, we
ask you to please answer honestly.
In the following, you will be given a number of statements on opinions that
you may have towards the Sensor-based component of the YAWL system. Please
indicate your level of agreement to the statements on the given scale by ticking
the box that best describes your view on the respective statement.
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Guidance was available to me in the use of
the Sensor-based component of the YAWL
system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Specialized instruction concerning the use of
the Sensor-based component of the YAWL
system was available to me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A specific person or group was available for
assistance with difficulties with the Sensor-
based component of the YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Satisfaction S
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I am extremely pleased with my use of the
Sensor-base component of the YAWL sys-
tem.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am extremely contented with my use of the
Sensor-base component of the YAWL sys-
tem.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am extremely delighted with my use of the
Sensor-base component of the YAWL sys-
tem.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am extremely satisfied with my use of the
Sensor-base component of the YAWL sys-
tem.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Perceived Usefulness S
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Overall, I find the Sensor- based component
of the YAWL system useful for modelling
process-related risks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I find the Sensor-based component of the
YAWL system useful for achieving the pur-
pose of modelling process-related risks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I find the Sensor-based component of the
YAWL system helps me in meeting my
process-related risks modelling objectives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perceived Ease of Use S
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I find it easy to model process- related risks
in the way I intended using the Sensor-based
component of the YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I find learning to use the Sensor-based com-
ponent of the YAWL system is easy.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I find easy to create process-related risks
using the Sensor-based component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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I intend to use the Sensor-based component
of the YAWL system when I have to define
and detect risks in business processes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I predict I would use the Sensor-based com-
ponent of the YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I plan to use the Sensor-based component
of the YAWL system in the future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I prefer to continue to work with the Sensor-
based component of the YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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